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'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA
'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA
Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.
Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).
At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”
When you look at the VA, what do you see?
I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.
There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.
How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?
If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.
One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.
Is VA being pushed toward privatization?
At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.
A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.
Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1
Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2
[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3
The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.
That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.
Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4
That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.
In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5
How can fragmented care be reduced?
Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.
This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.
Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.
Is community care itself the problem?
No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.
Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.
What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?
The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.
Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.
Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?
While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.
As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.
Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.
1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148
2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605
3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635
4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27
5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653
Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.
Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).
At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”
When you look at the VA, what do you see?
I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.
There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.
How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?
If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.
One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.
Is VA being pushed toward privatization?
At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.
A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.
Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1
Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2
[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3
The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.
That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.
Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4
That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.
In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5
How can fragmented care be reduced?
Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.
This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.
Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.
Is community care itself the problem?
No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.
Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.
What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?
The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.
Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.
Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?
While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.
As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.
Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.
Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.
Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).
At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”
When you look at the VA, what do you see?
I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.
There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.
How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?
If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.
One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.
Is VA being pushed toward privatization?
At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.
A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.
Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1
Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2
[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3
The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.
That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.
Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4
That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.
In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5
How can fragmented care be reduced?
Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.
This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.
Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.
Is community care itself the problem?
No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.
Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.
What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?
The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.
Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.
Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?
While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.
As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.
Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.
1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148
2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605
3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635
4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27
5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653
1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148
2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605
3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635
4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27
5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653
'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA
'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA
Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?
Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?
A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it.
Alistair Cooke
When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.
There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.
But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2
As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4
There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.
The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9
In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10
I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.
- Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
- US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
- Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
- New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
- Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
- American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
- National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
- National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
- The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
- Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it.
Alistair Cooke
When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.
There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.
But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2
As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4
There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.
The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9
In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10
I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.
A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it.
Alistair Cooke
When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.
There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.
But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2
As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4
There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.
The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9
In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10
I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.
- Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
- US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
- Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
- New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
- Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
- American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
- National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
- National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
- The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
- Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
- Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
- US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
- Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
- New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
- Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
- American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
- National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
- National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
- The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
- Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?
Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?
The Once and Future Veterans Health Administration
The Once and Future Veterans Health Administration
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle
Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1
This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated.
The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2
In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.
The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4
The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6
The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7
The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8
Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time
Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.
- Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
- Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
- Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
- Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
- Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
- Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
- Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle
Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1
This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated.
The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2
In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.
The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4
The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6
The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7
The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8
Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time
Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle
Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1
This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated.
The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2
In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.
The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4
The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6
The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7
The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8
Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time
Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.
- Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
- Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
- Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
- Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
- Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
- Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
- Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
- Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
- Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
- Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
- Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
- Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
- Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
- Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
The Once and Future Veterans Health Administration
The Once and Future Veterans Health Administration
VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages
VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages
For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortages—in this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.
In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.
Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.
The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.
VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.
VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.
Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.
In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for months—this Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."
The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.
In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.
The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."
For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortages—in this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.
In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.
Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.
The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.
VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.
VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.
Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.
In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for months—this Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."
The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.
In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.
The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."
For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortages—in this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.
In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.
Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.
The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.
VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.
VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.
Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.
In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for months—this Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."
The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.
In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.
The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."
VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages
VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages
VA Workforce Shrinking as it Loses Collective Bargaining Rights
VA Workforce Shrinking as it Loses Collective Bargaining Rights
The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.
According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.
The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.
VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.
During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.
The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.
According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.
The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.
VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.
During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.
The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.
According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.
The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.
VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.
During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.
VA Workforce Shrinking as it Loses Collective Bargaining Rights
VA Workforce Shrinking as it Loses Collective Bargaining Rights
AVAHO Encourages Members to Make Voices Heard
Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.
To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”
"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."
Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.
To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”
"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."
Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.
To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”
"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."
VA Choice Bill Defeated in the House
A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.
Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.
AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”
The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.
The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.
A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.
Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.
AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”
The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.
The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.
A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.
Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.
AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”
The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.
The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.
Involving Concerned Significant Others in Firearm Suicide Prevention: Development of the Family FireArms Secure Storage Training Intervention
Involving Concerned Significant Others in Firearm Suicide Prevention: Development of the Family FireArms Secure Storage Training Intervention
Veterans are at higher risk for suicide compared with civilian populations.1 Firearms are the most frequent cause of death in veteran deaths by suicide, likely because about 51% of veterans own ≥ 1 firearms and firearms are the most lethal and readily available mechanism.1-3 Unsecure firearm storage practices (eg, storing firearms unlocked, in an unsecure location, or loaded with ammunition) are associated with increased suicide risk.4 Conversely, secure firearm storage (ie, storing firearms locked and unloaded) is associated with lower suicide risk.5
A 2019 study of veterans who own firearms found that only 22.2% store all their firearms unloaded and locked, while 32.7% store ≥ 1 firearm unlocked and loaded, and 45.2% store firearms both unlocked and loaded or locked and unloaded. Only 6.3% of veterans strongly agreed that having a firearm at home increased suicide risk among household members; however, 77.2% indicated they would ensure a household member could not access firearms if they were concerned about their suicidal ideation.6
Another study found that 9.2% of veterans receive lethal means safety counseling from their US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-affiliated or non-VA health care professional.7 These data highlight a need to educate veterans about the increased risk for suicide associated with storing an unsecured firearm in the household and to connect this understanding to their values of service and protection of others, while simultaneously preparing them and their family members for a potential mental health crisis.
Consistent with the government’s public health approach to suicide prevention, prevention efforts should also enlist the participation of individuals outside health care.8 For example, prior research has found that family members are considered highly credible, and engaging them could expand the reach of lethal means safety conversations. A qualitative analysis of 29 veterans found that 17 (57%) said they preferred having a concerned significant other (CSO) (eg, spouse, adult friend, or relative) involved in their suicide prevention care, while 21 (72%) said they would prefer having a CSO assisting in the secure storage of firearms.9,10 Some veterans may be more amenable to a conversation about firearm access and suicide risk concerns initiated by a CSO rather than by a clinician, indicating the potential benefits of educating and involving CSOs in suicide prevention.11 Involving CSOs in secure firearm storage planning may also strengthen the veteran’s sense of social support, a key protective factor against suicidal ideation.12
CSO involvement in secure firearm storage can provide the following benefits: (1) helping the veteran create a secure storage plan, including developing approaches to secure storage; (2) understanding warning signs of suicide; (3) helping the veteran limit access to firearms during a suicidal crisis; (4) helping the veteran remember the secure storage plan; (5) helping the veteran connect with mental health services; and (6) enhancing social support. In most instances, CSOs are physically close to the veteran (eg, live in the same household) and have a greater practical ability to support and affect change with respect to changes in firearm storage practices.
This article describes the development of an intervention that incorporates CSO involvement in firearms safety efforts for veterans with guidance from VA mental health care practitioners (HCPs). The goal is to provide HCPs and other key stakeholders with a detailed description of the intervention and to suggest potential strategies for how to involve CSOs in suicide prevention.
This article follows the Guideline for Reporting Evidence-based Practice Educational interventions and Teaching checklist, which was developed to facilitate standardized reporting and replication for education interventions.13 Applicable portions of the checklist are outlined, with others (ie, incentives, planned/unplanned changes, attendance, and other outcomes) to be addressed in future research.
FFAST INTERVENTION
Training (FFAST) intervention promotes voluntary secure firearm storage, engages CSOs in veteran mental health care, and provides psychoeducation and skills to support crisis management. The intervention was developed for all veterans who do not securely store firearms.
Theory
The intervention incorporates motivational interviewing techniques, as ambivalence about changing firearm storage behaviors is common, particularly when veterans own firearms for safety or protection.6,14 Motivational interviewing is a collaborative approach that addresses a client’s ambivalence to change by eliciting and exploring the client’s own arguments related to change.14 An important aspect of developing this intervention was to ensure it would be culturally relevant to veteran firearm owners and their CSOs.15 Further, involvement of the CSO is intentional and meant to boost social support, a known buffering factor against suicide risk.12
Objectives
This intervention’s primary objective was for veteran participants to identify secure firearm storage practices and develop a plan for implementing them, including when a veteran or other household member experiences a mental health crisis. For CSOs, the primary objective is to learn how to help the veteran connect with mental health resources if needed and support secure firearm storage as necessary. The overall goal is to learn how to identify warning signs for suicide and how to respond to a mental health crisis through a collaborative process, including securing firearms in a crisis situation.
Materials, Educational Strategies, and Instructors
Training for delivering the intervention was provided via direct consultation with the developer of the intervention and manual. The manual contains pertinent background information to provide context for the intervention’s significance and rationale, including the role of firearms in suicides and current lethal means safety initiatives. It also describes the purpose and objective of each intervention component in detail in addition to providing a script for interventionists to follow to complete each objective.
Training materials for veterans and CSOs include a single Firearms Secure Storage Planning worksheet completed during the intervention, with which the interventionist guides participants through the creation of a secure firearm storage plan (Table). Educational strategies include psychoeducation and Socratic questioning (eg, questioning focused on guiding participants toward the intervention goals) delivered verbally by the interventionist.

The intervention is delivered in person or virtually during a single 90-minute session with a veteran and CSO. Veterans and CSOs work with the interventionist to complete collaborative activities during the session and have self-directive learning activities or homework.
The intervention has 4 primary components: (1) CSO involvement; (2) psychoeducation; (3) secure firearm storage; and (4) how to respond to a mental health crisis. Each CSO should have an established relationship with the veteran, be willing and able to be present during the intervention, and remain an encouraging support person for the veteran. The interventionist emphasizes that it is part of the VA mission for staff to care about the veteran, and that initiating such contact with a CSO is meant to prioritize veteran safety and the safety of their family. Psychoeducation on mental health symptoms, suicide warning signs, veteran suicide rates and lethal means, and the benefits of secure firearm storage, is incorporated in the intervention.
The secure firearm storage component consists of 7 subcomponents: (1) general lethal means secure storage; (2) warning signs; (3) dyad communication; (4) lethal means safety when symptoms emerge; (5) coping strategies; (6) social support; and (7) emergency contacts. A lethal means safety worksheet rooted in the Stanley and Brown suicide safety plan model and implemented in VA health care settings is used to facilitate discussions of secure storage (Appendix).16

CSOs typically have little or no suicidal crisis response training, yet they likely have more interaction with the veteran on a daily basis than HCPs, putting them in a vital position to identify a crisis early and connect the veteran with the proper care. The crisis component prepares the CSO and veteran to navigate a crisis scenario so they can practice their newly developed safety plan and increase their comfort in discussing mental health and suicidal crisis.
FICTIONAL CASE STUDY
Cole, aged 59 years, is a Persian Gulf War veteran and retired police officer. His medical history includes hypothyroidism, hypertension, type 2 diabetes mellitus, chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and insomnia.
Cole's wife of > 30 years, Sheila, joined him for the FFAST intervention. They report having 4 firearms in the home, 3 of which are loaded but stored in a lockbox and 1 that Cole reports is kept on his person for protection. Cole reports passive suicidal ideation, but no plans or intent. When discussing warning signs that a mental health crisis is building, Cole describes feeling anxious, having a change in his speech patterns, and isolating himself. Sheila agrees, but also mentions that Cole is easily angered and becomes nonverbal. Cole and Sheila express difficulty communicating and appear to have a breakthrough moment when Cole says he does not like when Sheila repeats herself, as he feels like she is “poking” at him. Sheila shares concerns for his safety and that she only repeats herself because he refuses to talk.
