Fact vs Fallacy: Challenging the Norms of Cancer Care Fallacies in Medicine

This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Hello, everyone. This is Dr Bishal Gyawali, from Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Today, I’m back with you to talk about some of the fallacies that I have seen in medicine, oncology, and the drug regulatory space. I wanted to clarify some of these fallacies.

In my last video, I talked about the FDA denying the approval of a new cancer drug. Let me start with one of the fallacies that is pertinent to that, which is that some people make an argument that patients are dying from a certain condition, such as cancer, or even any other disease besides cancer. That is an absolutely true statement, but that does not necessarily mean there should be a lower bar for drug approvals or we should be approving any drug that has a hint of benefit.

In fact, if we have increased mortality rates and our patients are dying from a certain condition, that means we actually need to have good drugs. We need to have drugs that prevent mortality. We need to have drugs that improve outcomes. Just having any drug out there, if we lower our threshold and are letting any drug be used in these patients because the argument is that people are dying, then in fact, it can have negative consequences.

First, there will be opportunity costs. If you can get any lousy drug into the market and make billions of dollars out of it, then there is no strong motivation to produce drugs that actually remarkably improve outcomes.

Second, patients will also be misled. It’s the patient’s opportunity cost in that they will use whatever time they have remaining to pursue these treatments that were not going to improve their outcomes anyway. This is time they could have better spent either in pursuing better treatments, if those treatments are out there, or to prioritize their time accordingly. This rather gives them a false hope, which can be harmful in the long term.

The first fallacy is that just because people are dying does not necessarily mean we should have more new drugs with a lower bar for approval.

The second fallacy I want to talk about, which is also related to this, is that if a certain cancer is rare, the bar for new drug approval should be quite low.

Of course, rare cancers are a special category, and rare cancers should be treated differently from a regulatory perspective. Absolutely. If the cancer is rare, we cannot have trials with large sample sizes to generate evidence. That problem is there, but that does not necessarily translate to the decision that we should approve anything, even something with a small hint of benefit.

There are other methods to make sure that, even in rare cancers, we can generate good-quality evidence. In fact, from an equity perspective, why should patients with rare cancer not deserve drugs that have good-quality evidence?

We can’t tell someone that, “Your cancer is rare, so you should get drugs that only have a benefit in terms of response rate whereas other cancers that are not rare will have drugs based on survival.”

Going back to the point about the difficulty in doing big trials in patients with rare cancers, that is absolutely true and there should be regulatory flexibility in this. I think accelerated approval is a pathway that allows for this regulatory flexibility, which allows access to these drugs early on based on earlier signals of benefit. You can continue to generate evidence in the future and confirm the clinical benefit.

There are also other nuances to this. One is that we should also make sure that this regulatory flexibility with rare cancers should not be misused. What do I mean by that? First, all rare cancers are not the same. There are some cancers that are ultra rare, and then there are some cancers that technically might fit the definition of rare, but trials are possible. Case in point: adrenocortical cancer. It is considered to be a very rare cancer, but there have been randomized trials in adrenocortical cancer.

Our efforts should be to maximize our collaboration globally so that a cancer that is rare locally will still not be so rare globally when we collect all these patients.

In certain situations, like let’s say, based on the molecular subtypes, any common cancer can be sliced and diced into a rare subtype: MSI-high, BRAF-negative, HER2-positive, right-sided colon cancer. If you start to slice cancers into these smaller and smaller molecular subtypes, you can consider anything as a rare cancer. That should not be misused as an excuse to get away from doing proper trials and generating adequate evidence for our patients.

The third fallacy I want to talk about is that increasing cancer incidence in a certain subgroup of population does not automatically translate into, “We should start screening this subgroup of population.”

A certain cancer — let’s say cancer X or cancer Y — is increasing in a young population, so therefore, we should lower the age of the screening of young populations. This cancer is increasing in this ethnic population, so therefore we should start screening this ethnic population more frequently. This cancer is increasing in this type of minority, so therefore, we should start screening this minority more.

No, it does not work like that. Increasing incidence will make us concerned, of course, but that does not necessarily translate into, “We should start screening them.” In order for a screening test to be useful, it has to fulfill a number of criteria.

The goal is not to detect cancers. The goal is to detect cancers that are not indolent enough that they would have never caused problems, nor speed up the diagnosis of aggressive cancers that are going to be lethal pretty soon anyway. The goal is to detect those cancers in the middle, so that by detecting early, we can intervene and improve the outcomes and improve the mortality from that cancer.

