Hospital Medicine

When my grandfather, who speaks limited English, was admitted to a hospital following a stroke amid the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, my family was understandably worried. Sure enough, within just hours of his admission, we were told our normally very calm and beloved Nana was experiencing significant agitation and delirium. He did not understand nurses’ efforts to calm him down, became even more confused, and was eventually sedated and placed in physical restraints. Even though my family’s presence might have prevented some or all of this terrible series of events, the hospital’s visiting policies during the wave of COVID-19 admissions meant that we were forced to wait in the parking lot as they transpired. The hospital’s policy at the time only allowed visitors for pediatrics, end-of-life care, or labor, not for patients with delirium or altered mental status. We were given the option to make a video call, but my grandfather’s stroke had almost completely taken away his vision. Instead of sitting by his side, comforting him, providing explanations in voices he knew and a language he understood, we were left imagining how difficult it must be to suddenly wake up in an unfamiliar environment, with strangers speaking a different language, limited vision, and your arms and legs tied. Intellectually, I understood the hospital’s goals to minimize transmission, but spiritually and emotionally, it felt very cruel and very wrong.

The next day, we successfully petitioned administration to make an exception for one visitor. We argued that our presence would allow for removal of the sedation and restraints. The clinical team agreed that video calls were insufficient in his situation; he was allowed a visitor. We decided that it should be my mother. As soon my grandfather heard her familiar voice, there was a dramatic improvement. He immediately became calmer and restraints were no longer necessary. The team was grateful for a better physical exam and my grandfather was more cooperative with physical therapy. A few days later, unfortunately, the hospital let us know that they had reevaluated their position on my mother’s visits and that she posed an unnecessary COVID-19 risk to medical staff and other patients. And as soon as she left, my grandfather was again agitated and confused for the remaining 3 days of his hospitalization. Although we are grateful that his delirium resolved once he returned home, delirium also has the potential to lead to long-term cognitive impairment.¹

The COVID-19 pandemic has required hospitals around the world to make difficult decisions about how to balance minimizing disease transmission with continuing to provide compassionate and high-quality patient care. Of these many dilemmas, developing flexible visitor policies is particularly difficult. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and many state health departments encourage limiting visitation in general but recognize the need for exceptions in special circumstances such as in end-of-life settings or altered mental status.^2-4

At the hospital level, there is substantial variation in visitation policies among hospitals. Near our family home in San Jose, California, one hospital currently allows visitation for pediatric patients, pregnant patients, end-of-life patients, surgical patients, and patients in the emergency department, as well as those with mental disabilities or safety needs.⁵ A mere 10 minutes away, another hospital has implemented a very different policy that allows only one visitor for pregnant patients and in end-of-life settings; there are no exceptions for patients with cognitive or physical disabilities.⁶ Other hospitals in the United States have gone even further, not permitting visitors even for those at the end of life.⁷ These patients are forced to spend their last few moments alone.

From an infection control perspective, there are certainly valid reasons to limit visitation. Even with temperature screenings, any movement into and out of a hospital poses a risk of transmitting disease. Infected but asymptomatic persons are known to transmit the disease. Additionally, hospitals still treat non–COVID-19 patients who are most susceptible to severe illness should they develop COVID-19 infection. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations in testing capacity, personal protective equipment (PPE), and staffing made it challenging to ensure safe visitation. In many cases, it was almost impossible to mitigate the transmission risk that visitors posed. Because many hospitals did not have the capacity to test all symptomatic patients, they could not reliably limit visits to COVID-19–positive patients. Additionally, without enough PPE for healthcare workers, hospitals could not afford for visitors to use additional PPE.

Now that testing is more readily available and some aspects of the PPE shortages have been addressed, we should not forget that visitation has significant benefits for both patients’ psychological well-being and their overall outcomes.⁸ Putting aside the emotional support that the physical presence of loved ones can offer, a large body of research indicates that allowing visitors can also meaningfully improve other important patient outcomes. Specifically, the presence of visitors is associated with less fear,⁹ reduced delirium,¹⁰ and even faster recovery.⁸ In many cases, family members can also help improve hospital safety surveillance and catch medical errors.¹¹

I saw firsthand how these benefits are particularly true for visitors who are also a patient’s primary caretaker. When my mother visited my grandfather, she was not simply a visitor but instead served as an active member of the care team. In addition to providing emotional comfort, my mother oriented him to his surroundings, successfully encouraged oral intake, and even caught some medication errors. Particularly for patients with cognitive impairment, caretakers know the patient better than anyone on the clinical team, and their absence can negatively affect the quality of care.

As a family member who also has familiarity with the healthcare system, I share hospitals’ concerns about wanting to minimize disease transmission. I recognize that, even with PPE and screenings, there is still a chance that visitors unknowingly spread COVID-19 to others in the hospital. On a personal level, however, it feels inhumane to maintain this policy even when it affects particularly vulnerable patients like my grandfather. As some hospitals are already doing,¹² we can take steps to allow visitors for such patients while minimizing the likelihood of COVID-19 disease transmission from visitors. Arriving visitors can be screened and required to wear PPE. While these measures may not eliminate the risk of COVID-19 transmission from visitors, they will likely reduce it significantly when implemented properly and make possible a more humane experience for all.¹³

Fortunately, my grandfather is now recovering comfortably at home, surrounded by his loved ones. To this day, however, he has not forgotten what it was like to be confused and alone in the hospital after his stroke. Even with loved ones around, a stroke is a profoundly distressing experience. To go through such an experience alone is even worse. Because of our petitioning, my grandfather was at least allowed a visitor for part of his stay. Other patients are not even allowed that. As we plan for the pandemic’s next waves, hospitals should reevaluate their visitor policies to ensure that their most vulnerable patients do not have to suffer alone.

The author sincerely thanks Dr Allan Goroll (Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School) for his mentorship and critical review of this manuscript.

The author has nothing to disclose.

When my grandfather, who speaks limited English, was admitted to a hospital following a stroke amid the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, my family was understandably worried. Sure enough, within just hours of his admission, we were told our normally very calm and beloved Nana was experiencing significant agitation and delirium. He did not understand nurses’ efforts to calm him down, became even more confused, and was eventually sedated and placed in physical restraints. Even though my family’s presence might have prevented some or all of this terrible series of events, the hospital’s visiting policies during the wave of COVID-19 admissions meant that we were forced to wait in the parking lot as they transpired. The hospital’s policy at the time only allowed visitors for pediatrics, end-of-life care, or labor, not for patients with delirium or altered mental status. We were given the option to make a video call, but my grandfather’s stroke had almost completely taken away his vision. Instead of sitting by his side, comforting him, providing explanations in voices he knew and a language he understood, we were left imagining how difficult it must be to suddenly wake up in an unfamiliar environment, with strangers speaking a different language, limited vision, and your arms and legs tied. Intellectually, I understood the hospital’s goals to minimize transmission, but spiritually and emotionally, it felt very cruel and very wrong.

The next day, we successfully petitioned administration to make an exception for one visitor. We argued that our presence would allow for removal of the sedation and restraints. The clinical team agreed that video calls were insufficient in his situation; he was allowed a visitor. We decided that it should be my mother. As soon my grandfather heard her familiar voice, there was a dramatic improvement. He immediately became calmer and restraints were no longer necessary. The team was grateful for a better physical exam and my grandfather was more cooperative with physical therapy. A few days later, unfortunately, the hospital let us know that they had reevaluated their position on my mother’s visits and that she posed an unnecessary COVID-19 risk to medical staff and other patients. And as soon as she left, my grandfather was again agitated and confused for the remaining 3 days of his hospitalization. Although we are grateful that his delirium resolved once he returned home, delirium also has the potential to lead to long-term cognitive impairment.¹

The COVID-19 pandemic has required hospitals around the world to make difficult decisions about how to balance minimizing disease transmission with continuing to provide compassionate and high-quality patient care. Of these many dilemmas, developing flexible visitor policies is particularly difficult. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and many state health departments encourage limiting visitation in general but recognize the need for exceptions in special circumstances such as in end-of-life settings or altered mental status.^2-4

At the hospital level, there is substantial variation in visitation policies among hospitals. Near our family home in San Jose, California, one hospital currently allows visitation for pediatric patients, pregnant patients, end-of-life patients, surgical patients, and patients in the emergency department, as well as those with mental disabilities or safety needs.⁵ A mere 10 minutes away, another hospital has implemented a very different policy that allows only one visitor for pregnant patients and in end-of-life settings; there are no exceptions for patients with cognitive or physical disabilities.⁶ Other hospitals in the United States have gone even further, not permitting visitors even for those at the end of life.⁷ These patients are forced to spend their last few moments alone.