Cole agrees to verbalize that he is safe but needs time to process his thoughts. Sheila agrees to give him space with a plan to revisit the conversation within an agreed upon timeline. When discussing an updated secure storage plan for their firearms when a mental health crisis is building, Cole commits to allowing Sheila to store the firearm currently on his person in their gun safe, with the ammunition stored separately, and to giving her the gun safe key. They agree to implement this practice until the mental health crisis has passed.
To mitigate a potential crisis, the interventionist discusses possible internal coping strategies for Cole, including writing, reading, walking the dog, listening to music, and baking. People and social settings that could provide distraction involve going to the gym, talking to his friend Carl or his daughter Kelly, and attending the men’s ministry at church. The intervention concludes by discussing professionals or agencies that Cole and Sheila could contact during a crisis. After the intervention, Cole and Sheila are asked to rate their likelihood of using the plan they established during the conversation on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being highly unlikely and 10 being extremely likely. Cole responds with 9 and Sheila responds with 10.
DISCUSSION
Lethal means safety remains a critical component of veteran suicide prevention. However, lethal means safety discussions are often implemented after suicide risk has been identified, which may be too late. Thus, having these conversations early and before a crisis may be imperative. Veterans have expressed a desire to have CSOs involved in their suicide prevention treatment, and CSOs can play a key role in recognizing risk factors during everyday life. The FFAST intervention addresses many of these gaps.
Having discussions in advance of a crisis allows veterans to consider an effective secure firearm storage plan outside of the context of a crisis. Including a CSO galvanizes another person to understand a veteran’s needs and assist with secure firearm storage, identify warning signs, and support them during a crisis. These discussions occur in a context where there is less pressure than during a crisis. Features that were more appealing to veterans and their CSOs were also incorporated, such as having the dyad build a plan that is conceptually similar to other public safety initiatives (eg, a fire safety plan, tornado plan, or hurricane plan). Previous research demonstrates that veterans appreciated the nonjudgmental approach and some preferred that clinicians approach the discussion of secure firearm storage within the context of general home and family safety.17 Additionally, this intervention can build on veterans’ prior military training in preparedness.
Other potential benefits associated with the FFAST intervention include creating an opportunity to strengthen communication between the veteran and CSO. While FFAST is intended to be used with all types of CSOs, this work is consistent with preliminary data from a couples-based suicide prevention study that indicated veterans and their partners reported increases in relationship functioning and marginal decreases in suicidal ideation.18 It is possible that communication strategies gained from the current intervention could improve veterans’ relationships with their CSOs, which are associated with a greater sense of social support and reduced suicide risk.12
The intervention is a brief, single session that may be appealing to veterans and CSOs with full schedules. Evidence suggests that even brief, single-session interventions have a significant impact on beliefs about secure firearm storage, knowledge of lethal means safety, and confidence in having secure firearm storage conversations.19 However, clinicians should be cautious when extrapolating from the findings of the current case example, which was a one-time intervention with no follow-up.
Future Directions
Pilot testing of the proposed intervention is underway, and future research will include feedback from veterans and CSOs, as well as feasibility and acceptability data collected during the pilot process. The pilot study uses a successive cohort design with an initial 2 sets of 5 veteran and CSO dyads, and subsequent funding has expanded the pilot study to include an additional 30 dyads. Qualitative interviews will be conducted separately with each veteran and CSO, and additional constructs such as feasibility, acceptability, barriers and facilitators to implementation, and changes in secure storage will be examined. This future research may provide a deeper understanding of the broader acceptability, feasibility, and satisfaction associated with a suicide prevention intervention focused on securing firearms and involving veterans and their CSOs. These data could be used to inform future implementation trials and inform the development of an implementation strategy. In the interim, the nature of the manual is summarized in the context of the urgency of suicide prevention in this at-risk population.
Conclusions
FFAST is a novel approach to veteran firearm suicide prevention. By involving CSOs and emphasizing mental health crisis preparedness between them and veterans, the dyad can work in association with HCPs to establish and exercise secure firearm storage practices as part of an at-home safety plan. Implementation of FFAST may be beneficial for all veterans, not only those who have been identified as being at high suicide risk.
- US Dept of Veterans Affairs Office of Suicide Prevention. 2024 national veteran suicide prevention annual report. December 2024. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2024/2024-Annual-Report-Part-2-of-2_508.pdf
- Fischer IC, Aunon FM, Nichter B, et al. Firearm ownership among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans. Am J Prev Med. 2023;65:1129-1133. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2023.06.013
- Conner A, Azrael D, Miller M. Suicide case-fatality rates in the United States, 2007-2014: a nationwide population-based study. Ann Intern Med. 2019;171(12):885-895. doi:10.7326/M19-1324
- Dempsey CL, Benedek DM, Zuromski KL, et al. Association of firearm ownership, use, accessibility, and storage practices with suicide risk among US army soldiers. JAMA Netw Open. 2019;2:e195383. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.5383
- Butterworth SE, Daruwala SE, Anestis MD. Firearm storage and shooting experience: factors relevant to the practical capability for suicide. J Psychiatr Res. 2018;102:52-56. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2018.03.010
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Miller M. Firearm storage practices and risk perceptions among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans with and without self-harm risk factors. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2019;49:653-664. doi:10.1111/sltb.12463
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Zhang W, Miller M. Receipt of clinician-delivered firearm safety counseling among U.S. veterans: results from a 2019 national survey. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2022;52:1121-1125. doi:10.1111/sltb.12906
- US Office of the Surgeon General. The surgeon general’s call to action to implement the national strategy for suicide prevention. January 2021. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sprc-call-to-action.pdf
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Kittel JA, et al. Quality Improvement Evaluation of the Feasibility and Acceptability of Adding a Concerned Significant Other to Safety Planning for Suicide Prevention With Veterans. J Ment Health Couns. 2019;41:4-20. doi:10.17744/mehc.41.1.02
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Degutis LC, et al. Firearms lethal means safety among veterans: attitudes toward involving a concerned significant other. J Mil Veteran Fam Health. 2025;11:23-31.
- Monteith LL, Holliday R, Dorsey Holliman BA, et al. Understanding female veterans’ experiences and perspectives of firearms. J Clin Psychol. 2020;76:1736-1753. doi:10.1002/jclp.22952
- DeBeer BB, Kimbrel NA, Meyer EC, et al. Combined PTSD and depressive symptoms interact with post-deployment social support to predict suicidal ideation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans. Psychiatry Res. 2014;216:357-362. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2014.02.010
- Phillips AC, Lewis LK, McEvoy MP, et al. Development and validation of the guideline for reporting evidence-based practice educational interventions and teaching (GREET). BMC Med Educ. 2016;16:237. doi:10.1186/s12909-016-0759-1
- Miller WR, Rollnick S. Motivational Interviewing: Helping People Change. 3rd ed. Guilford Press; 2013.
- Khazanov GK, Keddem S, Hoskins K, et al. Stakeholder perceptions of lethal means safety counseling: a qualitative systematic review. Front Psychiatry. 2022;13:993415. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2022.993415
- Stanley B, Brown GK, Karlin B, et al. US Dept of Veterans Affairs. Safety plan treatment manual to reduce suicide risk: veteran version. August 20, 2008. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/mentalhealth/docs/va_safety_planning_manual.doc
- Dobscha SK, Clark KD, Newell S, et al. Strategies for discussing firearms storage safety in primary care: veteran perspectives. J Gen Intern Med. 2021;36:1492-1502. doi:10.1007/s11606-020-06412-x
- Khalifian CE, Leifker FR, Knopp K, et al. Utilizing the couple relationship to prevent suicide: a preliminary examination of treatment for relationships and safety together. J Clin Psych. 2022;78:747-757. doi:10.1002/jclp.23251
- Walsh A, Friedman K, Morrissey BH, et al. Project Safe Guard: evaluating a lethal means safety intervention to reduce firearm suicide in the National Guard. Mil Med. 2024;189:510-516. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae172
- Beck AT. Beyond belief: a theory of modes, personality, and psychopathology. In: Salkovkis PM, ed. Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy. Guilford Press;1996:1-25.
- Rudd MD. The suicidal mode: a cognitive-behavioral model of suicidality. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2000;30(1):18-33.
Veterans are at higher risk for suicide compared with civilian populations.1 Firearms are the most frequent cause of death in veteran deaths by suicide, likely because about 51% of veterans own ≥ 1 firearms and firearms are the most lethal and readily available mechanism.1-3 Unsecure firearm storage practices (eg, storing firearms unlocked, in an unsecure location, or loaded with ammunition) are associated with increased suicide risk.4 Conversely, secure firearm storage (ie, storing firearms locked and unloaded) is associated with lower suicide risk.5
A 2019 study of veterans who own firearms found that only 22.2% store all their firearms unloaded and locked, while 32.7% store ≥ 1 firearm unlocked and loaded, and 45.2% store firearms both unlocked and loaded or locked and unloaded. Only 6.3% of veterans strongly agreed that having a firearm at home increased suicide risk among household members; however, 77.2% indicated they would ensure a household member could not access firearms if they were concerned about their suicidal ideation.6
Another study found that 9.2% of veterans receive lethal means safety counseling from their US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-affiliated or non-VA health care professional.7 These data highlight a need to educate veterans about the increased risk for suicide associated with storing an unsecured firearm in the household and to connect this understanding to their values of service and protection of others, while simultaneously preparing them and their family members for a potential mental health crisis.
Consistent with the government’s public health approach to suicide prevention, prevention efforts should also enlist the participation of individuals outside health care.8 For example, prior research has found that family members are considered highly credible, and engaging them could expand the reach of lethal means safety conversations. A qualitative analysis of 29 veterans found that 17 (57%) said they preferred having a concerned significant other (CSO) (eg, spouse, adult friend, or relative) involved in their suicide prevention care, while 21 (72%) said they would prefer having a CSO assisting in the secure storage of firearms.9,10 Some veterans may be more amenable to a conversation about firearm access and suicide risk concerns initiated by a CSO rather than by a clinician, indicating the potential benefits of educating and involving CSOs in suicide prevention.11 Involving CSOs in secure firearm storage planning may also strengthen the veteran’s sense of social support, a key protective factor against suicidal ideation.12
CSO involvement in secure firearm storage can provide the following benefits: (1) helping the veteran create a secure storage plan, including developing approaches to secure storage; (2) understanding warning signs of suicide; (3) helping the veteran limit access to firearms during a suicidal crisis; (4) helping the veteran remember the secure storage plan; (5) helping the veteran connect with mental health services; and (6) enhancing social support. In most instances, CSOs are physically close to the veteran (eg, live in the same household) and have a greater practical ability to support and affect change with respect to changes in firearm storage practices.
This article describes the development of an intervention that incorporates CSO involvement in firearms safety efforts for veterans with guidance from VA mental health care practitioners (HCPs). The goal is to provide HCPs and other key stakeholders with a detailed description of the intervention and to suggest potential strategies for how to involve CSOs in suicide prevention.
This article follows the Guideline for Reporting Evidence-based Practice Educational interventions and Teaching checklist, which was developed to facilitate standardized reporting and replication for education interventions.13 Applicable portions of the checklist are outlined, with others (ie, incentives, planned/unplanned changes, attendance, and other outcomes) to be addressed in future research.
FFAST INTERVENTION
Training (FFAST) intervention promotes voluntary secure firearm storage, engages CSOs in veteran mental health care, and provides psychoeducation and skills to support crisis management. The intervention was developed for all veterans who do not securely store firearms.