This type of intervention requires a thoughtful consideration of the increasing incidence of the cancer, of course, but also the utility of the screening test in that subgroup of population; the life expectancy of this subgroup of patients with and without cancer; the interventions available to address that increasing burden of cancer; and whether by intervening we are going to reduce the mortality rates.

Just because we can detect cancers does not mean we should detect cancers. That’s the third fallacy I wanted to talk about.

The fourth fallacy is related to when someone is asking for more evidence for anything. There is a new drug for this cancer,so what is the evidence? Or there is this new intervention that will detect ctDNA or whatever before the cancer relapses, or before the cancer even shows up as a screening test.

Whenever there is any treatment that is being promoted and someone asks for evidence, people sometimes try to make personal attacks by saying, “Oh, so, you’re okay with patients dying. You don’t want to save lives.”

Absolutely we want to save lives. That’s why we’re in this field, and that’s why we’re asking for more evidence. You should not consider someone who is asking for evidence as evil or that this person does not want this new drug, or this person does not want this innovation. No, that person actually wants to make sure that that innovation actually helps people. That’s why that person is asking for more evidence.

If we stop asking for evidence, then our whole practice becomes based on emotions, faith, and trust rather than science. You could extrapolate it to the other extreme, like if you are not asking for evidence. If it is interpreted as someone who is asking for evidence is evil, or someone who does not want patients to get new drugs, then you could extrapolate these to people also making claims about alternative medicines or ivermectin nowadays, and claiming that this cures cancer.

Science is science. You need to be the same no matter the circumstances. If you are asking for data for ivermectin, you should also be asking data for your cancer drug that you think is going to work. We should always ask for evidence.

Asking for evidence is not a sign that whoever is asking for evidence does not want the patient to have access to the drug. It is showing that the person who is asking for evidence actually wants to make sure that the patients who get this drug are actually being helped by the drug rather than being harmed.

I’m talking about 5 fallacies today. The final, fifth fallacy is that clinical expertise does not equal expertise in making public health decisions or even expertise in critical appraisal. Someone can be a fantastic breast cancer doctor, the best oncologist for breast cancer. That does not automatically make that person the best person to evaluate clinical trials of breast cancer drugs.

Someone can be a fantastic colon cancer doctor. That does not make that person automatically the best person to evaluate whether or not colonoscopy or colon cancer screening is indicated in a certain patient population.

These population-level decisions — including should this drug be approved, should this drug be funded, and should this screening test be made a public health measure, all of these public health decisions that are done at a population level — require different expertise in critical appraisal, clinical epidemiology, and public health.

Just because someone is a fantastic clinician does not make that person a fantastic public health expert. I see on social media often that a famous doctor with expertise in their domain, let’s say a famous neurosurgeon, might say, “I think brain tumors are increasing in incidence in young persons, so we should be targeting an MRI screening for everyone over the age of 30.”

I’m just making this up, but we see examples of things not dissimilar to this. Just because someone is a neurosurgeon does not make them an expert on brain tumor epidemiology, surveillance, or screening. We should separate clinical expertise from public health expertise.

Thank you.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Hello, everyone. This is Dr Bishal Gyawali, from Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Today, I’m back with you to talk about some of the fallacies that I have seen in medicine, oncology, and the drug regulatory space. I wanted to clarify some of these fallacies.

In my last video, I talked about the FDA denying the approval of a new cancer drug. Let me start with one of the fallacies that is pertinent to that, which is that some people make an argument that patients are dying from a certain condition, such as cancer, or even any other disease besides cancer. That is an absolutely true statement, but that does not necessarily mean there should be a lower bar for drug approvals or we should be approving any drug that has a hint of benefit.

In fact, if we have increased mortality rates and our patients are dying from a certain condition, that means we actually need to have good drugs. We need to have drugs that prevent mortality. We need to have drugs that improve outcomes. Just having any drug out there, if we lower our threshold and are letting any drug be used in these patients because the argument is that people are dying, then in fact, it can have negative consequences.

First, there will be opportunity costs. If you can get any lousy drug into the market and make billions of dollars out of it, then there is no strong motivation to produce drugs that actually remarkably improve outcomes.

Second, patients will also be misled. It’s the patient’s opportunity cost in that they will use whatever time they have remaining to pursue these treatments that were not going to improve their outcomes anyway. This is time they could have better spent either in pursuing better treatments, if those treatments are out there, or to prioritize their time accordingly. This rather gives them a false hope, which can be harmful in the long term.

