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Question: A doctor may owe a duty of care in the setting of:
A. A cyber relationship.
B. A special relationship.
C. Both A and B.
D. Neither A nor B.
Answer: C. Ascertaining whether a defendant owes a duty to a claimant is the first inquiry in the tort of negligence. To say there is no duty owed is to deny liability altogether, however obvious the breach or horrendous the foreseeable injuries.
Thus, duty is used as a filter mechanism to reduce frivolous suits or otherwise control the tide of litigation, to prevent “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
Duty in the context of medical negligence is not usually in dispute, as it is plainly owed by a doctor to his or her patient. It arises out of the doctor-patient relationship. Whether a relationship has been formed in the first place is a threshold inquiry. Where a doctor accepts a patient who is seeking his or her services, the relationship is readily evident. Duty is also established when the doctor begins the evaluation process in a typical encounter.
However, a phone inquiry by a potential patient, without more, may be insufficient to create this relationship, although this may depend on the nature of the phone conversation and the doctor’s response.
Likewise, a “curbside” consultation sought by a colleague does not normally translate into a duty for the doctor offering the opinion. Presumably casual advice given freely and understood as such at social gatherings does not add up to a doctor-patient relationship, and courts will look to reasonableness as the touchstone in deciding whether such a relationship was ever formed.
Still, there are some medical situations where a legitimate question of duty can be raised. With the growth of electronic medical records and communication, medical encounters in cyberspace will emerge as an increasing source of litigation.
Internet liability can be far reaching. In addition to risks governing negligence, informed consent, and privacy/confidentiality, there are additional issues of product liability, cross-border jurisdictional conflicts, and others.
The threshold question when assessing cyberspace liability arising, for example, from the use of doctor-operated medical websites concerns duty, because its existence or denial will determine whether the case can go forward in the first place. Although not the typical office or hospital patient, a plaintiff may argue successfully that a doctor-patient relationship had nonetheless been formed in cyberspace.
It is possible that such a relationship will be found in some circumstances, relevant factors being knowledge of names of subscribers, frequency of interactions, specificity of queries, and so on. In particular, a subscription fee is likely to be construed as evidence of soliciting and accepting a more committed interaction, so it places the operator of the website at greater legal risk. A specific disclaimer is a standard precaution but may not be enough to definitively protect against a lawsuit.
Courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs despite the absence of face-to-face interaction with a physician. In one case, a doctor speaking to a patient from the emergency department was deemed to have formed a doctor-patient relationship (O’Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 132 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1960). In another, an on-call neurologist’s telephone advice to the treating doctor likewise raised the issue of legal duty (Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App. Dallas 2001).
The state of Hawaii now permits telehealth services to be reimbursable, notwithstanding the absence of face-to-face contact (HI Rev Stat § 431:10A-116.3[a]). With this law, an online encounter will likely translate into a professional relationship – with corresponding legal duty of due care.
In the case of a Good Samaritan physician – i.e., one who offers gratuitous aid to a stranger in need of medical assistance – courts are unlikely to find a professional relationship, because there is no common law duty to help a stranger.
However, once treatment has begun, there is a duty not to make matters worse. So, all 50 states have enacted Good Samaritan statutes, which protect against liability arising out of negligent rescue. Note that statutory protection is generally excluded for Good Samaritan acts performed within a hospital setting, under the theory that doctors have an ongoing relationship with the hospital and are already obligated to provide emergency care within its walls.
Another category of legal duty concerns nonpatient third parties. The complaint may relate to a failure to warn family members of a patient’s contagious disease, or the transmissible condition may have been missed and an innocent third party was injured as a result.
Another situation where duty to a third party might arise is the learning of a credible threat of harm directed at a named individual. This is famously known as the Tarasoff doctrine, after a California case in which the court imposed a duty on a college psychologist to directly warn an intended victim of harm by his patient – even though that meant breaching confidentiality of a professional relationship, and the victim was a nonpatient third party (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 [Cal. 1976]).
A doctor may also incur liability for automobile injuries sustained by one other than his or her own patient. In a Hawaii case, a car suddenly veered across five lanes of traffic, striking an 11-year-old bystander. The driver alleged that the prescription medication prazosin caused him to lose control of the car.