Theory
The intervention incorporates motivational interviewing techniques, as ambivalence about changing firearm storage behaviors is common, particularly when veterans own firearms for safety or protection.6,14 Motivational interviewing is a collaborative approach that addresses a client’s ambivalence to change by eliciting and exploring the client’s own arguments related to change.14 An important aspect of developing this intervention was to ensure it would be culturally relevant to veteran firearm owners and their CSOs.15 Further, involvement of the CSO is intentional and meant to boost social support, a known buffering factor against suicide risk.12
Objectives
This intervention’s primary objective was for veteran participants to identify secure firearm storage practices and develop a plan for implementing them, including when a veteran or other household member experiences a mental health crisis. For CSOs, the primary objective is to learn how to help the veteran connect with mental health resources if needed and support secure firearm storage as necessary. The overall goal is to learn how to identify warning signs for suicide and how to respond to a mental health crisis through a collaborative process, including securing firearms in a crisis situation.
Materials, Educational Strategies, and Instructors
Training for delivering the intervention was provided via direct consultation with the developer of the intervention and manual. The manual contains pertinent background information to provide context for the intervention’s significance and rationale, including the role of firearms in suicides and current lethal means safety initiatives. It also describes the purpose and objective of each intervention component in detail in addition to providing a script for interventionists to follow to complete each objective.
Training materials for veterans and CSOs include a single Firearms Secure Storage Planning worksheet completed during the intervention, with which the interventionist guides participants through the creation of a secure firearm storage plan (Table). Educational strategies include psychoeducation and Socratic questioning (eg, questioning focused on guiding participants toward the intervention goals) delivered verbally by the interventionist.

The intervention is delivered in person or virtually during a single 90-minute session with a veteran and CSO. Veterans and CSOs work with the interventionist to complete collaborative activities during the session and have self-directive learning activities or homework.
The intervention has 4 primary components: (1) CSO involvement; (2) psychoeducation; (3) secure firearm storage; and (4) how to respond to a mental health crisis. Each CSO should have an established relationship with the veteran, be willing and able to be present during the intervention, and remain an encouraging support person for the veteran. The interventionist emphasizes that it is part of the VA mission for staff to care about the veteran, and that initiating such contact with a CSO is meant to prioritize veteran safety and the safety of their family. Psychoeducation on mental health symptoms, suicide warning signs, veteran suicide rates and lethal means, and the benefits of secure firearm storage, is incorporated in the intervention.
The secure firearm storage component consists of 7 subcomponents: (1) general lethal means secure storage; (2) warning signs; (3) dyad communication; (4) lethal means safety when symptoms emerge; (5) coping strategies; (6) social support; and (7) emergency contacts. A lethal means safety worksheet rooted in the Stanley and Brown suicide safety plan model and implemented in VA health care settings is used to facilitate discussions of secure storage (Appendix).16

CSOs typically have little or no suicidal crisis response training, yet they likely have more interaction with the veteran on a daily basis than HCPs, putting them in a vital position to identify a crisis early and connect the veteran with the proper care. The crisis component prepares the CSO and veteran to navigate a crisis scenario so they can practice their newly developed safety plan and increase their comfort in discussing mental health and suicidal crisis.
FICTIONAL CASE STUDY
Cole, aged 59 years, is a Persian Gulf War veteran and retired police officer. His medical history includes hypothyroidism, hypertension, type 2 diabetes mellitus, chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and insomnia.
Cole's wife of > 30 years, Sheila, joined him for the FFAST intervention. They report having 4 firearms in the home, 3 of which are loaded but stored in a lockbox and 1 that Cole reports is kept on his person for protection. Cole reports passive suicidal ideation, but no plans or intent. When discussing warning signs that a mental health crisis is building, Cole describes feeling anxious, having a change in his speech patterns, and isolating himself. Sheila agrees, but also mentions that Cole is easily angered and becomes nonverbal. Cole and Sheila express difficulty communicating and appear to have a breakthrough moment when Cole says he does not like when Sheila repeats herself, as he feels like she is “poking” at him. Sheila shares concerns for his safety and that she only repeats herself because he refuses to talk.
Cole agrees to verbalize that he is safe but needs time to process his thoughts. Sheila agrees to give him space with a plan to revisit the conversation within an agreed upon timeline. When discussing an updated secure storage plan for their firearms when a mental health crisis is building, Cole commits to allowing Sheila to store the firearm currently on his person in their gun safe, with the ammunition stored separately, and to giving her the gun safe key. They agree to implement this practice until the mental health crisis has passed.
To mitigate a potential crisis, the interventionist discusses possible internal coping strategies for Cole, including writing, reading, walking the dog, listening to music, and baking. People and social settings that could provide distraction involve going to the gym, talking to his friend Carl or his daughter Kelly, and attending the men’s ministry at church. The intervention concludes by discussing professionals or agencies that Cole and Sheila could contact during a crisis. After the intervention, Cole and Sheila are asked to rate their likelihood of using the plan they established during the conversation on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being highly unlikely and 10 being extremely likely. Cole responds with 9 and Sheila responds with 10.
DISCUSSION
Lethal means safety remains a critical component of veteran suicide prevention. However, lethal means safety discussions are often implemented after suicide risk has been identified, which may be too late. Thus, having these conversations early and before a crisis may be imperative. Veterans have expressed a desire to have CSOs involved in their suicide prevention treatment, and CSOs can play a key role in recognizing risk factors during everyday life. The FFAST intervention addresses many of these gaps.
Having discussions in advance of a crisis allows veterans to consider an effective secure firearm storage plan outside of the context of a crisis. Including a CSO galvanizes another person to understand a veteran’s needs and assist with secure firearm storage, identify warning signs, and support them during a crisis. These discussions occur in a context where there is less pressure than during a crisis. Features that were more appealing to veterans and their CSOs were also incorporated, such as having the dyad build a plan that is conceptually similar to other public safety initiatives (eg, a fire safety plan, tornado plan, or hurricane plan). Previous research demonstrates that veterans appreciated the nonjudgmental approach and some preferred that clinicians approach the discussion of secure firearm storage within the context of general home and family safety.17 Additionally, this intervention can build on veterans’ prior military training in preparedness.
Other potential benefits associated with the FFAST intervention include creating an opportunity to strengthen communication between the veteran and CSO. While FFAST is intended to be used with all types of CSOs, this work is consistent with preliminary data from a couples-based suicide prevention study that indicated veterans and their partners reported increases in relationship functioning and marginal decreases in suicidal ideation.18 It is possible that communication strategies gained from the current intervention could improve veterans’ relationships with their CSOs, which are associated with a greater sense of social support and reduced suicide risk.12
The intervention is a brief, single session that may be appealing to veterans and CSOs with full schedules. Evidence suggests that even brief, single-session interventions have a significant impact on beliefs about secure firearm storage, knowledge of lethal means safety, and confidence in having secure firearm storage conversations.19 However, clinicians should be cautious when extrapolating from the findings of the current case example, which was a one-time intervention with no follow-up.
Future Directions
Pilot testing of the proposed intervention is underway, and future research will include feedback from veterans and CSOs, as well as feasibility and acceptability data collected during the pilot process. The pilot study uses a successive cohort design with an initial 2 sets of 5 veteran and CSO dyads, and subsequent funding has expanded the pilot study to include an additional 30 dyads. Qualitative interviews will be conducted separately with each veteran and CSO, and additional constructs such as feasibility, acceptability, barriers and facilitators to implementation, and changes in secure storage will be examined. This future research may provide a deeper understanding of the broader acceptability, feasibility, and satisfaction associated with a suicide prevention intervention focused on securing firearms and involving veterans and their CSOs. These data could be used to inform future implementation trials and inform the development of an implementation strategy. In the interim, the nature of the manual is summarized in the context of the urgency of suicide prevention in this at-risk population.
Conclusions
FFAST is a novel approach to veteran firearm suicide prevention. By involving CSOs and emphasizing mental health crisis preparedness between them and veterans, the dyad can work in association with HCPs to establish and exercise secure firearm storage practices as part of an at-home safety plan. Implementation of FFAST may be beneficial for all veterans, not only those who have been identified as being at high suicide risk.
Veterans are at higher risk for suicide compared with civilian populations.1 Firearms are the most frequent cause of death in veteran deaths by suicide, likely because about 51% of veterans own ≥ 1 firearms and firearms are the most lethal and readily available mechanism.1-3 Unsecure firearm storage practices (eg, storing firearms unlocked, in an unsecure location, or loaded with ammunition) are associated with increased suicide risk.4 Conversely, secure firearm storage (ie, storing firearms locked and unloaded) is associated with lower suicide risk.5
A 2019 study of veterans who own firearms found that only 22.2% store all their firearms unloaded and locked, while 32.7% store ≥ 1 firearm unlocked and loaded, and 45.2% store firearms both unlocked and loaded or locked and unloaded. Only 6.3% of veterans strongly agreed that having a firearm at home increased suicide risk among household members; however, 77.2% indicated they would ensure a household member could not access firearms if they were concerned about their suicidal ideation.6
Another study found that 9.2% of veterans receive lethal means safety counseling from their US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-affiliated or non-VA health care professional.7 These data highlight a need to educate veterans about the increased risk for suicide associated with storing an unsecured firearm in the household and to connect this understanding to their values of service and protection of others, while simultaneously preparing them and their family members for a potential mental health crisis.
Consistent with the government’s public health approach to suicide prevention, prevention efforts should also enlist the participation of individuals outside health care.8 For example, prior research has found that family members are considered highly credible, and engaging them could expand the reach of lethal means safety conversations. A qualitative analysis of 29 veterans found that 17 (57%) said they preferred having a concerned significant other (CSO) (eg, spouse, adult friend, or relative) involved in their suicide prevention care, while 21 (72%) said they would prefer having a CSO assisting in the secure storage of firearms.9,10 Some veterans may be more amenable to a conversation about firearm access and suicide risk concerns initiated by a CSO rather than by a clinician, indicating the potential benefits of educating and involving CSOs in suicide prevention.11 Involving CSOs in secure firearm storage planning may also strengthen the veteran’s sense of social support, a key protective factor against suicidal ideation.12
CSO involvement in secure firearm storage can provide the following benefits: (1) helping the veteran create a secure storage plan, including developing approaches to secure storage; (2) understanding warning signs of suicide; (3) helping the veteran limit access to firearms during a suicidal crisis; (4) helping the veteran remember the secure storage plan; (5) helping the veteran connect with mental health services; and (6) enhancing social support. In most instances, CSOs are physically close to the veteran (eg, live in the same household) and have a greater practical ability to support and affect change with respect to changes in firearm storage practices.
This article describes the development of an intervention that incorporates CSO involvement in firearms safety efforts for veterans with guidance from VA mental health care practitioners (HCPs). The goal is to provide HCPs and other key stakeholders with a detailed description of the intervention and to suggest potential strategies for how to involve CSOs in suicide prevention.
This article follows the Guideline for Reporting Evidence-based Practice Educational interventions and Teaching checklist, which was developed to facilitate standardized reporting and replication for education interventions.13 Applicable portions of the checklist are outlined, with others (ie, incentives, planned/unplanned changes, attendance, and other outcomes) to be addressed in future research.
FFAST INTERVENTION
Training (FFAST) intervention promotes voluntary secure firearm storage, engages CSOs in veteran mental health care, and provides psychoeducation and skills to support crisis management. The intervention was developed for all veterans who do not securely store firearms.