From an infection control perspective, there are certainly valid reasons to limit visitation. Even with temperature screenings, any movement into and out of a hospital poses a risk of transmitting disease. Infected but asymptomatic persons are known to transmit the disease. Additionally, hospitals still treat non–COVID-19 patients who are most susceptible to severe illness should they develop COVID-19 infection. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations in testing capacity, personal protective equipment (PPE), and staffing made it challenging to ensure safe visitation. In many cases, it was almost impossible to mitigate the transmission risk that visitors posed. Because many hospitals did not have the capacity to test all symptomatic patients, they could not reliably limit visits to COVID-19–positive patients. Additionally, without enough PPE for healthcare workers, hospitals could not afford for visitors to use additional PPE.

Now that testing is more readily available and some aspects of the PPE shortages have been addressed, we should not forget that visitation has significant benefits for both patients’ psychological well-being and their overall outcomes.⁸ Putting aside the emotional support that the physical presence of loved ones can offer, a large body of research indicates that allowing visitors can also meaningfully improve other important patient outcomes. Specifically, the presence of visitors is associated with less fear,⁹ reduced delirium,¹⁰ and even faster recovery.⁸ In many cases, family members can also help improve hospital safety surveillance and catch medical errors.¹¹

I saw firsthand how these benefits are particularly true for visitors who are also a patient’s primary caretaker. When my mother visited my grandfather, she was not simply a visitor but instead served as an active member of the care team. In addition to providing emotional comfort, my mother oriented him to his surroundings, successfully encouraged oral intake, and even caught some medication errors. Particularly for patients with cognitive impairment, caretakers know the patient better than anyone on the clinical team, and their absence can negatively affect the quality of care.

As a family member who also has familiarity with the healthcare system, I share hospitals’ concerns about wanting to minimize disease transmission. I recognize that, even with PPE and screenings, there is still a chance that visitors unknowingly spread COVID-19 to others in the hospital. On a personal level, however, it feels inhumane to maintain this policy even when it affects particularly vulnerable patients like my grandfather. As some hospitals are already doing,¹² we can take steps to allow visitors for such patients while minimizing the likelihood of COVID-19 disease transmission from visitors. Arriving visitors can be screened and required to wear PPE. While these measures may not eliminate the risk of COVID-19 transmission from visitors, they will likely reduce it significantly when implemented properly and make possible a more humane experience for all.¹³

Fortunately, my grandfather is now recovering comfortably at home, surrounded by his loved ones. To this day, however, he has not forgotten what it was like to be confused and alone in the hospital after his stroke. Even with loved ones around, a stroke is a profoundly distressing experience. To go through such an experience alone is even worse. Because of our petitioning, my grandfather was at least allowed a visitor for part of his stay. Other patients are not even allowed that. As we plan for the pandemic’s next waves, hospitals should reevaluate their visitor policies to ensure that their most vulnerable patients do not have to suffer alone.

The author sincerely thanks Dr Allan Goroll (Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School) for his mentorship and critical review of this manuscript.

The author has nothing to disclose.

When my grandfather, who speaks limited English, was admitted to a hospital following a stroke amid the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, my family was understandably worried. Sure enough, within just hours of his admission, we were told our normally very calm and beloved Nana was experiencing significant agitation and delirium. He did not understand nurses’ efforts to calm him down, became even more confused, and was eventually sedated and placed in physical restraints. Even though my family’s presence might have prevented some or all of this terrible series of events, the hospital’s visiting policies during the wave of COVID-19 admissions meant that we were forced to wait in the parking lot as they transpired. The hospital’s policy at the time only allowed visitors for pediatrics, end-of-life care, or labor, not for patients with delirium or altered mental status. We were given the option to make a video call, but my grandfather’s stroke had almost completely taken away his vision. Instead of sitting by his side, comforting him, providing explanations in voices he knew and a language he understood, we were left imagining how difficult it must be to suddenly wake up in an unfamiliar environment, with strangers speaking a different language, limited vision, and your arms and legs tied. Intellectually, I understood the hospital’s goals to minimize transmission, but spiritually and emotionally, it felt very cruel and very wrong.

The next day, we successfully petitioned administration to make an exception for one visitor. We argued that our presence would allow for removal of the sedation and restraints. The clinical team agreed that video calls were insufficient in his situation; he was allowed a visitor. We decided that it should be my mother. As soon my grandfather heard her familiar voice, there was a dramatic improvement. He immediately became calmer and restraints were no longer necessary. The team was grateful for a better physical exam and my grandfather was more cooperative with physical therapy. A few days later, unfortunately, the hospital let us know that they had reevaluated their position on my mother’s visits and that she posed an unnecessary COVID-19 risk to medical staff and other patients. And as soon as she left, my grandfather was again agitated and confused for the remaining 3 days of his hospitalization. Although we are grateful that his delirium resolved once he returned home, delirium also has the potential to lead to long-term cognitive impairment.¹

The COVID-19 pandemic has required hospitals around the world to make difficult decisions about how to balance minimizing disease transmission with continuing to provide compassionate and high-quality patient care. Of these many dilemmas, developing flexible visitor policies is particularly difficult. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and many state health departments encourage limiting visitation in general but recognize the need for exceptions in special circumstances such as in end-of-life settings or altered mental status.^2-4

At the hospital level, there is substantial variation in visitation policies among hospitals. Near our family home in San Jose, California, one hospital currently allows visitation for pediatric patients, pregnant patients, end-of-life patients, surgical patients, and patients in the emergency department, as well as those with mental disabilities or safety needs.⁵ A mere 10 minutes away, another hospital has implemented a very different policy that allows only one visitor for pregnant patients and in end-of-life settings; there are no exceptions for patients with cognitive or physical disabilities.⁶ Other hospitals in the United States have gone even further, not permitting visitors even for those at the end of life.⁷ These patients are forced to spend their last few moments alone.

From an infection control perspective, there are certainly valid reasons to limit visitation. Even with temperature screenings, any movement into and out of a hospital poses a risk of transmitting disease. Infected but asymptomatic persons are known to transmit the disease. Additionally, hospitals still treat non–COVID-19 patients who are most susceptible to severe illness should they develop COVID-19 infection. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations in testing capacity, personal protective equipment (PPE), and staffing made it challenging to ensure safe visitation. In many cases, it was almost impossible to mitigate the transmission risk that visitors posed. Because many hospitals did not have the capacity to test all symptomatic patients, they could not reliably limit visits to COVID-19–positive patients. Additionally, without enough PPE for healthcare workers, hospitals could not afford for visitors to use additional PPE.

Now that testing is more readily available and some aspects of the PPE shortages have been addressed, we should not forget that visitation has significant benefits for both patients’ psychological well-being and their overall outcomes.⁸ Putting aside the emotional support that the physical presence of loved ones can offer, a large body of research indicates that allowing visitors can also meaningfully improve other important patient outcomes. Specifically, the presence of visitors is associated with less fear,⁹ reduced delirium,¹⁰ and even faster recovery.⁸ In many cases, family members can also help improve hospital safety surveillance and catch medical errors.¹¹

I saw firsthand how these benefits are particularly true for visitors who are also a patient’s primary caretaker. When my mother visited my grandfather, she was not simply a visitor but instead served as an active member of the care team. In addition to providing emotional comfort, my mother oriented him to his surroundings, successfully encouraged oral intake, and even caught some medication errors. Particularly for patients with cognitive impairment, caretakers know the patient better than anyone on the clinical team, and their absence can negatively affect the quality of care.