In ruling that the health care provider was liable to the injured bystander, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that physicians have a duty to warn their patients of potential adverse medication effects, and this responsibility should extend to third parties (McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, 47 P.3d 1209 [Haw. 2002]).
A foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm is an important factor, but not the only decisive factor, in construing the existence of a legal duty. Under some circumstances, the term “special relationship” has been employed based on a consideration of “existing social values, customs, and considerations of policy.”
In a Massachusetts case, a family practitioner had failed to warn his patient of the risk of diabetic drugs when operating a vehicle. Just 45 minutes after the patient’s discharge from the hospital, he developed hypoglycemia, losing consciousness and injuring a motorcyclist who then sued the doctor. The court used the “special relationship” rationale in ruling that the doctor owed a duty to the motorcyclist (Arsenault v. McConarty, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 500 [2006]).
Dr. Tan is emeritus professor of medicine and former adjunct professor of law at the University of Hawaii, and currently directs the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics in Honolulu. This article is meant to be educational and does not constitute medical, ethical, or legal advice. Some of the articles in this series are adapted from the author’s 2006 book, “Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Law, Managing the Risk,” and his 2012 Halsbury treatise, “Medical Negligence and Professional Misconduct.” For additional information, readers may contact the author at siang@hawaii.edu.
Question: A doctor may owe a duty of care in the setting of:
A. A cyber relationship.
B. A special relationship.
C. Both A and B.
D. Neither A nor B.
Answer: C. Ascertaining whether a defendant owes a duty to a claimant is the first inquiry in the tort of negligence. To say there is no duty owed is to deny liability altogether, however obvious the breach or horrendous the foreseeable injuries.
Thus, duty is used as a filter mechanism to reduce frivolous suits or otherwise control the tide of litigation, to prevent “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
Duty in the context of medical negligence is not usually in dispute, as it is plainly owed by a doctor to his or her patient. It arises out of the doctor-patient relationship. Whether a relationship has been formed in the first place is a threshold inquiry. Where a doctor accepts a patient who is seeking his or her services, the relationship is readily evident. Duty is also established when the doctor begins the evaluation process in a typical encounter.
However, a phone inquiry by a potential patient, without more, may be insufficient to create this relationship, although this may depend on the nature of the phone conversation and the doctor’s response.
Likewise, a “curbside” consultation sought by a colleague does not normally translate into a duty for the doctor offering the opinion. Presumably casual advice given freely and understood as such at social gatherings does not add up to a doctor-patient relationship, and courts will look to reasonableness as the touchstone in deciding whether such a relationship was ever formed.
Still, there are some medical situations where a legitimate question of duty can be raised. With the growth of electronic medical records and communication, medical encounters in cyberspace will emerge as an increasing source of litigation.
Internet liability can be far reaching. In addition to risks governing negligence, informed consent, and privacy/confidentiality, there are additional issues of product liability, cross-border jurisdictional conflicts, and others.
The threshold question when assessing cyberspace liability arising, for example, from the use of doctor-operated medical websites concerns duty, because its existence or denial will determine whether the case can go forward in the first place. Although not the typical office or hospital patient, a plaintiff may argue successfully that a doctor-patient relationship had nonetheless been formed in cyberspace.
It is possible that such a relationship will be found in some circumstances, relevant factors being knowledge of names of subscribers, frequency of interactions, specificity of queries, and so on. In particular, a subscription fee is likely to be construed as evidence of soliciting and accepting a more committed interaction, so it places the operator of the website at greater legal risk. A specific disclaimer is a standard precaution but may not be enough to definitively protect against a lawsuit.
Courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs despite the absence of face-to-face interaction with a physician. In one case, a doctor speaking to a patient from the emergency department was deemed to have formed a doctor-patient relationship (O’Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 132 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1960). In another, an on-call neurologist’s telephone advice to the treating doctor likewise raised the issue of legal duty (Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App. Dallas 2001).