The first fallacy is that just because people are dying does not necessarily mean we should have more new drugs with a lower bar for approval.

The second fallacy I want to talk about, which is also related to this, is that if a certain cancer is rare, the bar for new drug approval should be quite low.

Of course, rare cancers are a special category, and rare cancers should be treated differently from a regulatory perspective. Absolutely. If the cancer is rare, we cannot have trials with large sample sizes to generate evidence. That problem is there, but that does not necessarily translate to the decision that we should approve anything, even something with a small hint of benefit.

There are other methods to make sure that, even in rare cancers, we can generate good-quality evidence. In fact, from an equity perspective, why should patients with rare cancer not deserve drugs that have good-quality evidence?

We can’t tell someone that, “Your cancer is rare, so you should get drugs that only have a benefit in terms of response rate whereas other cancers that are not rare will have drugs based on survival.”

Going back to the point about the difficulty in doing big trials in patients with rare cancers, that is absolutely true and there should be regulatory flexibility in this. I think accelerated approval is a pathway that allows for this regulatory flexibility, which allows access to these drugs early on based on earlier signals of benefit. You can continue to generate evidence in the future and confirm the clinical benefit.

There are also other nuances to this. One is that we should also make sure that this regulatory flexibility with rare cancers should not be misused. What do I mean by that? First, all rare cancers are not the same. There are some cancers that are ultra rare, and then there are some cancers that technically might fit the definition of rare, but trials are possible. Case in point: adrenocortical cancer. It is considered to be a very rare cancer, but there have been randomized trials in adrenocortical cancer.

Our efforts should be to maximize our collaboration globally so that a cancer that is rare locally will still not be so rare globally when we collect all these patients.

In certain situations, like let’s say, based on the molecular subtypes, any common cancer can be sliced and diced into a rare subtype: MSI-high, BRAF-negative, HER2-positive, right-sided colon cancer. If you start to slice cancers into these smaller and smaller molecular subtypes, you can consider anything as a rare cancer. That should not be misused as an excuse to get away from doing proper trials and generating adequate evidence for our patients.

The third fallacy I want to talk about is that increasing cancer incidence in a certain subgroup of population does not automatically translate into, “We should start screening this subgroup of population.”

A certain cancer — let’s say cancer X or cancer Y — is increasing in a young population, so therefore, we should lower the age of the screening of young populations. This cancer is increasing in this ethnic population, so therefore we should start screening this ethnic population more frequently. This cancer is increasing in this type of minority, so therefore, we should start screening this minority more.

No, it does not work like that. Increasing incidence will make us concerned, of course, but that does not necessarily translate into, “We should start screening them.” In order for a screening test to be useful, it has to fulfill a number of criteria.

The goal is not to detect cancers. The goal is to detect cancers that are not indolent enough that they would have never caused problems, nor speed up the diagnosis of aggressive cancers that are going to be lethal pretty soon anyway. The goal is to detect those cancers in the middle, so that by detecting early, we can intervene and improve the outcomes and improve the mortality from that cancer.

This type of intervention requires a thoughtful consideration of the increasing incidence of the cancer, of course, but also the utility of the screening test in that subgroup of population; the life expectancy of this subgroup of patients with and without cancer; the interventions available to address that increasing burden of cancer; and whether by intervening we are going to reduce the mortality rates.

Just because we can detect cancers does not mean we should detect cancers. That’s the third fallacy I wanted to talk about.

The fourth fallacy is related to when someone is asking for more evidence for anything. There is a new drug for this cancer,so what is the evidence? Or there is this new intervention that will detect ctDNA or whatever before the cancer relapses, or before the cancer even shows up as a screening test.

Whenever there is any treatment that is being promoted and someone asks for evidence, people sometimes try to make personal attacks by saying, “Oh, so, you’re okay with patients dying. You don’t want to save lives.”

Absolutely we want to save lives. That’s why we’re in this field, and that’s why we’re asking for more evidence. You should not consider someone who is asking for evidence as evil or that this person does not want this new drug, or this person does not want this innovation. No, that person actually wants to make sure that that innovation actually helps people. That’s why that person is asking for more evidence.

If we stop asking for evidence, then our whole practice becomes based on emotions, faith, and trust rather than science. You could extrapolate it to the other extreme, like if you are not asking for evidence. If it is interpreted as someone who is asking for evidence is evil, or someone who does not want patients to get new drugs, then you could extrapolate these to people also making claims about alternative medicines or ivermectin nowadays, and claiming that this cures cancer.