Theory
The intervention incorporates motivational interviewing techniques, as ambivalence about changing firearm storage behaviors is common, particularly when veterans own firearms for safety or protection.6,14 Motivational interviewing is a collaborative approach that addresses a client’s ambivalence to change by eliciting and exploring the client’s own arguments related to change.14 An important aspect of developing this intervention was to ensure it would be culturally relevant to veteran firearm owners and their CSOs.15 Further, involvement of the CSO is intentional and meant to boost social support, a known buffering factor against suicide risk.12
Objectives
This intervention’s primary objective was for veteran participants to identify secure firearm storage practices and develop a plan for implementing them, including when a veteran or other household member experiences a mental health crisis. For CSOs, the primary objective is to learn how to help the veteran connect with mental health resources if needed and support secure firearm storage as necessary. The overall goal is to learn how to identify warning signs for suicide and how to respond to a mental health crisis through a collaborative process, including securing firearms in a crisis situation.
Materials, Educational Strategies, and Instructors
Training for delivering the intervention was provided via direct consultation with the developer of the intervention and manual. The manual contains pertinent background information to provide context for the intervention’s significance and rationale, including the role of firearms in suicides and current lethal means safety initiatives. It also describes the purpose and objective of each intervention component in detail in addition to providing a script for interventionists to follow to complete each objective.
Training materials for veterans and CSOs include a single Firearms Secure Storage Planning worksheet completed during the intervention, with which the interventionist guides participants through the creation of a secure firearm storage plan (Table). Educational strategies include psychoeducation and Socratic questioning (eg, questioning focused on guiding participants toward the intervention goals) delivered verbally by the interventionist.

The intervention is delivered in person or virtually during a single 90-minute session with a veteran and CSO. Veterans and CSOs work with the interventionist to complete collaborative activities during the session and have self-directive learning activities or homework.
The intervention has 4 primary components: (1) CSO involvement; (2) psychoeducation; (3) secure firearm storage; and (4) how to respond to a mental health crisis. Each CSO should have an established relationship with the veteran, be willing and able to be present during the intervention, and remain an encouraging support person for the veteran. The interventionist emphasizes that it is part of the VA mission for staff to care about the veteran, and that initiating such contact with a CSO is meant to prioritize veteran safety and the safety of their family. Psychoeducation on mental health symptoms, suicide warning signs, veteran suicide rates and lethal means, and the benefits of secure firearm storage, is incorporated in the intervention.
The secure firearm storage component consists of 7 subcomponents: (1) general lethal means secure storage; (2) warning signs; (3) dyad communication; (4) lethal means safety when symptoms emerge; (5) coping strategies; (6) social support; and (7) emergency contacts. A lethal means safety worksheet rooted in the Stanley and Brown suicide safety plan model and implemented in VA health care settings is used to facilitate discussions of secure storage (Appendix).16

CSOs typically have little or no suicidal crisis response training, yet they likely have more interaction with the veteran on a daily basis than HCPs, putting them in a vital position to identify a crisis early and connect the veteran with the proper care. The crisis component prepares the CSO and veteran to navigate a crisis scenario so they can practice their newly developed safety plan and increase their comfort in discussing mental health and suicidal crisis.
FICTIONAL CASE STUDY
Cole, aged 59 years, is a Persian Gulf War veteran and retired police officer. His medical history includes hypothyroidism, hypertension, type 2 diabetes mellitus, chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and insomnia.
Cole's wife of > 30 years, Sheila, joined him for the FFAST intervention. They report having 4 firearms in the home, 3 of which are loaded but stored in a lockbox and 1 that Cole reports is kept on his person for protection. Cole reports passive suicidal ideation, but no plans or intent. When discussing warning signs that a mental health crisis is building, Cole describes feeling anxious, having a change in his speech patterns, and isolating himself. Sheila agrees, but also mentions that Cole is easily angered and becomes nonverbal. Cole and Sheila express difficulty communicating and appear to have a breakthrough moment when Cole says he does not like when Sheila repeats herself, as he feels like she is “poking” at him. Sheila shares concerns for his safety and that she only repeats herself because he refuses to talk.
Cole agrees to verbalize that he is safe but needs time to process his thoughts. Sheila agrees to give him space with a plan to revisit the conversation within an agreed upon timeline. When discussing an updated secure storage plan for their firearms when a mental health crisis is building, Cole commits to allowing Sheila to store the firearm currently on his person in their gun safe, with the ammunition stored separately, and to giving her the gun safe key. They agree to implement this practice until the mental health crisis has passed.
To mitigate a potential crisis, the interventionist discusses possible internal coping strategies for Cole, including writing, reading, walking the dog, listening to music, and baking. People and social settings that could provide distraction involve going to the gym, talking to his friend Carl or his daughter Kelly, and attending the men’s ministry at church. The intervention concludes by discussing professionals or agencies that Cole and Sheila could contact during a crisis. After the intervention, Cole and Sheila are asked to rate their likelihood of using the plan they established during the conversation on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being highly unlikely and 10 being extremely likely. Cole responds with 9 and Sheila responds with 10.
DISCUSSION
Lethal means safety remains a critical component of veteran suicide prevention. However, lethal means safety discussions are often implemented after suicide risk has been identified, which may be too late. Thus, having these conversations early and before a crisis may be imperative. Veterans have expressed a desire to have CSOs involved in their suicide prevention treatment, and CSOs can play a key role in recognizing risk factors during everyday life. The FFAST intervention addresses many of these gaps.
Having discussions in advance of a crisis allows veterans to consider an effective secure firearm storage plan outside of the context of a crisis. Including a CSO galvanizes another person to understand a veteran’s needs and assist with secure firearm storage, identify warning signs, and support them during a crisis. These discussions occur in a context where there is less pressure than during a crisis. Features that were more appealing to veterans and their CSOs were also incorporated, such as having the dyad build a plan that is conceptually similar to other public safety initiatives (eg, a fire safety plan, tornado plan, or hurricane plan). Previous research demonstrates that veterans appreciated the nonjudgmental approach and some preferred that clinicians approach the discussion of secure firearm storage within the context of general home and family safety.17 Additionally, this intervention can build on veterans’ prior military training in preparedness.
Other potential benefits associated with the FFAST intervention include creating an opportunity to strengthen communication between the veteran and CSO. While FFAST is intended to be used with all types of CSOs, this work is consistent with preliminary data from a couples-based suicide prevention study that indicated veterans and their partners reported increases in relationship functioning and marginal decreases in suicidal ideation.18 It is possible that communication strategies gained from the current intervention could improve veterans’ relationships with their CSOs, which are associated with a greater sense of social support and reduced suicide risk.12
The intervention is a brief, single session that may be appealing to veterans and CSOs with full schedules. Evidence suggests that even brief, single-session interventions have a significant impact on beliefs about secure firearm storage, knowledge of lethal means safety, and confidence in having secure firearm storage conversations.19 However, clinicians should be cautious when extrapolating from the findings of the current case example, which was a one-time intervention with no follow-up.
Future Directions
Pilot testing of the proposed intervention is underway, and future research will include feedback from veterans and CSOs, as well as feasibility and acceptability data collected during the pilot process. The pilot study uses a successive cohort design with an initial 2 sets of 5 veteran and CSO dyads, and subsequent funding has expanded the pilot study to include an additional 30 dyads. Qualitative interviews will be conducted separately with each veteran and CSO, and additional constructs such as feasibility, acceptability, barriers and facilitators to implementation, and changes in secure storage will be examined. This future research may provide a deeper understanding of the broader acceptability, feasibility, and satisfaction associated with a suicide prevention intervention focused on securing firearms and involving veterans and their CSOs. These data could be used to inform future implementation trials and inform the development of an implementation strategy. In the interim, the nature of the manual is summarized in the context of the urgency of suicide prevention in this at-risk population.
Conclusions
FFAST is a novel approach to veteran firearm suicide prevention. By involving CSOs and emphasizing mental health crisis preparedness between them and veterans, the dyad can work in association with HCPs to establish and exercise secure firearm storage practices as part of an at-home safety plan. Implementation of FFAST may be beneficial for all veterans, not only those who have been identified as being at high suicide risk.
- US Dept of Veterans Affairs Office of Suicide Prevention. 2024 national veteran suicide prevention annual report. December 2024. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2024/2024-Annual-Report-Part-2-of-2_508.pdf
- Fischer IC, Aunon FM, Nichter B, et al. Firearm ownership among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans. Am J Prev Med. 2023;65:1129-1133. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2023.06.013
- Conner A, Azrael D, Miller M. Suicide case-fatality rates in the United States, 2007-2014: a nationwide population-based study. Ann Intern Med. 2019;171(12):885-895. doi:10.7326/M19-1324
- Dempsey CL, Benedek DM, Zuromski KL, et al. Association of firearm ownership, use, accessibility, and storage practices with suicide risk among US army soldiers. JAMA Netw Open. 2019;2:e195383. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.5383
- Butterworth SE, Daruwala SE, Anestis MD. Firearm storage and shooting experience: factors relevant to the practical capability for suicide. J Psychiatr Res. 2018;102:52-56. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2018.03.010
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Miller M. Firearm storage practices and risk perceptions among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans with and without self-harm risk factors. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2019;49:653-664. doi:10.1111/sltb.12463
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Zhang W, Miller M. Receipt of clinician-delivered firearm safety counseling among U.S. veterans: results from a 2019 national survey. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2022;52:1121-1125. doi:10.1111/sltb.12906
- US Office of the Surgeon General. The surgeon general’s call to action to implement the national strategy for suicide prevention. January 2021. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sprc-call-to-action.pdf
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Kittel JA, et al. Quality Improvement Evaluation of the Feasibility and Acceptability of Adding a Concerned Significant Other to Safety Planning for Suicide Prevention With Veterans. J Ment Health Couns. 2019;41:4-20. doi:10.17744/mehc.41.1.02
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Degutis LC, et al. Firearms lethal means safety among veterans: attitudes toward involving a concerned significant other. J Mil Veteran Fam Health. 2025;11:23-31.
- Monteith LL, Holliday R, Dorsey Holliman BA, et al. Understanding female veterans’ experiences and perspectives of firearms. J Clin Psychol. 2020;76:1736-1753. doi:10.1002/jclp.22952
- DeBeer BB, Kimbrel NA, Meyer EC, et al. Combined PTSD and depressive symptoms interact with post-deployment social support to predict suicidal ideation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans. Psychiatry Res. 2014;216:357-362. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2014.02.010
- Phillips AC, Lewis LK, McEvoy MP, et al. Development and validation of the guideline for reporting evidence-based practice educational interventions and teaching (GREET). BMC Med Educ. 2016;16:237. doi:10.1186/s12909-016-0759-1
- Miller WR, Rollnick S. Motivational Interviewing: Helping People Change. 3rd ed. Guilford Press; 2013.
- Khazanov GK, Keddem S, Hoskins K, et al. Stakeholder perceptions of lethal means safety counseling: a qualitative systematic review. Front Psychiatry. 2022;13:993415. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2022.993415
- Stanley B, Brown GK, Karlin B, et al. US Dept of Veterans Affairs. Safety plan treatment manual to reduce suicide risk: veteran version. August 20, 2008. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/mentalhealth/docs/va_safety_planning_manual.doc
- Dobscha SK, Clark KD, Newell S, et al. Strategies for discussing firearms storage safety in primary care: veteran perspectives. J Gen Intern Med. 2021;36:1492-1502. doi:10.1007/s11606-020-06412-x
- Khalifian CE, Leifker FR, Knopp K, et al. Utilizing the couple relationship to prevent suicide: a preliminary examination of treatment for relationships and safety together. J Clin Psych. 2022;78:747-757. doi:10.1002/jclp.23251
- Walsh A, Friedman K, Morrissey BH, et al. Project Safe Guard: evaluating a lethal means safety intervention to reduce firearm suicide in the National Guard. Mil Med. 2024;189:510-516. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae172
- Beck AT. Beyond belief: a theory of modes, personality, and psychopathology. In: Salkovkis PM, ed. Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy. Guilford Press;1996:1-25.