The state of Hawaii now permits telehealth services to be reimbursable, notwithstanding the absence of face-to-face contact (HI Rev Stat § 431:10A-116.3[a]). With this law, an online encounter will likely translate into a professional relationship – with corresponding legal duty of due care.
In the case of a Good Samaritan physician – i.e., one who offers gratuitous aid to a stranger in need of medical assistance – courts are unlikely to find a professional relationship, because there is no common law duty to help a stranger.
However, once treatment has begun, there is a duty not to make matters worse. So, all 50 states have enacted Good Samaritan statutes, which protect against liability arising out of negligent rescue. Note that statutory protection is generally excluded for Good Samaritan acts performed within a hospital setting, under the theory that doctors have an ongoing relationship with the hospital and are already obligated to provide emergency care within its walls.
Another category of legal duty concerns nonpatient third parties. The complaint may relate to a failure to warn family members of a patient’s contagious disease, or the transmissible condition may have been missed and an innocent third party was injured as a result.
Another situation where duty to a third party might arise is the learning of a credible threat of harm directed at a named individual. This is famously known as the Tarasoff doctrine, after a California case in which the court imposed a duty on a college psychologist to directly warn an intended victim of harm by his patient – even though that meant breaching confidentiality of a professional relationship, and the victim was a nonpatient third party (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 [Cal. 1976]).
A doctor may also incur liability for automobile injuries sustained by one other than his or her own patient. In a Hawaii case, a car suddenly veered across five lanes of traffic, striking an 11-year-old bystander. The driver alleged that the prescription medication prazosin caused him to lose control of the car.
In ruling that the health care provider was liable to the injured bystander, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that physicians have a duty to warn their patients of potential adverse medication effects, and this responsibility should extend to third parties (McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, 47 P.3d 1209 [Haw. 2002]).
A foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm is an important factor, but not the only decisive factor, in construing the existence of a legal duty. Under some circumstances, the term “special relationship” has been employed based on a consideration of “existing social values, customs, and considerations of policy.”
In a Massachusetts case, a family practitioner had failed to warn his patient of the risk of diabetic drugs when operating a vehicle. Just 45 minutes after the patient’s discharge from the hospital, he developed hypoglycemia, losing consciousness and injuring a motorcyclist who then sued the doctor. The court used the “special relationship” rationale in ruling that the doctor owed a duty to the motorcyclist (Arsenault v. McConarty, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 500 [2006]).
Dr. Tan is emeritus professor of medicine and former adjunct professor of law at the University of Hawaii, and currently directs the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics in Honolulu. This article is meant to be educational and does not constitute medical, ethical, or legal advice. Some of the articles in this series are adapted from the author’s 2006 book, “Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Law, Managing the Risk,” and his 2012 Halsbury treatise, “Medical Negligence and Professional Misconduct.” For additional information, readers may contact the author at siang@hawaii.edu.
Question: A doctor may owe a duty of care in the setting of:
A. A cyber relationship.
B. A special relationship.
C. Both A and B.
D. Neither A nor B.
Answer: C. Ascertaining whether a defendant owes a duty to a claimant is the first inquiry in the tort of negligence. To say there is no duty owed is to deny liability altogether, however obvious the breach or horrendous the foreseeable injuries.
Thus, duty is used as a filter mechanism to reduce frivolous suits or otherwise control the tide of litigation, to prevent “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
Duty in the context of medical negligence is not usually in dispute, as it is plainly owed by a doctor to his or her patient. It arises out of the doctor-patient relationship. Whether a relationship has been formed in the first place is a threshold inquiry. Where a doctor accepts a patient who is seeking his or her services, the relationship is readily evident. Duty is also established when the doctor begins the evaluation process in a typical encounter.
However, a phone inquiry by a potential patient, without more, may be insufficient to create this relationship, although this may depend on the nature of the phone conversation and the doctor’s response.
Likewise, a “curbside” consultation sought by a colleague does not normally translate into a duty for the doctor offering the opinion. Presumably casual advice given freely and understood as such at social gatherings does not add up to a doctor-patient relationship, and courts will look to reasonableness as the touchstone in deciding whether such a relationship was ever formed.
Still, there are some medical situations where a legitimate question of duty can be raised. With the growth of electronic medical records and communication, medical encounters in cyberspace will emerge as an increasing source of litigation.