As a family member who also has familiarity with the healthcare system, I share hospitals’ concerns about wanting to minimize disease transmission. I recognize that, even with PPE and screenings, there is still a chance that visitors unknowingly spread COVID-19 to others in the hospital. On a personal level, however, it feels inhumane to maintain this policy even when it affects particularly vulnerable patients like my grandfather. As some hospitals are already doing,¹² we can take steps to allow visitors for such patients while minimizing the likelihood of COVID-19 disease transmission from visitors. Arriving visitors can be screened and required to wear PPE. While these measures may not eliminate the risk of COVID-19 transmission from visitors, they will likely reduce it significantly when implemented properly and make possible a more humane experience for all.¹³

Fortunately, my grandfather is now recovering comfortably at home, surrounded by his loved ones. To this day, however, he has not forgotten what it was like to be confused and alone in the hospital after his stroke. Even with loved ones around, a stroke is a profoundly distressing experience. To go through such an experience alone is even worse. Because of our petitioning, my grandfather was at least allowed a visitor for part of his stay. Other patients are not even allowed that. As we plan for the pandemic’s next waves, hospitals should reevaluate their visitor policies to ensure that their most vulnerable patients do not have to suffer alone.

The author sincerely thanks Dr Allan Goroll (Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School) for his mentorship and critical review of this manuscript.

The author has nothing to disclose.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges¹—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.^1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”^5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.⁴

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.⁸ We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.^4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,⁹ cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges¹—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.^1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”^5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.⁴

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.⁸ We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.^4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,⁹ cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges¹—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.^1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”^5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.⁴

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.⁸ We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.^4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,⁹ cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

Recent experiences in the transportation industry highlight the importance of getting right the regulation of decision-support systems in high-stakes environments. Two tragic plane crashes resulted in 346 deaths and were deemed, in part, to be related to a cockpit alert system that overwhelmed pilots with multiple notifications.¹ Similarly, a driverless car struck and killed a pedestrian in the street, in part because the car was not programmed to look for humans outside of a crosswalk.² These two bellwether events offer poignant lessons for the healthcare industry in which human lives also depend on decision-support systems.

Clinical decision-support (CDS) systems are computerized applications, often embedded in an electronic health record (EHR), that provide information to clinicians to inform care. Although CDS systems have been used for many years,³ they have never been subjected to any enforcement of formal testing requirements. However, a draft guidance document released in 2019 from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) outlined new directions for the regulation of CDS systems.⁴ Although the FDA has thus far focused regulatory efforts on predictive systems developed by private manufacturers,^5,6 this new document provides examples of software that would require regulation for CDS systems that hospitals are already using. Thus, this new guidance raises critical questions—will hospitals themselves be evaluated like private manufacturers, be exempted from federal regulation, or require their own specialized regulation? The FDA has not yet clarified its approach to hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, which leaves open numerous possibilities in a rapidly evolving regulatory environment.

Although the FDA has officially regulated CDS systems under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938), only recently has the FDA begun to sketch the shape of its regulatory efforts. This trend to actually regulate CDS systems began with the 21st Century Cures Act (2016) that amended the definition of software systems that qualify as medical devices and outlined criteria under which a system may be exempt from FDA oversight. For example, regulation would not apply to systems that support “population health” or a “healthy lifestyle” or to ones that qualify as “electronic patient records” as long as they do not “interpret or analyze” data within them.⁷ Following the rapid proliferation of many machine learning and other predictive technologies with medical applications, the FDA began the voluntary Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program in 2017. Through this program, the FDA selected nine companies from more than 100 applicants and certified them across five domains of excellence. Notably, the Pre-Cert Program currently allows for certification of software manufacturers themselves and does not approve or test actual software devices directly. This regulatory pathway will eventually allow manufacturers to apply under a modified premarket review process for individual software as a medical device (SaMD) that use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. In the meantime, however, many hospitals have developed and deployed their own predictive CDS systems that cross the boundaries into the FDA’s purview and, indeed, do “interpret or analyze” data for real-time EHR alerts, population health management, and other applications.

Regulatory oversight for hospitals could provide quality or safety standards where currently there are none. However, such regulations could also interfere with existing local care practices, hinder rapid development of new CDS systems, and may be perceived as interfering in hospital operations. With the current enthusiasm for AI-based technologies and the concurrent lack of evidence to suggest their effectiveness in practice, regulation could also prompt necessary scrutiny of potential harms of CDS systems, an area with even less evidence. At the same time, CDS developers—private or hospital based—may be able to avoid regulation for some devices with well-placed disclaimers about the intended use of the CDS, one of the FDA criteria for determining the degree of oversight. If the FDA were to regulate hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, there are several unanswered questions to consider so that such regulations have their intended impact.

First, does the FDA intend to regulate hospitals and hospital-developed software at all? The framework for determining whether a CDS system will be regulated depends on the severity of the clinical scenario, the ability to independently evaluate the model output, and the intended user (Table). Notably, many types of CDS systems that would require regulation under this framework are already commonplace. For example, the FDA intends to regulate software that “identifies patients who may exhibit signs of opioid addiction,” a scenario similar to prediction models already developed at academic hospitals.⁸ The FDA also plans to regulate a software device even if it is not a CDS system if it is “intended to generate an alarm or an alert to notify a caregiver of a life-threatening condition, such as stroke, and the caregiver relies primarily on this alarm or alert to make a treatment decision.” Although there are no published reports of stroke-specific early warning systems in use, analogous nonspecific and sepsis-specific early warning systems to prompt urgent clinical care have been deployed by hospitals directly⁹ and developed for embedding in commercial EHRs.¹⁰ Hospitals need clarification on the FDA’s regulatory intentions for such CDS systems. FDA regulation of hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems would fill a critical oversight need and potentially strengthen processes to improve safety and effectiveness. But burdensome regulations may also restrain hospitals from tackling complex problems in medicine for which they are uniquely suited.

Such a regulatory environment may be especially prohibitive for safety-net hospitals that could find themselves at a disadvantage in developing their own CDS systems relative to large academic medical centers that are typically endowed with greater resources. Additionally, CDS systems developed at academic medical centers may not generalize well to populations in the community setting, which could further deepen disparities in access to cutting-edge technologies. For example, racial bias in treatment and referral patterns could bias training labels for CDS systems focused on population health management.¹¹ Similarly, the composition of patient skin color in one population may distort predictions of a model in another with a different distribution of skin color, even when the primary outcome of a prediction model is gender.¹² Additional regulatory steps may apply for models that are adapted to new populations or recalibrated across locations and time.¹³ Until there is more data on the clinical impact of such CDS systems, it is unknown how potential differences in evaluation and approval would actually affect clinical outcomes.

Second, would hospitals be eligible for the Pre-Cert program, and if so, would they be held to the same standards as a private technology manufacturer? The domains of excellence required for precertification approval such as “patient safety,” “clinical responsibility,” and “proactive culture” are aligned with the efforts of hospitals that are already overseen and accredited by organizations like the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the American Nurses Credentialing Center. There is limited motivation for the FDA to be in the business of regulating these aspects of hospital functions. However, while domains like “product quality” and “cybersecurity” may be less familiar to some hospitals, these existing credentialing bodies may be better suited than the FDA to set and enforce standards for hospitals. In contrast, private manufacturers may have deep expertise in these latter domains. Therefore, as with public-private partnerships for the development of predictive radiology applications,¹⁴ synergies between hospitals and manufacturers may also prove useful for obtaining approvals in a competitive marketplace. Simultaneously, such collaborations would continue to raise questions about conflicts of interest and data privacy.