- Rudd MD. The suicidal mode: a cognitive-behavioral model of suicidality. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2000;30(1):18-33.
- US Dept of Veterans Affairs Office of Suicide Prevention. 2024 national veteran suicide prevention annual report. December 2024. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2024/2024-Annual-Report-Part-2-of-2_508.pdf
- Fischer IC, Aunon FM, Nichter B, et al. Firearm ownership among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans. Am J Prev Med. 2023;65:1129-1133. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2023.06.013
- Conner A, Azrael D, Miller M. Suicide case-fatality rates in the United States, 2007-2014: a nationwide population-based study. Ann Intern Med. 2019;171(12):885-895. doi:10.7326/M19-1324
- Dempsey CL, Benedek DM, Zuromski KL, et al. Association of firearm ownership, use, accessibility, and storage practices with suicide risk among US army soldiers. JAMA Netw Open. 2019;2:e195383. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.5383
- Butterworth SE, Daruwala SE, Anestis MD. Firearm storage and shooting experience: factors relevant to the practical capability for suicide. J Psychiatr Res. 2018;102:52-56. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2018.03.010
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Miller M. Firearm storage practices and risk perceptions among a nationally representative sample of U.S. veterans with and without self-harm risk factors. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2019;49:653-664. doi:10.1111/sltb.12463
- Simonetti JA, Azrael D, Zhang W, Miller M. Receipt of clinician-delivered firearm safety counseling among U.S. veterans: results from a 2019 national survey. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2022;52:1121-1125. doi:10.1111/sltb.12906
- US Office of the Surgeon General. The surgeon general’s call to action to implement the national strategy for suicide prevention. January 2021. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sprc-call-to-action.pdf
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Kittel JA, et al. Quality Improvement Evaluation of the Feasibility and Acceptability of Adding a Concerned Significant Other to Safety Planning for Suicide Prevention With Veterans. J Ment Health Couns. 2019;41:4-20. doi:10.17744/mehc.41.1.02
- DeBeer BB, Matthieu MM, Degutis LC, et al. Firearms lethal means safety among veterans: attitudes toward involving a concerned significant other. J Mil Veteran Fam Health. 2025;11:23-31.
- Monteith LL, Holliday R, Dorsey Holliman BA, et al. Understanding female veterans’ experiences and perspectives of firearms. J Clin Psychol. 2020;76:1736-1753. doi:10.1002/jclp.22952
- DeBeer BB, Kimbrel NA, Meyer EC, et al. Combined PTSD and depressive symptoms interact with post-deployment social support to predict suicidal ideation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans. Psychiatry Res. 2014;216:357-362. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2014.02.010
- Phillips AC, Lewis LK, McEvoy MP, et al. Development and validation of the guideline for reporting evidence-based practice educational interventions and teaching (GREET). BMC Med Educ. 2016;16:237. doi:10.1186/s12909-016-0759-1
- Miller WR, Rollnick S. Motivational Interviewing: Helping People Change. 3rd ed. Guilford Press; 2013.
- Khazanov GK, Keddem S, Hoskins K, et al. Stakeholder perceptions of lethal means safety counseling: a qualitative systematic review. Front Psychiatry. 2022;13:993415. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2022.993415
- Stanley B, Brown GK, Karlin B, et al. US Dept of Veterans Affairs. Safety plan treatment manual to reduce suicide risk: veteran version. August 20, 2008. Accessed February 5, 2026. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/mentalhealth/docs/va_safety_planning_manual.doc
- Dobscha SK, Clark KD, Newell S, et al. Strategies for discussing firearms storage safety in primary care: veteran perspectives. J Gen Intern Med. 2021;36:1492-1502. doi:10.1007/s11606-020-06412-x
- Khalifian CE, Leifker FR, Knopp K, et al. Utilizing the couple relationship to prevent suicide: a preliminary examination of treatment for relationships and safety together. J Clin Psych. 2022;78:747-757. doi:10.1002/jclp.23251
- Walsh A, Friedman K, Morrissey BH, et al. Project Safe Guard: evaluating a lethal means safety intervention to reduce firearm suicide in the National Guard. Mil Med. 2024;189:510-516. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae172
- Beck AT. Beyond belief: a theory of modes, personality, and psychopathology. In: Salkovkis PM, ed. Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy. Guilford Press;1996:1-25.
- Rudd MD. The suicidal mode: a cognitive-behavioral model of suicidality. Suicide Life Threat Behav. 2000;30(1):18-33.
Involving Concerned Significant Others in Firearm Suicide Prevention: Development of the Family FireArms Secure Storage Training Intervention
Involving Concerned Significant Others in Firearm Suicide Prevention: Development of the Family FireArms Secure Storage Training Intervention
Meeting the Needs of Those Who Have Served: The Role of VHA Specialized Mental Health Centers of Excellence
Meeting the Needs of Those Who Have Served: The Role of VHA Specialized Mental Health Centers of Excellence
Accessible and effective mental health services are a vital component of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) mission to provide exceptional care that improves veterans’ health and well-being. Veterans are seeking mental health care at the VHA at significantly higher rates than in previous years. From 2009 through 2024, the number of veterans who received direct mental health care from the VHA increased 78%.1 The proportion of veterans enrolled in the VHA who also received direct mental health care expanded from 23% of total enrollees in 2009 to 33% in 2024. The increase in VHA mental health care delivery is also reflected in the number of outpatient mental health care and treatment visits at the VHA, which increased from 12.7 million to 21.5 million over the same period.
The Sergeant First Class (SFC) Heath Robinson Honoring Our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 expanded eligibility for VHA services, including mental health care and counseling, to new cohorts of toxic-exposed veterans. From 2022 to 2024, > 680,000 veterans enrolled in VHA care, and 45% of those were PACT Act-eligible cohorts.2 Research highlighted the high prevalence of physical and psychiatric comorbidities in toxic-exposed veterans.3 As such, the VHA may face greater demand for direct mental health care with these newly eligible cohorts of veterans.
Veterans often have mental health conditions (eg, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), substance use disorders (SUDs), unique military experiences (eg, deployments), and injuries and illnesses (eg, traumatic brain injury [TBI]) that increase the complexity of their clinical presentation. The varied nature of these mental health conditions, as well as veterans’ unique military-related experiences, necessitates specialized centers focused on distinct high-priority areas of mental health in the VHA.
A series of public laws charged the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with developing specialized mental health Centers of Excellence (CoEs) focused on high-priority areas of veteran mental health. The first of these laws, Public Law 98- 528, established the National Center for PTSD (NCPTSD), which opened in 1989.4 In 1996, Congress established specialized mental health CoEs known as Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Centers (MIRECCs) across the VHA.5 To address the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, 3 additional specialized centers were established in 2005.6 Finally, under the authority of the Secretary of the VA, specialized mental health CoEs were established to focus on SUD and integrated health care.
There are 17 geographically diverse mental health CoEs and MIRECCs across the VA (Table). CoEs are embedded in VA medical centers (VAMCs) with strong medical school academic affiliations. Organizational oversight of the CoEs is provided by the VA Office of Mental Health and Office of Suicide Prevention, respectively. As part of the oversight process, CoEs submit annual reports detailing their advancements in research, education and training, and clinical activities, as well as participate in a peer-reviewed renewal process.

These specialized centers are united in a shared tripartite mission to generate new knowledge about the causes and treatments of mental health conditions, to educate and train VHA clinicians and personnel, and to develop and implement innovative clinical programs within the VHA. This combined focus on research, education, and improved clinical care reduces the time from discovery to implementation and improves the health and well-being of veterans.
Examples of this acceleration translation from scientific discovery to clinical practice are evident throughout mental health CoEs. The NCPTSD is a leader in research on PTSD and traumatic stress. Its work led to the development of national training programs for VHA clinicians, facilitating the broad dissemination of efficacious PTSD treatments across the enterprise.7 Researchers at the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 21 Sierra Pacific MIRECC identified depression as a significant risk factor for dementia and subsequently launched the first multisite trial of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in the VHA in 2012 (CSP #556: the effectiveness of rTMS in depressed VA patients).8 This project laid the groundwork for the national clinical rTMS program launched in 2017, which is now clinically available at 60 VAMCs. In the largest pragmatic randomized clinical trial of its kind, the VISN 4 Philadelphia and Pittsburgh MIRECC found that pharmacogenomic testing significantly reduced the number of prescription medications with predicted drug-gene interactions and improved clinical outcomes among veterans with depression.9
Mental health CoEs are also leaders in suicide prevention, a top clinical priority for the VHA. The VISN 2 New York MIRECC developed Project Life Force, a safety planning skills group for veterans with suicidal ideation, now implemented across 10 VAMCs, including telehealth hubs, outpatient settings, and veteran peer programs.10 The VISN 2 CoE for Suicide Prevention and VISN 19 Rocky Mountain MIRECC coordinate key suicide prevention services for VA, including the analysis of suicide surveillance data; evaluation of national VA suicide prevention initiatives; the support of veterans, families, and clinicians; and enhanced access to evidence-based treatments for at-risk veterans.
Mental health CoEs are a key operational partner in VHA treatment of SUDs. The CoEs in Substance Addiction Treatment and Education (CESATEs) are national resources dedicated to improving the quality, clinical outcomes, and cost-effectiveness of VHA SUD treatment. CESATEs developed and implemented a national rollout of an effective treatment for stimulant use disorders, training staff at > 120 VA programs. The VISN 1 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC’s focus on SUD and comorbid/co-occurring mental health conditions has highlighted the significant prevalence of these conditions and the impact they have on treatment response.11
Serious mental illness (SMI) (eg, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder) impacts up to 5% of veterans.12 VISN 22 Desert Pacific MIRECC has developed interventions to improve the lives of veterans with SMI. Its research established supported employment as an effective intervention to improve outcomes in veterans with psychotic disorders and supported its implementation in the VHA.13 Peer specialists are a cornerstone in the VHA commitment to recovery-oriented services for veterans with SMI. VISN 5 Capitol MIRECC has long championed research, clinical training, and educational activities that contributed to the effective deployment of peer specialists across the VHA enterprise.
Veterans have unique military-related experiences (eg, deployment, traumatic stress, transition to civilian status) and injuries and illnesses (eg, TBI, posttraumatic headaches) that significantly impact their mental health and quality of life.
