Health Policy

The size of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) workforce continues to contract according to the latest data released by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Applications for employment are down 44% in fiscal year (FY) 2025 with just 14,485 cumulative new hires and 28,969 losses. In 2024, the VHA had 416,667 workers—it now has 401,224. 

The reductions align with VA Secretary Doug Collins’ goal of downsizing the VA’s workforce by 30,000 employees by the end of 2025. In August, Collins outlined how a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force he proposed earlier this year.

Compared with July’s numbers, the VHA now employs 139 fewer medical officers/physicians, 418 fewer registered nurses, 107 fewer social workers, and 65 fewer psychologists. Staffing of licensed practical nurses, medical support assistants, and nursing assistants is also down (reduced by 77, 129, and 29, respectively). 

Retention rates for the first 2 years of onboarding hover around 80% for physicians and nurses. However, retention incentives have dropped from 19,484 to 8982 and recruitment incentives from 6069 to 1299.

In voluntary exit surveys, 78% of 6762 medical and dental staff who left said they would work again for the VA, while 79% said they would recommend the VA as an employer. These rates are down from a similar survey in May 2023 when 81% noted that they would work again for the VA and 82% would recommend the VA to others. Personal matters, geographic relocation, and poor working relationships with supervisors or colleagues were among the reasons cited for leaving in August 2025. 

Of 435 psychologists, 69% said they would work again for the VA, and 62% said they would recommend the VA as an employer (71% and 67%, respectively in May 2023). Their reasons for leaving in August 2025 included a lack of trust in senior leaders and policy or technology barriers to getting the work done.

An August survey from the Office of the Inspector General found that VHA facilities reported 4434 staffing shortages this fiscal year—a 50% increase from fiscal year 2024. Most (94%) of the 139 facilities reported severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% of facilities reported severe shortages for nurses. Due to the timing of the questionnaire, the responses did not yet reflect the full impact from workforce reshaping efforts.

The size of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) workforce continues to contract according to the latest data released by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Applications for employment are down 44% in fiscal year (FY) 2025 with just 14,485 cumulative new hires and 28,969 losses. In 2024, the VHA had 416,667 workers—it now has 401,224. 

The reductions align with VA Secretary Doug Collins’ goal of downsizing the VA’s workforce by 30,000 employees by the end of 2025. In August, Collins outlined how a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force he proposed earlier this year.

Compared with July’s numbers, the VHA now employs 139 fewer medical officers/physicians, 418 fewer registered nurses, 107 fewer social workers, and 65 fewer psychologists. Staffing of licensed practical nurses, medical support assistants, and nursing assistants is also down (reduced by 77, 129, and 29, respectively). 

Retention rates for the first 2 years of onboarding hover around 80% for physicians and nurses. However, retention incentives have dropped from 19,484 to 8982 and recruitment incentives from 6069 to 1299.

In voluntary exit surveys, 78% of 6762 medical and dental staff who left said they would work again for the VA, while 79% said they would recommend the VA as an employer. These rates are down from a similar survey in May 2023 when 81% noted that they would work again for the VA and 82% would recommend the VA to others. Personal matters, geographic relocation, and poor working relationships with supervisors or colleagues were among the reasons cited for leaving in August 2025. 

Of 435 psychologists, 69% said they would work again for the VA, and 62% said they would recommend the VA as an employer (71% and 67%, respectively in May 2023). Their reasons for leaving in August 2025 included a lack of trust in senior leaders and policy or technology barriers to getting the work done.

An August survey from the Office of the Inspector General found that VHA facilities reported 4434 staffing shortages this fiscal year—a 50% increase from fiscal year 2024. Most (94%) of the 139 facilities reported severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% of facilities reported severe shortages for nurses. Due to the timing of the questionnaire, the responses did not yet reflect the full impact from workforce reshaping efforts.

The size of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) workforce continues to contract according to the latest data released by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Applications for employment are down 44% in fiscal year (FY) 2025 with just 14,485 cumulative new hires and 28,969 losses. In 2024, the VHA had 416,667 workers—it now has 401,224. 

The reductions align with VA Secretary Doug Collins’ goal of downsizing the VA’s workforce by 30,000 employees by the end of 2025. In August, Collins outlined how a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force he proposed earlier this year.

Compared with July’s numbers, the VHA now employs 139 fewer medical officers/physicians, 418 fewer registered nurses, 107 fewer social workers, and 65 fewer psychologists. Staffing of licensed practical nurses, medical support assistants, and nursing assistants is also down (reduced by 77, 129, and 29, respectively). 

Retention rates for the first 2 years of onboarding hover around 80% for physicians and nurses. However, retention incentives have dropped from 19,484 to 8982 and recruitment incentives from 6069 to 1299.

In voluntary exit surveys, 78% of 6762 medical and dental staff who left said they would work again for the VA, while 79% said they would recommend the VA as an employer. These rates are down from a similar survey in May 2023 when 81% noted that they would work again for the VA and 82% would recommend the VA to others. Personal matters, geographic relocation, and poor working relationships with supervisors or colleagues were among the reasons cited for leaving in August 2025. 

Of 435 psychologists, 69% said they would work again for the VA, and 62% said they would recommend the VA as an employer (71% and 67%, respectively in May 2023). Their reasons for leaving in August 2025 included a lack of trust in senior leaders and policy or technology barriers to getting the work done.

An August survey from the Office of the Inspector General found that VHA facilities reported 4434 staffing shortages this fiscal year—a 50% increase from fiscal year 2024. Most (94%) of the 139 facilities reported severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% of facilities reported severe shortages for nurses. Due to the timing of the questionnaire, the responses did not yet reflect the full impact from workforce reshaping efforts.

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.