Finally, regardless of how the FDA will regulate hospitals, what will become of predictive CDS systems that fall outside of the FDA’s scope? Hospitals will continue to find themselves in the position of self-regulation without clear guidance. Although the FDA suggests that developers of unregulated CDS systems still follow best practices for software validation and cybersecurity, existing guidance documents in these domains do not cover the full range of concerns relevant to the development, deployment, and oversight of AI-based CDS systems in the clinical domain. Nor do most hospitals have the infrastructure or expertise to oversee their own CDS systems. Disparate recommendations for development, training, and oversight of AI-based medical systems have emerged but have yet to be endorsed by a federal regulatory body or become part of the hospital accreditation process.¹⁵ Optimal local oversight would require a collaboration between clinical experts, hospital operations leaders, statisticians, data scientists, and ethics experts to ensure effectiveness, safety, and fairness.

Hospitals will remain at the forefront of developing and implementing predictive CDS systems. The proposed FDA regulatory framework would mark an important step toward realizing benefit from such systems, but the FDA needs to clarify the requirements for hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems to ensure reasonable standards that account for their differences from private software manufacturers. Should the FDA choose to focus regulation on private manufacturers only, hospitals leaders may both feel more empowered to develop their own local CDS tools and feel more comfortable buying CDS systems from vendors that have been precertified. This strategy would provide an optimal balance of assurance and flexibility while maintaining quality standards that ultimately improve patient care.

Recent experiences in the transportation industry highlight the importance of getting right the regulation of decision-support systems in high-stakes environments. Two tragic plane crashes resulted in 346 deaths and were deemed, in part, to be related to a cockpit alert system that overwhelmed pilots with multiple notifications.¹ Similarly, a driverless car struck and killed a pedestrian in the street, in part because the car was not programmed to look for humans outside of a crosswalk.² These two bellwether events offer poignant lessons for the healthcare industry in which human lives also depend on decision-support systems.

Clinical decision-support (CDS) systems are computerized applications, often embedded in an electronic health record (EHR), that provide information to clinicians to inform care. Although CDS systems have been used for many years,³ they have never been subjected to any enforcement of formal testing requirements. However, a draft guidance document released in 2019 from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) outlined new directions for the regulation of CDS systems.⁴ Although the FDA has thus far focused regulatory efforts on predictive systems developed by private manufacturers,^5,6 this new document provides examples of software that would require regulation for CDS systems that hospitals are already using. Thus, this new guidance raises critical questions—will hospitals themselves be evaluated like private manufacturers, be exempted from federal regulation, or require their own specialized regulation? The FDA has not yet clarified its approach to hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, which leaves open numerous possibilities in a rapidly evolving regulatory environment.

Although the FDA has officially regulated CDS systems under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938), only recently has the FDA begun to sketch the shape of its regulatory efforts. This trend to actually regulate CDS systems began with the 21st Century Cures Act (2016) that amended the definition of software systems that qualify as medical devices and outlined criteria under which a system may be exempt from FDA oversight. For example, regulation would not apply to systems that support “population health” or a “healthy lifestyle” or to ones that qualify as “electronic patient records” as long as they do not “interpret or analyze” data within them.⁷ Following the rapid proliferation of many machine learning and other predictive technologies with medical applications, the FDA began the voluntary Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program in 2017. Through this program, the FDA selected nine companies from more than 100 applicants and certified them across five domains of excellence. Notably, the Pre-Cert Program currently allows for certification of software manufacturers themselves and does not approve or test actual software devices directly. This regulatory pathway will eventually allow manufacturers to apply under a modified premarket review process for individual software as a medical device (SaMD) that use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. In the meantime, however, many hospitals have developed and deployed their own predictive CDS systems that cross the boundaries into the FDA’s purview and, indeed, do “interpret or analyze” data for real-time EHR alerts, population health management, and other applications.

Regulatory oversight for hospitals could provide quality or safety standards where currently there are none. However, such regulations could also interfere with existing local care practices, hinder rapid development of new CDS systems, and may be perceived as interfering in hospital operations. With the current enthusiasm for AI-based technologies and the concurrent lack of evidence to suggest their effectiveness in practice, regulation could also prompt necessary scrutiny of potential harms of CDS systems, an area with even less evidence. At the same time, CDS developers—private or hospital based—may be able to avoid regulation for some devices with well-placed disclaimers about the intended use of the CDS, one of the FDA criteria for determining the degree of oversight. If the FDA were to regulate hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, there are several unanswered questions to consider so that such regulations have their intended impact.

First, does the FDA intend to regulate hospitals and hospital-developed software at all? The framework for determining whether a CDS system will be regulated depends on the severity of the clinical scenario, the ability to independently evaluate the model output, and the intended user (Table). Notably, many types of CDS systems that would require regulation under this framework are already commonplace. For example, the FDA intends to regulate software that “identifies patients who may exhibit signs of opioid addiction,” a scenario similar to prediction models already developed at academic hospitals.⁸ The FDA also plans to regulate a software device even if it is not a CDS system if it is “intended to generate an alarm or an alert to notify a caregiver of a life-threatening condition, such as stroke, and the caregiver relies primarily on this alarm or alert to make a treatment decision.” Although there are no published reports of stroke-specific early warning systems in use, analogous nonspecific and sepsis-specific early warning systems to prompt urgent clinical care have been deployed by hospitals directly⁹ and developed for embedding in commercial EHRs.¹⁰ Hospitals need clarification on the FDA’s regulatory intentions for such CDS systems. FDA regulation of hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems would fill a critical oversight need and potentially strengthen processes to improve safety and effectiveness. But burdensome regulations may also restrain hospitals from tackling complex problems in medicine for which they are uniquely suited.

Such a regulatory environment may be especially prohibitive for safety-net hospitals that could find themselves at a disadvantage in developing their own CDS systems relative to large academic medical centers that are typically endowed with greater resources. Additionally, CDS systems developed at academic medical centers may not generalize well to populations in the community setting, which could further deepen disparities in access to cutting-edge technologies. For example, racial bias in treatment and referral patterns could bias training labels for CDS systems focused on population health management.¹¹ Similarly, the composition of patient skin color in one population may distort predictions of a model in another with a different distribution of skin color, even when the primary outcome of a prediction model is gender.¹² Additional regulatory steps may apply for models that are adapted to new populations or recalibrated across locations and time.¹³ Until there is more data on the clinical impact of such CDS systems, it is unknown how potential differences in evaluation and approval would actually affect clinical outcomes.

Second, would hospitals be eligible for the Pre-Cert program, and if so, would they be held to the same standards as a private technology manufacturer? The domains of excellence required for precertification approval such as “patient safety,” “clinical responsibility,” and “proactive culture” are aligned with the efforts of hospitals that are already overseen and accredited by organizations like the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the American Nurses Credentialing Center. There is limited motivation for the FDA to be in the business of regulating these aspects of hospital functions. However, while domains like “product quality” and “cybersecurity” may be less familiar to some hospitals, these existing credentialing bodies may be better suited than the FDA to set and enforce standards for hospitals. In contrast, private manufacturers may have deep expertise in these latter domains. Therefore, as with public-private partnerships for the development of predictive radiology applications,¹⁴ synergies between hospitals and manufacturers may also prove useful for obtaining approvals in a competitive marketplace. Simultaneously, such collaborations would continue to raise questions about conflicts of interest and data privacy.

Finally, regardless of how the FDA will regulate hospitals, what will become of predictive CDS systems that fall outside of the FDA’s scope? Hospitals will continue to find themselves in the position of self-regulation without clear guidance. Although the FDA suggests that developers of unregulated CDS systems still follow best practices for software validation and cybersecurity, existing guidance documents in these domains do not cover the full range of concerns relevant to the development, deployment, and oversight of AI-based CDS systems in the clinical domain. Nor do most hospitals have the infrastructure or expertise to oversee their own CDS systems. Disparate recommendations for development, training, and oversight of AI-based medical systems have emerged but have yet to be endorsed by a federal regulatory body or become part of the hospital accreditation process.¹⁵ Optimal local oversight would require a collaboration between clinical experts, hospital operations leaders, statisticians, data scientists, and ethics experts to ensure effectiveness, safety, and fairness.