Science is science. You need to be the same no matter the circumstances. If you are asking for data for ivermectin, you should also be asking data for your cancer drug that you think is going to work. We should always ask for evidence.

Asking for evidence is not a sign that whoever is asking for evidence does not want the patient to have access to the drug. It is showing that the person who is asking for evidence actually wants to make sure that the patients who get this drug are actually being helped by the drug rather than being harmed.

I’m talking about 5 fallacies today. The final, fifth fallacy is that clinical expertise does not equal expertise in making public health decisions or even expertise in critical appraisal. Someone can be a fantastic breast cancer doctor, the best oncologist for breast cancer. That does not automatically make that person the best person to evaluate clinical trials of breast cancer drugs.

Someone can be a fantastic colon cancer doctor. That does not make that person automatically the best person to evaluate whether or not colonoscopy or colon cancer screening is indicated in a certain patient population.

These population-level decisions — including should this drug be approved, should this drug be funded, and should this screening test be made a public health measure, all of these public health decisions that are done at a population level — require different expertise in critical appraisal, clinical epidemiology, and public health.

Just because someone is a fantastic clinician does not make that person a fantastic public health expert. I see on social media often that a famous doctor with expertise in their domain, let’s say a famous neurosurgeon, might say, “I think brain tumors are increasing in incidence in young persons, so we should be targeting an MRI screening for everyone over the age of 30.”

I’m just making this up, but we see examples of things not dissimilar to this. Just because someone is a neurosurgeon does not make them an expert on brain tumor epidemiology, surveillance, or screening. We should separate clinical expertise from public health expertise.

Thank you.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Hello, everyone. This is Dr Bishal Gyawali, from Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Today, I’m back with you to talk about some of the fallacies that I have seen in medicine, oncology, and the drug regulatory space. I wanted to clarify some of these fallacies.

In my last video, I talked about the FDA denying the approval of a new cancer drug. Let me start with one of the fallacies that is pertinent to that, which is that some people make an argument that patients are dying from a certain condition, such as cancer, or even any other disease besides cancer. That is an absolutely true statement, but that does not necessarily mean there should be a lower bar for drug approvals or we should be approving any drug that has a hint of benefit.

In fact, if we have increased mortality rates and our patients are dying from a certain condition, that means we actually need to have good drugs. We need to have drugs that prevent mortality. We need to have drugs that improve outcomes. Just having any drug out there, if we lower our threshold and are letting any drug be used in these patients because the argument is that people are dying, then in fact, it can have negative consequences.

First, there will be opportunity costs. If you can get any lousy drug into the market and make billions of dollars out of it, then there is no strong motivation to produce drugs that actually remarkably improve outcomes.

Second, patients will also be misled. It’s the patient’s opportunity cost in that they will use whatever time they have remaining to pursue these treatments that were not going to improve their outcomes anyway. This is time they could have better spent either in pursuing better treatments, if those treatments are out there, or to prioritize their time accordingly. This rather gives them a false hope, which can be harmful in the long term.

The first fallacy is that just because people are dying does not necessarily mean we should have more new drugs with a lower bar for approval.

The second fallacy I want to talk about, which is also related to this, is that if a certain cancer is rare, the bar for new drug approval should be quite low.

Of course, rare cancers are a special category, and rare cancers should be treated differently from a regulatory perspective. Absolutely. If the cancer is rare, we cannot have trials with large sample sizes to generate evidence. That problem is there, but that does not necessarily translate to the decision that we should approve anything, even something with a small hint of benefit.

There are other methods to make sure that, even in rare cancers, we can generate good-quality evidence. In fact, from an equity perspective, why should patients with rare cancer not deserve drugs that have good-quality evidence?

We can’t tell someone that, “Your cancer is rare, so you should get drugs that only have a benefit in terms of response rate whereas other cancers that are not rare will have drugs based on survival.”

Going back to the point about the difficulty in doing big trials in patients with rare cancers, that is absolutely true and there should be regulatory flexibility in this. I think accelerated approval is a pathway that allows for this regulatory flexibility, which allows access to these drugs early on based on earlier signals of benefit. You can continue to generate evidence in the future and confirm the clinical benefit.

There are also other nuances to this. One is that we should also make sure that this regulatory flexibility with rare cancers should not be misused. What do I mean by that? First, all rare cancers are not the same. There are some cancers that are ultra rare, and then there are some cancers that technically might fit the definition of rare, but trials are possible. Case in point: adrenocortical cancer. It is considered to be a very rare cancer, but there have been randomized trials in adrenocortical cancer.