The period between active duty and transition to civilian status is a critical time in a veteran’s life. The VISN 17 CoE Veteran Sponsorship Initiative connects veterans with VA care within 30 days postdischarge, with the option of additional support in the community. The VISN 22 CoE for Stress and Mental Health (CESAMH) develops, evaluates, and disseminates diagnostics and treatments for veterans affected by traumatic events and brain injuries, with a unique focus on supporting their whole health needs. The VISN 6 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC leads the ongoing VISN-6 Post-Deployment Mental Health (PDMH) study, the largest biorepository of post-9/11 veterans. PDMH has greatly expanded the understanding of the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, with > 100 peer-reviewed publications to date. Veterans with mild TBI frequently experience chronic posttraumatic headaches that can be disabling and nonresponsive to treatment. The VISN 20 Northwest MIRECC demonstrated that prazosin, a repurposed, low-cost, widely available, nonaddictive medication, can safely and effectively reduce the frequency of these headaches and improve functional impairment in veterans and active-duty service members.14
Increased and enhanced access to effective mental health treatment is a priority for VA. In 2007, the VA launched the National Primary Care Mental Health Integration program, which integrated mental health services into primary care settings. The Center for Integrated Healthcare (CIH) has supported the VA in these efforts. In 2024, CIH trained > 5000 health care staff on high-fidelity integration of behavioral health and medical care. VA has also focused on increasing access to mental health services via expanded telehealth offerings. The VISN 16 MIRECC, with its unique focus on increasing access to care for rural veterans via distance-based and digital health technology, supported the VA Offices of Mental Health and Connected Care to virtualize mental health care and promote adoption and sustained use of VA Video Connect across the enterprise.
Specialized MH CoEs are uniquely equipped to support the VHA in providing training and education to VA clinicians, veterans, care partners and family members, and the community on high-priority mental health topics. Education is a core component of the MH CoEs tripartite mission. As such, MH CoEs offer national trainings, conferences, consultation services, clinical demonstration projects, development of clinical dashboards and toolkits, and public awareness campaigns. Researchers, educators, and clinicians at the CoEs frequently serve as subject matter experts on topics aligned with their respective missions. Several national rollout programs that disseminated evidence-based treatments for mental health conditions to the field (eg, cognitive behavioral therapy for depression, cognitive behavioral therapy for insomnia, and prolonged exposure) were developed at specialized CoEs.
The VHA provides advanced training, residencies, and fellowships to > 120,000 trainees annually. Many of these trainees choose to remain at the VA. Seven of 10 VHA psychologists and 6 of 10 VHA physicians trained within the VHA prior to their employment.15 The MH CoEs and MIRECCs play an important role in preparing these trainees for VHA mental health careers. These centers are funded to provide advanced postdoctoral training to physicians as well as allied health professionals in clinical and counseling psychology, social work, pharmacy, and nursing. Training is not limited to postdoctoral fellows: graduate students, residents, and interns from affiliated accredited training programs may rotate through mental health CoEs each academic year.
Conclusions
For > 30 years, mental health CoEs have brought thousands of veterans advanced treatments for their mental health needs and helped reduce death by suicide. The centers have a bright future ahead, harnessing advances in artificial intelligence and genomics to permit the matching of the individual veterans to the treatment most likely to benefit them. Precision medicine, as espoused by the Hannon Act, will not only encourage the efficient use of health care resources but also rapidly reduce pain in veterans with mental health and SUDs.
- Congressionally Mandated Report: Report on Transparency in Mental Health Care Services. US Dept of Veterans Affairs; December 2022. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CMR-VA1-00181657/pdf/CMR-VA1-00181657.pdf
- Beckman AL, Jacobs J, Elnahal SM. The PACT Act—expanding coverage and access for veterans. JAMA. 2024;332:1423-1424. doi:10.1001/jama.2024.16013
- Morse JL, Acheson DT, Almklov E, et al. Associations among environmental exposures and physical and psychiatric symptoms in a care-seeking sample of U.S. military veterans. Mil Med. 2024;189:e1397-e1402. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae035
- Veterans’ Health Care Act of 1984, 38 USC §98-528 (1984). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/5618/text
- Veterans’ Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996, 38 USC §104-262 (1996). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/3118/text
- Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2006. Pub L No. 109-114, 119 Stat. 2372. Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/2528/text
- Karlin BE, Ruzek JI, Chard KM, et al. Dissemination of evidence‐based psychological treatments for posttraumatic stress disorder in the Veterans Health Administration. J Trauma Stress. 2010;23:663-673. doi:10.1002/jts.20588
- Byers AL, Covinsky KE, Barnes DE, et al. Dysthymia and depression increase risk of dementia and mortality among older veterans. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2012;20:664-672. doi:10.1097/JGP.0b013e31822001c1
- Oslin DW, Lynch KG, Shih MC, et al. Effect of pharmacogenomic testing for drug-gene interactions on medication selection and remission of symptoms in major depressive disorder: the PRIME Care randomized clinical trial. JAMA. 2022;328:151-161. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.9805
- Goodman M, Brown GK, Galfalvy HC, et al. Group (“Project Life Force”) versus individual suicide safety planning: a randomized clinical trial. Contemp Clin Trials Commun. 2020;17:100520. doi:10.1016/j.conctc.2020.100520
- Na PJ, Ralevski E, Jegede O, et al. Depression and/or PTSD comorbidity affects response to antidepressants in those with alcohol use disorder. Front Psychiatry. 2022;12:768318. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2021.768318
- McCarthy JF, Blow FC, Valenstein M, et al. Veterans Affairs Health System and mental health treatment retention among patients with serious mental illness: evaluating accessibility and availability barriers. Health Serv Res. 2007;42:1042-1060. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00642.x
- Glynn SM, Marder SR, Noordsy DL, et al. An RCT evaluating the effects of skills training and medication type on work outcomes among patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatr Serv. 2016;67:500-506. doi:10.1176/appips201500171
- Mayer CL, Savage PJ, Engle CK, et al. Randomized controlled pilot trial of prazosin for prophylaxis of posttraumatic headaches in active-duty service members and veterans. Headache. 2023;63:751-762. doi:10.1111/head.14529
- Hill C. Medical education at VA: it’s all about the veterans. VA News. August 18, 2021. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://news.va.gov/93370/medical-education-at-va-its-all-about-the-veterans/
Accessible and effective mental health services are a vital component of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) mission to provide exceptional care that improves veterans’ health and well-being. Veterans are seeking mental health care at the VHA at significantly higher rates than in previous years. From 2009 through 2024, the number of veterans who received direct mental health care from the VHA increased 78%.1 The proportion of veterans enrolled in the VHA who also received direct mental health care expanded from 23% of total enrollees in 2009 to 33% in 2024. The increase in VHA mental health care delivery is also reflected in the number of outpatient mental health care and treatment visits at the VHA, which increased from 12.7 million to 21.5 million over the same period.
The Sergeant First Class (SFC) Heath Robinson Honoring Our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 expanded eligibility for VHA services, including mental health care and counseling, to new cohorts of toxic-exposed veterans. From 2022 to 2024, > 680,000 veterans enrolled in VHA care, and 45% of those were PACT Act-eligible cohorts.2 Research highlighted the high prevalence of physical and psychiatric comorbidities in toxic-exposed veterans.3 As such, the VHA may face greater demand for direct mental health care with these newly eligible cohorts of veterans.
Veterans often have mental health conditions (eg, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), substance use disorders (SUDs), unique military experiences (eg, deployments), and injuries and illnesses (eg, traumatic brain injury [TBI]) that increase the complexity of their clinical presentation. The varied nature of these mental health conditions, as well as veterans’ unique military-related experiences, necessitates specialized centers focused on distinct high-priority areas of mental health in the VHA.
A series of public laws charged the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with developing specialized mental health Centers of Excellence (CoEs) focused on high-priority areas of veteran mental health. The first of these laws, Public Law 98- 528, established the National Center for PTSD (NCPTSD), which opened in 1989.4 In 1996, Congress established specialized mental health CoEs known as Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Centers (MIRECCs) across the VHA.5 To address the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, 3 additional specialized centers were established in 2005.6 Finally, under the authority of the Secretary of the VA, specialized mental health CoEs were established to focus on SUD and integrated health care.
There are 17 geographically diverse mental health CoEs and MIRECCs across the VA (Table). CoEs are embedded in VA medical centers (VAMCs) with strong medical school academic affiliations. Organizational oversight of the CoEs is provided by the VA Office of Mental Health and Office of Suicide Prevention, respectively. As part of the oversight process, CoEs submit annual reports detailing their advancements in research, education and training, and clinical activities, as well as participate in a peer-reviewed renewal process.

These specialized centers are united in a shared tripartite mission to generate new knowledge about the causes and treatments of mental health conditions, to educate and train VHA clinicians and personnel, and to develop and implement innovative clinical programs within the VHA. This combined focus on research, education, and improved clinical care reduces the time from discovery to implementation and improves the health and well-being of veterans.
Examples of this acceleration translation from scientific discovery to clinical practice are evident throughout mental health CoEs. The NCPTSD is a leader in research on PTSD and traumatic stress. Its work led to the development of national training programs for VHA clinicians, facilitating the broad dissemination of efficacious PTSD treatments across the enterprise.7 Researchers at the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 21 Sierra Pacific MIRECC identified depression as a significant risk factor for dementia and subsequently launched the first multisite trial of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in the VHA in 2012 (CSP #556: the effectiveness of rTMS in depressed VA patients).8 This project laid the groundwork for the national clinical rTMS program launched in 2017, which is now clinically available at 60 VAMCs. In the largest pragmatic randomized clinical trial of its kind, the VISN 4 Philadelphia and Pittsburgh MIRECC found that pharmacogenomic testing significantly reduced the number of prescription medications with predicted drug-gene interactions and improved clinical outcomes among veterans with depression.9
Mental health CoEs are also leaders in suicide prevention, a top clinical priority for the VHA. The VISN 2 New York MIRECC developed Project Life Force, a safety planning skills group for veterans with suicidal ideation, now implemented across 10 VAMCs, including telehealth hubs, outpatient settings, and veteran peer programs.10 The VISN 2 CoE for Suicide Prevention and VISN 19 Rocky Mountain MIRECC coordinate key suicide prevention services for VA, including the analysis of suicide surveillance data; evaluation of national VA suicide prevention initiatives; the support of veterans, families, and clinicians; and enhanced access to evidence-based treatments for at-risk veterans.
Mental health CoEs are a key operational partner in VHA treatment of SUDs. The CoEs in Substance Addiction Treatment and Education (CESATEs) are national resources dedicated to improving the quality, clinical outcomes, and cost-effectiveness of VHA SUD treatment. CESATEs developed and implemented a national rollout of an effective treatment for stimulant use disorders, training staff at > 120 VA programs. The VISN 1 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC’s focus on SUD and comorbid/co-occurring mental health conditions has highlighted the significant prevalence of these conditions and the impact they have on treatment response.11
Serious mental illness (SMI) (eg, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder) impacts up to 5% of veterans.12 VISN 22 Desert Pacific MIRECC has developed interventions to improve the lives of veterans with SMI. Its research established supported employment as an effective intervention to improve outcomes in veterans with psychotic disorders and supported its implementation in the VHA.13 Peer specialists are a cornerstone in the VHA commitment to recovery-oriented services for veterans with SMI. VISN 5 Capitol MIRECC has long championed research, clinical training, and educational activities that contributed to the effective deployment of peer specialists across the VHA enterprise.
Veterans have unique military-related experiences (eg, deployment, traumatic stress, transition to civilian status) and injuries and illnesses (eg, TBI, posttraumatic headaches) that significantly impact their mental health and quality of life.