Hospitals will remain at the forefront of developing and implementing predictive CDS systems. The proposed FDA regulatory framework would mark an important step toward realizing benefit from such systems, but the FDA needs to clarify the requirements for hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems to ensure reasonable standards that account for their differences from private software manufacturers. Should the FDA choose to focus regulation on private manufacturers only, hospitals leaders may both feel more empowered to develop their own local CDS tools and feel more comfortable buying CDS systems from vendors that have been precertified. This strategy would provide an optimal balance of assurance and flexibility while maintaining quality standards that ultimately improve patient care.

Recent experiences in the transportation industry highlight the importance of getting right the regulation of decision-support systems in high-stakes environments. Two tragic plane crashes resulted in 346 deaths and were deemed, in part, to be related to a cockpit alert system that overwhelmed pilots with multiple notifications.¹ Similarly, a driverless car struck and killed a pedestrian in the street, in part because the car was not programmed to look for humans outside of a crosswalk.² These two bellwether events offer poignant lessons for the healthcare industry in which human lives also depend on decision-support systems.

Clinical decision-support (CDS) systems are computerized applications, often embedded in an electronic health record (EHR), that provide information to clinicians to inform care. Although CDS systems have been used for many years,³ they have never been subjected to any enforcement of formal testing requirements. However, a draft guidance document released in 2019 from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) outlined new directions for the regulation of CDS systems.⁴ Although the FDA has thus far focused regulatory efforts on predictive systems developed by private manufacturers,^5,6 this new document provides examples of software that would require regulation for CDS systems that hospitals are already using. Thus, this new guidance raises critical questions—will hospitals themselves be evaluated like private manufacturers, be exempted from federal regulation, or require their own specialized regulation? The FDA has not yet clarified its approach to hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, which leaves open numerous possibilities in a rapidly evolving regulatory environment.

Although the FDA has officially regulated CDS systems under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938), only recently has the FDA begun to sketch the shape of its regulatory efforts. This trend to actually regulate CDS systems began with the 21st Century Cures Act (2016) that amended the definition of software systems that qualify as medical devices and outlined criteria under which a system may be exempt from FDA oversight. For example, regulation would not apply to systems that support “population health” or a “healthy lifestyle” or to ones that qualify as “electronic patient records” as long as they do not “interpret or analyze” data within them.⁷ Following the rapid proliferation of many machine learning and other predictive technologies with medical applications, the FDA began the voluntary Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program in 2017. Through this program, the FDA selected nine companies from more than 100 applicants and certified them across five domains of excellence. Notably, the Pre-Cert Program currently allows for certification of software manufacturers themselves and does not approve or test actual software devices directly. This regulatory pathway will eventually allow manufacturers to apply under a modified premarket review process for individual software as a medical device (SaMD) that use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. In the meantime, however, many hospitals have developed and deployed their own predictive CDS systems that cross the boundaries into the FDA’s purview and, indeed, do “interpret or analyze” data for real-time EHR alerts, population health management, and other applications.

Regulatory oversight for hospitals could provide quality or safety standards where currently there are none. However, such regulations could also interfere with existing local care practices, hinder rapid development of new CDS systems, and may be perceived as interfering in hospital operations. With the current enthusiasm for AI-based technologies and the concurrent lack of evidence to suggest their effectiveness in practice, regulation could also prompt necessary scrutiny of potential harms of CDS systems, an area with even less evidence. At the same time, CDS developers—private or hospital based—may be able to avoid regulation for some devices with well-placed disclaimers about the intended use of the CDS, one of the FDA criteria for determining the degree of oversight. If the FDA were to regulate hospitals or hospital-developed CDS systems, there are several unanswered questions to consider so that such regulations have their intended impact.

First, does the FDA intend to regulate hospitals and hospital-developed software at all? The framework for determining whether a CDS system will be regulated depends on the severity of the clinical scenario, the ability to independently evaluate the model output, and the intended user (Table). Notably, many types of CDS systems that would require regulation under this framework are already commonplace. For example, the FDA intends to regulate software that “identifies patients who may exhibit signs of opioid addiction,” a scenario similar to prediction models already developed at academic hospitals.⁸ The FDA also plans to regulate a software device even if it is not a CDS system if it is “intended to generate an alarm or an alert to notify a caregiver of a life-threatening condition, such as stroke, and the caregiver relies primarily on this alarm or alert to make a treatment decision.” Although there are no published reports of stroke-specific early warning systems in use, analogous nonspecific and sepsis-specific early warning systems to prompt urgent clinical care have been deployed by hospitals directly⁹ and developed for embedding in commercial EHRs.¹⁰ Hospitals need clarification on the FDA’s regulatory intentions for such CDS systems. FDA regulation of hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems would fill a critical oversight need and potentially strengthen processes to improve safety and effectiveness. But burdensome regulations may also restrain hospitals from tackling complex problems in medicine for which they are uniquely suited.

Such a regulatory environment may be especially prohibitive for safety-net hospitals that could find themselves at a disadvantage in developing their own CDS systems relative to large academic medical centers that are typically endowed with greater resources. Additionally, CDS systems developed at academic medical centers may not generalize well to populations in the community setting, which could further deepen disparities in access to cutting-edge technologies. For example, racial bias in treatment and referral patterns could bias training labels for CDS systems focused on population health management.¹¹ Similarly, the composition of patient skin color in one population may distort predictions of a model in another with a different distribution of skin color, even when the primary outcome of a prediction model is gender.¹² Additional regulatory steps may apply for models that are adapted to new populations or recalibrated across locations and time.¹³ Until there is more data on the clinical impact of such CDS systems, it is unknown how potential differences in evaluation and approval would actually affect clinical outcomes.

Second, would hospitals be eligible for the Pre-Cert program, and if so, would they be held to the same standards as a private technology manufacturer? The domains of excellence required for precertification approval such as “patient safety,” “clinical responsibility,” and “proactive culture” are aligned with the efforts of hospitals that are already overseen and accredited by organizations like the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the American Nurses Credentialing Center. There is limited motivation for the FDA to be in the business of regulating these aspects of hospital functions. However, while domains like “product quality” and “cybersecurity” may be less familiar to some hospitals, these existing credentialing bodies may be better suited than the FDA to set and enforce standards for hospitals. In contrast, private manufacturers may have deep expertise in these latter domains. Therefore, as with public-private partnerships for the development of predictive radiology applications,¹⁴ synergies between hospitals and manufacturers may also prove useful for obtaining approvals in a competitive marketplace. Simultaneously, such collaborations would continue to raise questions about conflicts of interest and data privacy.

Finally, regardless of how the FDA will regulate hospitals, what will become of predictive CDS systems that fall outside of the FDA’s scope? Hospitals will continue to find themselves in the position of self-regulation without clear guidance. Although the FDA suggests that developers of unregulated CDS systems still follow best practices for software validation and cybersecurity, existing guidance documents in these domains do not cover the full range of concerns relevant to the development, deployment, and oversight of AI-based CDS systems in the clinical domain. Nor do most hospitals have the infrastructure or expertise to oversee their own CDS systems. Disparate recommendations for development, training, and oversight of AI-based medical systems have emerged but have yet to be endorsed by a federal regulatory body or become part of the hospital accreditation process.¹⁵ Optimal local oversight would require a collaboration between clinical experts, hospital operations leaders, statisticians, data scientists, and ethics experts to ensure effectiveness, safety, and fairness.

Hospitals will remain at the forefront of developing and implementing predictive CDS systems. The proposed FDA regulatory framework would mark an important step toward realizing benefit from such systems, but the FDA needs to clarify the requirements for hospitals and hospital-developed CDS systems to ensure reasonable standards that account for their differences from private software manufacturers. Should the FDA choose to focus regulation on private manufacturers only, hospitals leaders may both feel more empowered to develop their own local CDS tools and feel more comfortable buying CDS systems from vendors that have been precertified. This strategy would provide an optimal balance of assurance and flexibility while maintaining quality standards that ultimately improve patient care.