Our efforts should be to maximize our collaboration globally so that a cancer that is rare locally will still not be so rare globally when we collect all these patients.

In certain situations, like let’s say, based on the molecular subtypes, any common cancer can be sliced and diced into a rare subtype: MSI-high, BRAF-negative, HER2-positive, right-sided colon cancer. If you start to slice cancers into these smaller and smaller molecular subtypes, you can consider anything as a rare cancer. That should not be misused as an excuse to get away from doing proper trials and generating adequate evidence for our patients.

The third fallacy I want to talk about is that increasing cancer incidence in a certain subgroup of population does not automatically translate into, “We should start screening this subgroup of population.”

A certain cancer — let’s say cancer X or cancer Y — is increasing in a young population, so therefore, we should lower the age of the screening of young populations. This cancer is increasing in this ethnic population, so therefore we should start screening this ethnic population more frequently. This cancer is increasing in this type of minority, so therefore, we should start screening this minority more.

No, it does not work like that. Increasing incidence will make us concerned, of course, but that does not necessarily translate into, “We should start screening them.” In order for a screening test to be useful, it has to fulfill a number of criteria.

The goal is not to detect cancers. The goal is to detect cancers that are not indolent enough that they would have never caused problems, nor speed up the diagnosis of aggressive cancers that are going to be lethal pretty soon anyway. The goal is to detect those cancers in the middle, so that by detecting early, we can intervene and improve the outcomes and improve the mortality from that cancer.

This type of intervention requires a thoughtful consideration of the increasing incidence of the cancer, of course, but also the utility of the screening test in that subgroup of population; the life expectancy of this subgroup of patients with and without cancer; the interventions available to address that increasing burden of cancer; and whether by intervening we are going to reduce the mortality rates.

Just because we can detect cancers does not mean we should detect cancers. That’s the third fallacy I wanted to talk about.

The fourth fallacy is related to when someone is asking for more evidence for anything. There is a new drug for this cancer,so what is the evidence? Or there is this new intervention that will detect ctDNA or whatever before the cancer relapses, or before the cancer even shows up as a screening test.

Whenever there is any treatment that is being promoted and someone asks for evidence, people sometimes try to make personal attacks by saying, “Oh, so, you’re okay with patients dying. You don’t want to save lives.”

Absolutely we want to save lives. That’s why we’re in this field, and that’s why we’re asking for more evidence. You should not consider someone who is asking for evidence as evil or that this person does not want this new drug, or this person does not want this innovation. No, that person actually wants to make sure that that innovation actually helps people. That’s why that person is asking for more evidence.

If we stop asking for evidence, then our whole practice becomes based on emotions, faith, and trust rather than science. You could extrapolate it to the other extreme, like if you are not asking for evidence. If it is interpreted as someone who is asking for evidence is evil, or someone who does not want patients to get new drugs, then you could extrapolate these to people also making claims about alternative medicines or ivermectin nowadays, and claiming that this cures cancer.

Science is science. You need to be the same no matter the circumstances. If you are asking for data for ivermectin, you should also be asking data for your cancer drug that you think is going to work. We should always ask for evidence.

Asking for evidence is not a sign that whoever is asking for evidence does not want the patient to have access to the drug. It is showing that the person who is asking for evidence actually wants to make sure that the patients who get this drug are actually being helped by the drug rather than being harmed.

I’m talking about 5 fallacies today. The final, fifth fallacy is that clinical expertise does not equal expertise in making public health decisions or even expertise in critical appraisal. Someone can be a fantastic breast cancer doctor, the best oncologist for breast cancer. That does not automatically make that person the best person to evaluate clinical trials of breast cancer drugs.

Someone can be a fantastic colon cancer doctor. That does not make that person automatically the best person to evaluate whether or not colonoscopy or colon cancer screening is indicated in a certain patient population.

These population-level decisions — including should this drug be approved, should this drug be funded, and should this screening test be made a public health measure, all of these public health decisions that are done at a population level — require different expertise in critical appraisal, clinical epidemiology, and public health.

Just because someone is a fantastic clinician does not make that person a fantastic public health expert. I see on social media often that a famous doctor with expertise in their domain, let’s say a famous neurosurgeon, might say, “I think brain tumors are increasing in incidence in young persons, so we should be targeting an MRI screening for everyone over the age of 30.”

I’m just making this up, but we see examples of things not dissimilar to this. Just because someone is a neurosurgeon does not make them an expert on brain tumor epidemiology, surveillance, or screening. We should separate clinical expertise from public health expertise.

Thank you.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.