Internet liability can be far reaching. In addition to risks governing negligence, informed consent, and privacy/confidentiality, there are additional issues of product liability, cross-border jurisdictional conflicts, and others.
The threshold question when assessing cyberspace liability arising, for example, from the use of doctor-operated medical websites concerns duty, because its existence or denial will determine whether the case can go forward in the first place. Although not the typical office or hospital patient, a plaintiff may argue successfully that a doctor-patient relationship had nonetheless been formed in cyberspace.
It is possible that such a relationship will be found in some circumstances, relevant factors being knowledge of names of subscribers, frequency of interactions, specificity of queries, and so on. In particular, a subscription fee is likely to be construed as evidence of soliciting and accepting a more committed interaction, so it places the operator of the website at greater legal risk. A specific disclaimer is a standard precaution but may not be enough to definitively protect against a lawsuit.
Courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs despite the absence of face-to-face interaction with a physician. In one case, a doctor speaking to a patient from the emergency department was deemed to have formed a doctor-patient relationship (O’Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 132 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1960). In another, an on-call neurologist’s telephone advice to the treating doctor likewise raised the issue of legal duty (Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App. Dallas 2001).
The state of Hawaii now permits telehealth services to be reimbursable, notwithstanding the absence of face-to-face contact (HI Rev Stat § 431:10A-116.3[a]). With this law, an online encounter will likely translate into a professional relationship – with corresponding legal duty of due care.
In the case of a Good Samaritan physician – i.e., one who offers gratuitous aid to a stranger in need of medical assistance – courts are unlikely to find a professional relationship, because there is no common law duty to help a stranger.
However, once treatment has begun, there is a duty not to make matters worse. So, all 50 states have enacted Good Samaritan statutes, which protect against liability arising out of negligent rescue. Note that statutory protection is generally excluded for Good Samaritan acts performed within a hospital setting, under the theory that doctors have an ongoing relationship with the hospital and are already obligated to provide emergency care within its walls.
Another category of legal duty concerns nonpatient third parties. The complaint may relate to a failure to warn family members of a patient’s contagious disease, or the transmissible condition may have been missed and an innocent third party was injured as a result.
Another situation where duty to a third party might arise is the learning of a credible threat of harm directed at a named individual. This is famously known as the Tarasoff doctrine, after a California case in which the court imposed a duty on a college psychologist to directly warn an intended victim of harm by his patient – even though that meant breaching confidentiality of a professional relationship, and the victim was a nonpatient third party (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 [Cal. 1976]).
A doctor may also incur liability for automobile injuries sustained by one other than his or her own patient. In a Hawaii case, a car suddenly veered across five lanes of traffic, striking an 11-year-old bystander. The driver alleged that the prescription medication prazosin caused him to lose control of the car.
In ruling that the health care provider was liable to the injured bystander, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that physicians have a duty to warn their patients of potential adverse medication effects, and this responsibility should extend to third parties (McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, 47 P.3d 1209 [Haw. 2002]).
A foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm is an important factor, but not the only decisive factor, in construing the existence of a legal duty. Under some circumstances, the term “special relationship” has been employed based on a consideration of “existing social values, customs, and considerations of policy.”
In a Massachusetts case, a family practitioner had failed to warn his patient of the risk of diabetic drugs when operating a vehicle. Just 45 minutes after the patient’s discharge from the hospital, he developed hypoglycemia, losing consciousness and injuring a motorcyclist who then sued the doctor. The court used the “special relationship” rationale in ruling that the doctor owed a duty to the motorcyclist (Arsenault v. McConarty, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 500 [2006]).
Dr. Tan is emeritus professor of medicine and former adjunct professor of law at the University of Hawaii, and currently directs the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics in Honolulu. This article is meant to be educational and does not constitute medical, ethical, or legal advice. Some of the articles in this series are adapted from the author’s 2006 book, “Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Law, Managing the Risk,” and his 2012 Halsbury treatise, “Medical Negligence and Professional Misconduct.” For additional information, readers may contact the author at siang@hawaii.edu.