There is growing momentum to hold drug manufacturers accountable for the more than 400,000 US opioid overdose deaths that have occurred since 1999.¹ As state lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors wind their way through the legal system, hospitals—which may benefit from settlement funds—have been paying close attention. Recently, former Governor John Kasich (R-Ohio), West Virginia University president E. Gordon Gee, and America’s Essential Hospitals argued that adequately compensating hospitals for the costs of being on the crisis’ “front lines” requires prioritizing them as settlement fund recipients.²

Hospitals should be laying the groundwork for how settlement funds might be used. They may consider enhancing some of the most promising, evidence-based services for individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs), including improving treatment for commonly associated health conditions such as HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV); expanding ambulatory long-term antibiotic treatment for endocarditis and other intravenous drug use–associated infections; more broadly adopting harm-reduction practices such as naloxone coprescribing; and applying best practices to caring for substance-exposed infants. They could also develop clinical services not already provided, including creating programs for OUD management during pregnancy and initiating medication for OUD in inpatient, emergency department, and ambulatory settings. In short, hospitals play a critical role in engaging people with OUD in treatment at every possible opportunity.³

When considering how to most effectively use opioid settlement funding, hospitals may consider adding or expanding these much-needed clinical services to address opioid-­related harms; however, their efforts should not stop there. Investments made outside hospital walls could have a significant effect on the public’s health, especially if they target social determinants of health. By tackling factors in the pathway to developing OUD, such as lack of meaningful employment, affordable housing, and mental health care, hospitals can move beyond treating the downstream consequences of addiction and toward preventing community-level opioid-related harms. To accomplish this daunting goal, hospitals will need to strengthen existing relationships with community partners and build new ones. Yet in a 2015 study, only 54% of nonprofit hospitals proposed a strategy to address the overdose crisis that involved community partnering.⁴

In this Perspective, we describe the following three strategies hospitals can use to multiply the reach of their opioid settlement funding by addressing root causes of opioid use through primary prevention: (1) supporting economic opportunities in their communities, (2) expanding affordable housing options in surrounding neighborhoods, and (3) building capacity in ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent OUD (Table).

Lack of economic opportunity is one of many root causes of opioid use. For example, a recent study found that automotive assembly plant closures were associated with increases in opioid overdose mortality.⁵ To tackle this complex issue, hospitals can play a crucial role in expanding employment and career advancement options for members of their local communities. Specifically, hospitals can do the following:

• Create jobs within the healthcare system and preferentially recruit and hire from surrounding neighborhoods
• Establish structured career development programs to build skills among entry-level healthcare employees
• Award contracts of varying sizes to locally owned businesses
• Employ individuals with lived experience with substance use disorders, such as peer recovery coaches⁶

To illustrate how health systems are investing in enhancing career opportunities for members of their communities, hundreds of institutions have implemented “School at Work,” a 6-month career development program for entry-level healthcare employees.⁷ The hospitals’ Human Resources department trains participants in communication skills, reading and writing, patient safety and satisfaction, medical terminology, and strategies for success and career advancement. Evaluations of this program have demonstrated improved employee outcomes and a favorable return on investment for hospitals.⁸

As “anchor institutions” and large employers in many communities, hospitals can simultaneously enhance their own workforce and offer employment opportunities that can help break the cycle of addiction that commonly traps individuals and families in communities affected by the overdose crisis.

Hospitals are increasingly supporting interventions that fall outside their traditional purview as they seek to improve population health, such as developing safe green outdoor spaces and increasing access to healthy food options by supporting local farmers markets and grocers.⁹ Stable, decent, and affordable housing is critically important to health and well-being,¹⁰ and there is a well-documented association of opioid use disorder and opioid misuse with housing instability.¹¹ Given evidence of improved outcomes with hospital-led housing interventions,¹² a growing number of hospitals are partnering with housing authorities and community groups to help do the following¹³:

• Contribute to supportive housing options
• Provide environmental health assessments, repairs, and renovations
• Buy or develop affordable housing units

Boston Medical Center, where one in four inpatients are experiencing homelessnes and one in three pediatric emergency department patients are housing insecure, provides an example of how a hospital has invested in housing.¹⁴ In 2017, the hospital began a 5-year, $6.5 million investment in community partnerships in surrounding neighborhoods. Instead of building housing units or acting as a landlord, the hospital chose to invest funding in creative ways to increase the pool of affordable housing. It invested $1 million to rehabilitate permanent, supportive housing units for individuals with mental health conditions in a nearby Boston neighborhood and in a housing stabilization program for people with complex medical issues including substance use disorder. It provided resources to a homeless shelter near the hospital and to the Boston Health Care for the Homeless Program, which provides healthcare to individuals with housing instability. It also funded a community wellness advocate based at the hospital, who received training in substance use disorders and served as a liaison between the hospital and the Boston Housing Authority.

Housing instability is just one of the social determinants of health that hospitals have the capacity to address as they consider where to invest their opioid settlement funds.

Finally, hospitals can partner with community ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent the progression to problematic opioid use and OUD. Specifically, hospitals can do as follows:

• Provide evidence-based training to community providers on safe prescribing practices for acute and chronic pain management, as well as postoperative, postprocedural, and postpartum pain management
• Support ambulatory providers in expanding office-based mental health treatment through direct care via telemedicine and in building mental health treatment capacity through consultation, continuing medical education, and telementorship (eg, Project ECHO¹⁵)
• Support ambulatory providers to implement risk reduction strategies to prevent initiation of problematic opioid use, particularly among adolescents and young adults
• Partner with local pharmacies to promote point-of-­prescription counseling on the risks and benefits of opioids

Hospitals bring key strengths and resources to these prevention-­oriented partnerships. First, they may have resources available for clinical research, implementation support, program evaluation, and quality improvement, bringing such expertise to partnerships with ambulatory practices and pharmacies. They likely have specific expertise among their staff, including areas such as pain management, obstetric care, pediatrics, and adolescent medicine, and can provide specialists for consultation services or telementoring initiatives. They also can organize continuing medical education and can offer in-service training at local practices and pharmacies.

Project ECHO is one example of telementoring to build capacity among community providers to manage chronic pain and address addiction and other related harms.¹⁶ The Project ECHO model includes virtual sessions with didactic content and case presentations during which specialists mentor community clinicians. Specific to primary prevention, telementoring has been shown to improve access to evidence-based treatment of chronic pain and mental health conditions,^17,18 which could prevent the development of OUD. By equipping community clinicians with tools to prevent the development of problematic opioid use, hospitals can help reduce the downstream burden of OUD and its associated morbidity, mortality, and costs.

The opioid crisis has devastated families, reduced life expectancy in certain communities,¹⁹ and had a substantial financial impact on hospitals—resulting in an estimated $11 billion in costs to US hospitals each year.²⁰ This ongoing crisis is only going to be compounded by the recent emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Hospital resources are being strained in unprecedented ways, which has required unprecedented responses in order to continue to serve their communities. Supporting economic opportunity, stable housing, and mental health treatment will be challenging in this new environment but has never been more urgently needed. If opioid settlement funds are targeted to US hospitals, they should be held accountable for where funds are spent because they have a unique opportunity to focus on primary prevention in their communities—confronting OUD before it begins.²¹ However, if hospitals use opioid settlement funding only to continue to provide services already offered, or fail to make bold investments in their communities, this public health crisis will continue to strain the resources of those providing clinical care on the front lines.

The authors wish to thank Hilary Peterson of the RAND Corporation for preparing the paper for submission. She was not compensated for her contribution.