The period between active duty and transition to civilian status is a critical time in a veteran’s life. The VISN 17 CoE Veteran Sponsorship Initiative connects veterans with VA care within 30 days postdischarge, with the option of additional support in the community. The VISN 22 CoE for Stress and Mental Health (CESAMH) develops, evaluates, and disseminates diagnostics and treatments for veterans affected by traumatic events and brain injuries, with a unique focus on supporting their whole health needs. The VISN 6 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC leads the ongoing VISN-6 Post-Deployment Mental Health (PDMH) study, the largest biorepository of post-9/11 veterans. PDMH has greatly expanded the understanding of the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, with > 100 peer-reviewed publications to date. Veterans with mild TBI frequently experience chronic posttraumatic headaches that can be disabling and nonresponsive to treatment. The VISN 20 Northwest MIRECC demonstrated that prazosin, a repurposed, low-cost, widely available, nonaddictive medication, can safely and effectively reduce the frequency of these headaches and improve functional impairment in veterans and active-duty service members.14
Increased and enhanced access to effective mental health treatment is a priority for VA. In 2007, the VA launched the National Primary Care Mental Health Integration program, which integrated mental health services into primary care settings. The Center for Integrated Healthcare (CIH) has supported the VA in these efforts. In 2024, CIH trained > 5000 health care staff on high-fidelity integration of behavioral health and medical care. VA has also focused on increasing access to mental health services via expanded telehealth offerings. The VISN 16 MIRECC, with its unique focus on increasing access to care for rural veterans via distance-based and digital health technology, supported the VA Offices of Mental Health and Connected Care to virtualize mental health care and promote adoption and sustained use of VA Video Connect across the enterprise.
Specialized MH CoEs are uniquely equipped to support the VHA in providing training and education to VA clinicians, veterans, care partners and family members, and the community on high-priority mental health topics. Education is a core component of the MH CoEs tripartite mission. As such, MH CoEs offer national trainings, conferences, consultation services, clinical demonstration projects, development of clinical dashboards and toolkits, and public awareness campaigns. Researchers, educators, and clinicians at the CoEs frequently serve as subject matter experts on topics aligned with their respective missions. Several national rollout programs that disseminated evidence-based treatments for mental health conditions to the field (eg, cognitive behavioral therapy for depression, cognitive behavioral therapy for insomnia, and prolonged exposure) were developed at specialized CoEs.
The VHA provides advanced training, residencies, and fellowships to > 120,000 trainees annually. Many of these trainees choose to remain at the VA. Seven of 10 VHA psychologists and 6 of 10 VHA physicians trained within the VHA prior to their employment.15 The MH CoEs and MIRECCs play an important role in preparing these trainees for VHA mental health careers. These centers are funded to provide advanced postdoctoral training to physicians as well as allied health professionals in clinical and counseling psychology, social work, pharmacy, and nursing. Training is not limited to postdoctoral fellows: graduate students, residents, and interns from affiliated accredited training programs may rotate through mental health CoEs each academic year.
Conclusions
For > 30 years, mental health CoEs have brought thousands of veterans advanced treatments for their mental health needs and helped reduce death by suicide. The centers have a bright future ahead, harnessing advances in artificial intelligence and genomics to permit the matching of the individual veterans to the treatment most likely to benefit them. Precision medicine, as espoused by the Hannon Act, will not only encourage the efficient use of health care resources but also rapidly reduce pain in veterans with mental health and SUDs.
Accessible and effective mental health services are a vital component of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) mission to provide exceptional care that improves veterans’ health and well-being. Veterans are seeking mental health care at the VHA at significantly higher rates than in previous years. From 2009 through 2024, the number of veterans who received direct mental health care from the VHA increased 78%.1 The proportion of veterans enrolled in the VHA who also received direct mental health care expanded from 23% of total enrollees in 2009 to 33% in 2024. The increase in VHA mental health care delivery is also reflected in the number of outpatient mental health care and treatment visits at the VHA, which increased from 12.7 million to 21.5 million over the same period.
The Sergeant First Class (SFC) Heath Robinson Honoring Our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 expanded eligibility for VHA services, including mental health care and counseling, to new cohorts of toxic-exposed veterans. From 2022 to 2024, > 680,000 veterans enrolled in VHA care, and 45% of those were PACT Act-eligible cohorts.2 Research highlighted the high prevalence of physical and psychiatric comorbidities in toxic-exposed veterans.3 As such, the VHA may face greater demand for direct mental health care with these newly eligible cohorts of veterans.
Veterans often have mental health conditions (eg, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), substance use disorders (SUDs), unique military experiences (eg, deployments), and injuries and illnesses (eg, traumatic brain injury [TBI]) that increase the complexity of their clinical presentation. The varied nature of these mental health conditions, as well as veterans’ unique military-related experiences, necessitates specialized centers focused on distinct high-priority areas of mental health in the VHA.
A series of public laws charged the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with developing specialized mental health Centers of Excellence (CoEs) focused on high-priority areas of veteran mental health. The first of these laws, Public Law 98- 528, established the National Center for PTSD (NCPTSD), which opened in 1989.4 In 1996, Congress established specialized mental health CoEs known as Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Centers (MIRECCs) across the VHA.5 To address the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, 3 additional specialized centers were established in 2005.6 Finally, under the authority of the Secretary of the VA, specialized mental health CoEs were established to focus on SUD and integrated health care.
There are 17 geographically diverse mental health CoEs and MIRECCs across the VA (Table). CoEs are embedded in VA medical centers (VAMCs) with strong medical school academic affiliations. Organizational oversight of the CoEs is provided by the VA Office of Mental Health and Office of Suicide Prevention, respectively. As part of the oversight process, CoEs submit annual reports detailing their advancements in research, education and training, and clinical activities, as well as participate in a peer-reviewed renewal process.

These specialized centers are united in a shared tripartite mission to generate new knowledge about the causes and treatments of mental health conditions, to educate and train VHA clinicians and personnel, and to develop and implement innovative clinical programs within the VHA. This combined focus on research, education, and improved clinical care reduces the time from discovery to implementation and improves the health and well-being of veterans.
Examples of this acceleration translation from scientific discovery to clinical practice are evident throughout mental health CoEs. The NCPTSD is a leader in research on PTSD and traumatic stress. Its work led to the development of national training programs for VHA clinicians, facilitating the broad dissemination of efficacious PTSD treatments across the enterprise.7 Researchers at the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 21 Sierra Pacific MIRECC identified depression as a significant risk factor for dementia and subsequently launched the first multisite trial of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in the VHA in 2012 (CSP #556: the effectiveness of rTMS in depressed VA patients).8 This project laid the groundwork for the national clinical rTMS program launched in 2017, which is now clinically available at 60 VAMCs. In the largest pragmatic randomized clinical trial of its kind, the VISN 4 Philadelphia and Pittsburgh MIRECC found that pharmacogenomic testing significantly reduced the number of prescription medications with predicted drug-gene interactions and improved clinical outcomes among veterans with depression.9
Mental health CoEs are also leaders in suicide prevention, a top clinical priority for the VHA. The VISN 2 New York MIRECC developed Project Life Force, a safety planning skills group for veterans with suicidal ideation, now implemented across 10 VAMCs, including telehealth hubs, outpatient settings, and veteran peer programs.10 The VISN 2 CoE for Suicide Prevention and VISN 19 Rocky Mountain MIRECC coordinate key suicide prevention services for VA, including the analysis of suicide surveillance data; evaluation of national VA suicide prevention initiatives; the support of veterans, families, and clinicians; and enhanced access to evidence-based treatments for at-risk veterans.
Mental health CoEs are a key operational partner in VHA treatment of SUDs. The CoEs in Substance Addiction Treatment and Education (CESATEs) are national resources dedicated to improving the quality, clinical outcomes, and cost-effectiveness of VHA SUD treatment. CESATEs developed and implemented a national rollout of an effective treatment for stimulant use disorders, training staff at > 120 VA programs. The VISN 1 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC’s focus on SUD and comorbid/co-occurring mental health conditions has highlighted the significant prevalence of these conditions and the impact they have on treatment response.11
Serious mental illness (SMI) (eg, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder) impacts up to 5% of veterans.12 VISN 22 Desert Pacific MIRECC has developed interventions to improve the lives of veterans with SMI. Its research established supported employment as an effective intervention to improve outcomes in veterans with psychotic disorders and supported its implementation in the VHA.13 Peer specialists are a cornerstone in the VHA commitment to recovery-oriented services for veterans with SMI. VISN 5 Capitol MIRECC has long championed research, clinical training, and educational activities that contributed to the effective deployment of peer specialists across the VHA enterprise.
Veterans have unique military-related experiences (eg, deployment, traumatic stress, transition to civilian status) and injuries and illnesses (eg, TBI, posttraumatic headaches) that significantly impact their mental health and quality of life.
The period between active duty and transition to civilian status is a critical time in a veteran’s life. The VISN 17 CoE Veteran Sponsorship Initiative connects veterans with VA care within 30 days postdischarge, with the option of additional support in the community. The VISN 22 CoE for Stress and Mental Health (CESAMH) develops, evaluates, and disseminates diagnostics and treatments for veterans affected by traumatic events and brain injuries, with a unique focus on supporting their whole health needs. The VISN 6 Mid-Atlantic MIRECC leads the ongoing VISN-6 Post-Deployment Mental Health (PDMH) study, the largest biorepository of post-9/11 veterans. PDMH has greatly expanded the understanding of the unique needs of post-9/11 veterans, with > 100 peer-reviewed publications to date. Veterans with mild TBI frequently experience chronic posttraumatic headaches that can be disabling and nonresponsive to treatment. The VISN 20 Northwest MIRECC demonstrated that prazosin, a repurposed, low-cost, widely available, nonaddictive medication, can safely and effectively reduce the frequency of these headaches and improve functional impairment in veterans and active-duty service members.14
Increased and enhanced access to effective mental health treatment is a priority for VA. In 2007, the VA launched the National Primary Care Mental Health Integration program, which integrated mental health services into primary care settings. The Center for Integrated Healthcare (CIH) has supported the VA in these efforts. In 2024, CIH trained > 5000 health care staff on high-fidelity integration of behavioral health and medical care. VA has also focused on increasing access to mental health services via expanded telehealth offerings. The VISN 16 MIRECC, with its unique focus on increasing access to care for rural veterans via distance-based and digital health technology, supported the VA Offices of Mental Health and Connected Care to virtualize mental health care and promote adoption and sustained use of VA Video Connect across the enterprise.
Specialized MH CoEs are uniquely equipped to support the VHA in providing training and education to VA clinicians, veterans, care partners and family members, and the community on high-priority mental health topics. Education is a core component of the MH CoEs tripartite mission. As such, MH CoEs offer national trainings, conferences, consultation services, clinical demonstration projects, development of clinical dashboards and toolkits, and public awareness campaigns. Researchers, educators, and clinicians at the CoEs frequently serve as subject matter experts on topics aligned with their respective missions. Several national rollout programs that disseminated evidence-based treatments for mental health conditions to the field (eg, cognitive behavioral therapy for depression, cognitive behavioral therapy for insomnia, and prolonged exposure) were developed at specialized CoEs.
The VHA provides advanced training, residencies, and fellowships to > 120,000 trainees annually. Many of these trainees choose to remain at the VA. Seven of 10 VHA psychologists and 6 of 10 VHA physicians trained within the VHA prior to their employment.15 The MH CoEs and MIRECCs play an important role in preparing these trainees for VHA mental health careers. These centers are funded to provide advanced postdoctoral training to physicians as well as allied health professionals in clinical and counseling psychology, social work, pharmacy, and nursing. Training is not limited to postdoctoral fellows: graduate students, residents, and interns from affiliated accredited training programs may rotate through mental health CoEs each academic year.