The authors report being supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health under awards R21DA045212 (Dr Faherty), K23DA045085 (Dr Hadland), L40DA042434 (Dr Hadland), K23DA038720 (Dr Patrick), R01DA045729 (Dr Patrick), and P50DA046351 (Dr Stein). Dr Hadland also reports grant support from the Thrasher Research Fund and the Academic Pediatric Association. The content of this article is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

There is growing momentum to hold drug manufacturers accountable for the more than 400,000 US opioid overdose deaths that have occurred since 1999.¹ As state lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors wind their way through the legal system, hospitals—which may benefit from settlement funds—have been paying close attention. Recently, former Governor John Kasich (R-Ohio), West Virginia University president E. Gordon Gee, and America’s Essential Hospitals argued that adequately compensating hospitals for the costs of being on the crisis’ “front lines” requires prioritizing them as settlement fund recipients.²

Hospitals should be laying the groundwork for how settlement funds might be used. They may consider enhancing some of the most promising, evidence-based services for individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs), including improving treatment for commonly associated health conditions such as HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV); expanding ambulatory long-term antibiotic treatment for endocarditis and other intravenous drug use–associated infections; more broadly adopting harm-reduction practices such as naloxone coprescribing; and applying best practices to caring for substance-exposed infants. They could also develop clinical services not already provided, including creating programs for OUD management during pregnancy and initiating medication for OUD in inpatient, emergency department, and ambulatory settings. In short, hospitals play a critical role in engaging people with OUD in treatment at every possible opportunity.³

When considering how to most effectively use opioid settlement funding, hospitals may consider adding or expanding these much-needed clinical services to address opioid-­related harms; however, their efforts should not stop there. Investments made outside hospital walls could have a significant effect on the public’s health, especially if they target social determinants of health. By tackling factors in the pathway to developing OUD, such as lack of meaningful employment, affordable housing, and mental health care, hospitals can move beyond treating the downstream consequences of addiction and toward preventing community-level opioid-related harms. To accomplish this daunting goal, hospitals will need to strengthen existing relationships with community partners and build new ones. Yet in a 2015 study, only 54% of nonprofit hospitals proposed a strategy to address the overdose crisis that involved community partnering.⁴

In this Perspective, we describe the following three strategies hospitals can use to multiply the reach of their opioid settlement funding by addressing root causes of opioid use through primary prevention: (1) supporting economic opportunities in their communities, (2) expanding affordable housing options in surrounding neighborhoods, and (3) building capacity in ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent OUD (Table).

Lack of economic opportunity is one of many root causes of opioid use. For example, a recent study found that automotive assembly plant closures were associated with increases in opioid overdose mortality.⁵ To tackle this complex issue, hospitals can play a crucial role in expanding employment and career advancement options for members of their local communities. Specifically, hospitals can do the following:

• Create jobs within the healthcare system and preferentially recruit and hire from surrounding neighborhoods
• Establish structured career development programs to build skills among entry-level healthcare employees
• Award contracts of varying sizes to locally owned businesses
• Employ individuals with lived experience with substance use disorders, such as peer recovery coaches⁶

To illustrate how health systems are investing in enhancing career opportunities for members of their communities, hundreds of institutions have implemented “School at Work,” a 6-month career development program for entry-level healthcare employees.⁷ The hospitals’ Human Resources department trains participants in communication skills, reading and writing, patient safety and satisfaction, medical terminology, and strategies for success and career advancement. Evaluations of this program have demonstrated improved employee outcomes and a favorable return on investment for hospitals.⁸

As “anchor institutions” and large employers in many communities, hospitals can simultaneously enhance their own workforce and offer employment opportunities that can help break the cycle of addiction that commonly traps individuals and families in communities affected by the overdose crisis.

Hospitals are increasingly supporting interventions that fall outside their traditional purview as they seek to improve population health, such as developing safe green outdoor spaces and increasing access to healthy food options by supporting local farmers markets and grocers.⁹ Stable, decent, and affordable housing is critically important to health and well-being,¹⁰ and there is a well-documented association of opioid use disorder and opioid misuse with housing instability.¹¹ Given evidence of improved outcomes with hospital-led housing interventions,¹² a growing number of hospitals are partnering with housing authorities and community groups to help do the following¹³:

• Contribute to supportive housing options
• Provide environmental health assessments, repairs, and renovations
• Buy or develop affordable housing units

Boston Medical Center, where one in four inpatients are experiencing homelessnes and one in three pediatric emergency department patients are housing insecure, provides an example of how a hospital has invested in housing.¹⁴ In 2017, the hospital began a 5-year, $6.5 million investment in community partnerships in surrounding neighborhoods. Instead of building housing units or acting as a landlord, the hospital chose to invest funding in creative ways to increase the pool of affordable housing. It invested $1 million to rehabilitate permanent, supportive housing units for individuals with mental health conditions in a nearby Boston neighborhood and in a housing stabilization program for people with complex medical issues including substance use disorder. It provided resources to a homeless shelter near the hospital and to the Boston Health Care for the Homeless Program, which provides healthcare to individuals with housing instability. It also funded a community wellness advocate based at the hospital, who received training in substance use disorders and served as a liaison between the hospital and the Boston Housing Authority.

Housing instability is just one of the social determinants of health that hospitals have the capacity to address as they consider where to invest their opioid settlement funds.

Finally, hospitals can partner with community ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent the progression to problematic opioid use and OUD. Specifically, hospitals can do as follows:

• Provide evidence-based training to community providers on safe prescribing practices for acute and chronic pain management, as well as postoperative, postprocedural, and postpartum pain management
• Support ambulatory providers in expanding office-based mental health treatment through direct care via telemedicine and in building mental health treatment capacity through consultation, continuing medical education, and telementorship (eg, Project ECHO¹⁵)
• Support ambulatory providers to implement risk reduction strategies to prevent initiation of problematic opioid use, particularly among adolescents and young adults
• Partner with local pharmacies to promote point-of-­prescription counseling on the risks and benefits of opioids

Hospitals bring key strengths and resources to these prevention-­oriented partnerships. First, they may have resources available for clinical research, implementation support, program evaluation, and quality improvement, bringing such expertise to partnerships with ambulatory practices and pharmacies. They likely have specific expertise among their staff, including areas such as pain management, obstetric care, pediatrics, and adolescent medicine, and can provide specialists for consultation services or telementoring initiatives. They also can organize continuing medical education and can offer in-service training at local practices and pharmacies.

Project ECHO is one example of telementoring to build capacity among community providers to manage chronic pain and address addiction and other related harms.¹⁶ The Project ECHO model includes virtual sessions with didactic content and case presentations during which specialists mentor community clinicians. Specific to primary prevention, telementoring has been shown to improve access to evidence-based treatment of chronic pain and mental health conditions,^17,18 which could prevent the development of OUD. By equipping community clinicians with tools to prevent the development of problematic opioid use, hospitals can help reduce the downstream burden of OUD and its associated morbidity, mortality, and costs.

The opioid crisis has devastated families, reduced life expectancy in certain communities,¹⁹ and had a substantial financial impact on hospitals—resulting in an estimated $11 billion in costs to US hospitals each year.²⁰ This ongoing crisis is only going to be compounded by the recent emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Hospital resources are being strained in unprecedented ways, which has required unprecedented responses in order to continue to serve their communities. Supporting economic opportunity, stable housing, and mental health treatment will be challenging in this new environment but has never been more urgently needed. If opioid settlement funds are targeted to US hospitals, they should be held accountable for where funds are spent because they have a unique opportunity to focus on primary prevention in their communities—confronting OUD before it begins.²¹ However, if hospitals use opioid settlement funding only to continue to provide services already offered, or fail to make bold investments in their communities, this public health crisis will continue to strain the resources of those providing clinical care on the front lines.

The authors wish to thank Hilary Peterson of the RAND Corporation for preparing the paper for submission. She was not compensated for her contribution.