Conclusions
For > 30 years, mental health CoEs have brought thousands of veterans advanced treatments for their mental health needs and helped reduce death by suicide. The centers have a bright future ahead, harnessing advances in artificial intelligence and genomics to permit the matching of the individual veterans to the treatment most likely to benefit them. Precision medicine, as espoused by the Hannon Act, will not only encourage the efficient use of health care resources but also rapidly reduce pain in veterans with mental health and SUDs.
- Congressionally Mandated Report: Report on Transparency in Mental Health Care Services. US Dept of Veterans Affairs; December 2022. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CMR-VA1-00181657/pdf/CMR-VA1-00181657.pdf
- Beckman AL, Jacobs J, Elnahal SM. The PACT Act—expanding coverage and access for veterans. JAMA. 2024;332:1423-1424. doi:10.1001/jama.2024.16013
- Morse JL, Acheson DT, Almklov E, et al. Associations among environmental exposures and physical and psychiatric symptoms in a care-seeking sample of U.S. military veterans. Mil Med. 2024;189:e1397-e1402. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae035
- Veterans’ Health Care Act of 1984, 38 USC §98-528 (1984). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/5618/text
- Veterans’ Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996, 38 USC §104-262 (1996). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/3118/text
- Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2006. Pub L No. 109-114, 119 Stat. 2372. Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/2528/text
- Karlin BE, Ruzek JI, Chard KM, et al. Dissemination of evidence‐based psychological treatments for posttraumatic stress disorder in the Veterans Health Administration. J Trauma Stress. 2010;23:663-673. doi:10.1002/jts.20588
- Byers AL, Covinsky KE, Barnes DE, et al. Dysthymia and depression increase risk of dementia and mortality among older veterans. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2012;20:664-672. doi:10.1097/JGP.0b013e31822001c1
- Oslin DW, Lynch KG, Shih MC, et al. Effect of pharmacogenomic testing for drug-gene interactions on medication selection and remission of symptoms in major depressive disorder: the PRIME Care randomized clinical trial. JAMA. 2022;328:151-161. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.9805
- Goodman M, Brown GK, Galfalvy HC, et al. Group (“Project Life Force”) versus individual suicide safety planning: a randomized clinical trial. Contemp Clin Trials Commun. 2020;17:100520. doi:10.1016/j.conctc.2020.100520
- Na PJ, Ralevski E, Jegede O, et al. Depression and/or PTSD comorbidity affects response to antidepressants in those with alcohol use disorder. Front Psychiatry. 2022;12:768318. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2021.768318
- McCarthy JF, Blow FC, Valenstein M, et al. Veterans Affairs Health System and mental health treatment retention among patients with serious mental illness: evaluating accessibility and availability barriers. Health Serv Res. 2007;42:1042-1060. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00642.x
- Glynn SM, Marder SR, Noordsy DL, et al. An RCT evaluating the effects of skills training and medication type on work outcomes among patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatr Serv. 2016;67:500-506. doi:10.1176/appips201500171
- Mayer CL, Savage PJ, Engle CK, et al. Randomized controlled pilot trial of prazosin for prophylaxis of posttraumatic headaches in active-duty service members and veterans. Headache. 2023;63:751-762. doi:10.1111/head.14529
- Hill C. Medical education at VA: it’s all about the veterans. VA News. August 18, 2021. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://news.va.gov/93370/medical-education-at-va-its-all-about-the-veterans/
- Congressionally Mandated Report: Report on Transparency in Mental Health Care Services. US Dept of Veterans Affairs; December 2022. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CMR-VA1-00181657/pdf/CMR-VA1-00181657.pdf
- Beckman AL, Jacobs J, Elnahal SM. The PACT Act—expanding coverage and access for veterans. JAMA. 2024;332:1423-1424. doi:10.1001/jama.2024.16013
- Morse JL, Acheson DT, Almklov E, et al. Associations among environmental exposures and physical and psychiatric symptoms in a care-seeking sample of U.S. military veterans. Mil Med. 2024;189:e1397-e1402. doi:10.1093/milmed/usae035
- Veterans’ Health Care Act of 1984, 38 USC §98-528 (1984). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/5618/text
- Veterans’ Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996, 38 USC §104-262 (1996). Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/3118/text
- Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2006. Pub L No. 109-114, 119 Stat. 2372. Accessed March 27, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/2528/text
- Karlin BE, Ruzek JI, Chard KM, et al. Dissemination of evidence‐based psychological treatments for posttraumatic stress disorder in the Veterans Health Administration. J Trauma Stress. 2010;23:663-673. doi:10.1002/jts.20588
- Byers AL, Covinsky KE, Barnes DE, et al. Dysthymia and depression increase risk of dementia and mortality among older veterans. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2012;20:664-672. doi:10.1097/JGP.0b013e31822001c1
- Oslin DW, Lynch KG, Shih MC, et al. Effect of pharmacogenomic testing for drug-gene interactions on medication selection and remission of symptoms in major depressive disorder: the PRIME Care randomized clinical trial. JAMA. 2022;328:151-161. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.9805
- Goodman M, Brown GK, Galfalvy HC, et al. Group (“Project Life Force”) versus individual suicide safety planning: a randomized clinical trial. Contemp Clin Trials Commun. 2020;17:100520. doi:10.1016/j.conctc.2020.100520
- Na PJ, Ralevski E, Jegede O, et al. Depression and/or PTSD comorbidity affects response to antidepressants in those with alcohol use disorder. Front Psychiatry. 2022;12:768318. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2021.768318
- McCarthy JF, Blow FC, Valenstein M, et al. Veterans Affairs Health System and mental health treatment retention among patients with serious mental illness: evaluating accessibility and availability barriers. Health Serv Res. 2007;42:1042-1060. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00642.x
- Glynn SM, Marder SR, Noordsy DL, et al. An RCT evaluating the effects of skills training and medication type on work outcomes among patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatr Serv. 2016;67:500-506. doi:10.1176/appips201500171
- Mayer CL, Savage PJ, Engle CK, et al. Randomized controlled pilot trial of prazosin for prophylaxis of posttraumatic headaches in active-duty service members and veterans. Headache. 2023;63:751-762. doi:10.1111/head.14529
- Hill C. Medical education at VA: it’s all about the veterans. VA News. August 18, 2021. Accessed December 5, 2025. https://news.va.gov/93370/medical-education-at-va-its-all-about-the-veterans/
Meeting the Needs of Those Who Have Served: The Role of VHA Specialized Mental Health Centers of Excellence
Meeting the Needs of Those Who Have Served: The Role of VHA Specialized Mental Health Centers of Excellence
VA Restarts EHR Rollout After Addressing Issues
After a nearly 3-year pause, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is again ramping up the rollout of its new federal electronic health records (EHR) system from Oracle-Cerner, which previously experienced various issues and led to numerous setbacks. On April 11, 2026, the federal EHR went live at 4 Michigan sites: VA Ann Arbor Healthcare System, VA Battle Creek Medical Center, VA Detroit Healthcare System, and VA Saginaw Healthcare System.
VA officials have promised that things will be different this time, claiming it has fixed “hundreds of problems related to the initial rollout of the EHR system at the [6] original VA sites” and eliminated “the bureaucracy that was holding the project back.” At a press conference announcing the relaunch of the EHR rollout, VA Secretary Doug Collins said the old system cost the department hundreds of millions of dollars each year. He also said the VA has been too resistant to change at the expense of proper veteran health care.
“We’re all going to stay close to ensure that this is a smooth transition,” Collins said. “This needs to be a win for the VA patients.”
A VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation found 360 major performance incidents—outages, performance degradations, and incomplete functionality—that occurred between October 24, 2020, and August 31, 2022. Additionally, an investigation by The Spokesman-Review and The Washington Post found that the EHR “played a role” in > 4400 cases of patient harm and 6 deaths.
VA Deputy Secretary Paul Lawrence said that the VA plans to stagger the release of the system, unlike in previous deployments. The agency intends to implement the EHR at 13 sites in 2026 and 26 in 2027, anticipating a pace of about 28 to 30 sites each year after that.
The VA said it is also boosting staffing to ensure the transition goes smoothly and is in the process of hiring 400 employees. Other problems may arise, though. At the end of March laid off between 20,000 and 30,000. This prompted concerns that resources could be redirected from the VA EHR at a critical stage.
After a nearly 3-year pause, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is again ramping up the rollout of its new federal electronic health records (EHR) system from Oracle-Cerner, which previously experienced various issues and led to numerous setbacks. On April 11, 2026, the federal EHR went live at 4 Michigan sites: VA Ann Arbor Healthcare System, VA Battle Creek Medical Center, VA Detroit Healthcare System, and VA Saginaw Healthcare System.
VA officials have promised that things will be different this time, claiming it has fixed “hundreds of problems related to the initial rollout of the EHR system at the [6] original VA sites” and eliminated “the bureaucracy that was holding the project back.” At a press conference announcing the relaunch of the EHR rollout, VA Secretary Doug Collins said the old system cost the department hundreds of millions of dollars each year. He also said the VA has been too resistant to change at the expense of proper veteran health care.
“We’re all going to stay close to ensure that this is a smooth transition,” Collins said. “This needs to be a win for the VA patients.”
A VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation found 360 major performance incidents—outages, performance degradations, and incomplete functionality—that occurred between October 24, 2020, and August 31, 2022. Additionally, an investigation by The Spokesman-Review and The Washington Post found that the EHR “played a role” in > 4400 cases of patient harm and 6 deaths.
VA Deputy Secretary Paul Lawrence said that the VA plans to stagger the release of the system, unlike in previous deployments. The agency intends to implement the EHR at 13 sites in 2026 and 26 in 2027, anticipating a pace of about 28 to 30 sites each year after that.
The VA said it is also boosting staffing to ensure the transition goes smoothly and is in the process of hiring 400 employees. Other problems may arise, though. At the end of March laid off between 20,000 and 30,000. This prompted concerns that resources could be redirected from the VA EHR at a critical stage.
After a nearly 3-year pause, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is again ramping up the rollout of its new federal electronic health records (EHR) system from Oracle-Cerner, which previously experienced various issues and led to numerous setbacks. On April 11, 2026, the federal EHR went live at 4 Michigan sites: VA Ann Arbor Healthcare System, VA Battle Creek Medical Center, VA Detroit Healthcare System, and VA Saginaw Healthcare System.
VA officials have promised that things will be different this time, claiming it has fixed “hundreds of problems related to the initial rollout of the EHR system at the [6] original VA sites” and eliminated “the bureaucracy that was holding the project back.” At a press conference announcing the relaunch of the EHR rollout, VA Secretary Doug Collins said the old system cost the department hundreds of millions of dollars each year. He also said the VA has been too resistant to change at the expense of proper veteran health care.
“We’re all going to stay close to ensure that this is a smooth transition,” Collins said. “This needs to be a win for the VA patients.”
A VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation found 360 major performance incidents—outages, performance degradations, and incomplete functionality—that occurred between October 24, 2020, and August 31, 2022. Additionally, an investigation by The Spokesman-Review and The Washington Post found that the EHR “played a role” in > 4400 cases of patient harm and 6 deaths.
VA Deputy Secretary Paul Lawrence said that the VA plans to stagger the release of the system, unlike in previous deployments. The agency intends to implement the EHR at 13 sites in 2026 and 26 in 2027, anticipating a pace of about 28 to 30 sites each year after that.
The VA said it is also boosting staffing to ensure the transition goes smoothly and is in the process of hiring 400 employees. Other problems may arise, though. At the end of March laid off between 20,000 and 30,000. This prompted concerns that resources could be redirected from the VA EHR at a critical stage.