The authors report being supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health under awards R21DA045212 (Dr Faherty), K23DA045085 (Dr Hadland), L40DA042434 (Dr Hadland), K23DA038720 (Dr Patrick), R01DA045729 (Dr Patrick), and P50DA046351 (Dr Stein). Dr Hadland also reports grant support from the Thrasher Research Fund and the Academic Pediatric Association. The content of this article is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

There is growing momentum to hold drug manufacturers accountable for the more than 400,000 US opioid overdose deaths that have occurred since 1999.¹ As state lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors wind their way through the legal system, hospitals—which may benefit from settlement funds—have been paying close attention. Recently, former Governor John Kasich (R-Ohio), West Virginia University president E. Gordon Gee, and America’s Essential Hospitals argued that adequately compensating hospitals for the costs of being on the crisis’ “front lines” requires prioritizing them as settlement fund recipients.²

Hospitals should be laying the groundwork for how settlement funds might be used. They may consider enhancing some of the most promising, evidence-based services for individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs), including improving treatment for commonly associated health conditions such as HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV); expanding ambulatory long-term antibiotic treatment for endocarditis and other intravenous drug use–associated infections; more broadly adopting harm-reduction practices such as naloxone coprescribing; and applying best practices to caring for substance-exposed infants. They could also develop clinical services not already provided, including creating programs for OUD management during pregnancy and initiating medication for OUD in inpatient, emergency department, and ambulatory settings. In short, hospitals play a critical role in engaging people with OUD in treatment at every possible opportunity.³

When considering how to most effectively use opioid settlement funding, hospitals may consider adding or expanding these much-needed clinical services to address opioid-­related harms; however, their efforts should not stop there. Investments made outside hospital walls could have a significant effect on the public’s health, especially if they target social determinants of health. By tackling factors in the pathway to developing OUD, such as lack of meaningful employment, affordable housing, and mental health care, hospitals can move beyond treating the downstream consequences of addiction and toward preventing community-level opioid-related harms. To accomplish this daunting goal, hospitals will need to strengthen existing relationships with community partners and build new ones. Yet in a 2015 study, only 54% of nonprofit hospitals proposed a strategy to address the overdose crisis that involved community partnering.⁴

In this Perspective, we describe the following three strategies hospitals can use to multiply the reach of their opioid settlement funding by addressing root causes of opioid use through primary prevention: (1) supporting economic opportunities in their communities, (2) expanding affordable housing options in surrounding neighborhoods, and (3) building capacity in ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent OUD (Table).

Lack of economic opportunity is one of many root causes of opioid use. For example, a recent study found that automotive assembly plant closures were associated with increases in opioid overdose mortality.⁵ To tackle this complex issue, hospitals can play a crucial role in expanding employment and career advancement options for members of their local communities. Specifically, hospitals can do the following:

• Create jobs within the healthcare system and preferentially recruit and hire from surrounding neighborhoods
• Establish structured career development programs to build skills among entry-level healthcare employees
• Award contracts of varying sizes to locally owned businesses
• Employ individuals with lived experience with substance use disorders, such as peer recovery coaches⁶

To illustrate how health systems are investing in enhancing career opportunities for members of their communities, hundreds of institutions have implemented “School at Work,” a 6-month career development program for entry-level healthcare employees.⁷ The hospitals’ Human Resources department trains participants in communication skills, reading and writing, patient safety and satisfaction, medical terminology, and strategies for success and career advancement. Evaluations of this program have demonstrated improved employee outcomes and a favorable return on investment for hospitals.⁸

As “anchor institutions” and large employers in many communities, hospitals can simultaneously enhance their own workforce and offer employment opportunities that can help break the cycle of addiction that commonly traps individuals and families in communities affected by the overdose crisis.

Hospitals are increasingly supporting interventions that fall outside their traditional purview as they seek to improve population health, such as developing safe green outdoor spaces and increasing access to healthy food options by supporting local farmers markets and grocers.⁹ Stable, decent, and affordable housing is critically important to health and well-being,¹⁰ and there is a well-documented association of opioid use disorder and opioid misuse with housing instability.¹¹ Given evidence of improved outcomes with hospital-led housing interventions,¹² a growing number of hospitals are partnering with housing authorities and community groups to help do the following¹³:

• Contribute to supportive housing options
• Provide environmental health assessments, repairs, and renovations
• Buy or develop affordable housing units

Boston Medical Center, where one in four inpatients are experiencing homelessnes and one in three pediatric emergency department patients are housing insecure, provides an example of how a hospital has invested in housing.¹⁴ In 2017, the hospital began a 5-year, $6.5 million investment in community partnerships in surrounding neighborhoods. Instead of building housing units or acting as a landlord, the hospital chose to invest funding in creative ways to increase the pool of affordable housing. It invested $1 million to rehabilitate permanent, supportive housing units for individuals with mental health conditions in a nearby Boston neighborhood and in a housing stabilization program for people with complex medical issues including substance use disorder. It provided resources to a homeless shelter near the hospital and to the Boston Health Care for the Homeless Program, which provides healthcare to individuals with housing instability. It also funded a community wellness advocate based at the hospital, who received training in substance use disorders and served as a liaison between the hospital and the Boston Housing Authority.

Housing instability is just one of the social determinants of health that hospitals have the capacity to address as they consider where to invest their opioid settlement funds.

Finally, hospitals can partner with community ambulatory practices and pharmacies to prevent the progression to problematic opioid use and OUD. Specifically, hospitals can do as follows:

• Provide evidence-based training to community providers on safe prescribing practices for acute and chronic pain management, as well as postoperative, postprocedural, and postpartum pain management
• Support ambulatory providers in expanding office-based mental health treatment through direct care via telemedicine and in building mental health treatment capacity through consultation, continuing medical education, and telementorship (eg, Project ECHO¹⁵)
• Support ambulatory providers to implement risk reduction strategies to prevent initiation of problematic opioid use, particularly among adolescents and young adults
• Partner with local pharmacies to promote point-of-­prescription counseling on the risks and benefits of opioids

Hospitals bring key strengths and resources to these prevention-­oriented partnerships. First, they may have resources available for clinical research, implementation support, program evaluation, and quality improvement, bringing such expertise to partnerships with ambulatory practices and pharmacies. They likely have specific expertise among their staff, including areas such as pain management, obstetric care, pediatrics, and adolescent medicine, and can provide specialists for consultation services or telementoring initiatives. They also can organize continuing medical education and can offer in-service training at local practices and pharmacies.

Project ECHO is one example of telementoring to build capacity among community providers to manage chronic pain and address addiction and other related harms.¹⁶ The Project ECHO model includes virtual sessions with didactic content and case presentations during which specialists mentor community clinicians. Specific to primary prevention, telementoring has been shown to improve access to evidence-based treatment of chronic pain and mental health conditions,^17,18 which could prevent the development of OUD. By equipping community clinicians with tools to prevent the development of problematic opioid use, hospitals can help reduce the downstream burden of OUD and its associated morbidity, mortality, and costs.

The opioid crisis has devastated families, reduced life expectancy in certain communities,¹⁹ and had a substantial financial impact on hospitals—resulting in an estimated $11 billion in costs to US hospitals each year.²⁰ This ongoing crisis is only going to be compounded by the recent emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Hospital resources are being strained in unprecedented ways, which has required unprecedented responses in order to continue to serve their communities. Supporting economic opportunity, stable housing, and mental health treatment will be challenging in this new environment but has never been more urgently needed. If opioid settlement funds are targeted to US hospitals, they should be held accountable for where funds are spent because they have a unique opportunity to focus on primary prevention in their communities—confronting OUD before it begins.²¹ However, if hospitals use opioid settlement funding only to continue to provide services already offered, or fail to make bold investments in their communities, this public health crisis will continue to strain the resources of those providing clinical care on the front lines.

The authors wish to thank Hilary Peterson of the RAND Corporation for preparing the paper for submission. She was not compensated for her contribution.

The authors report being supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health under awards R21DA045212 (Dr Faherty), K23DA045085 (Dr Hadland), L40DA042434 (Dr Hadland), K23DA038720 (Dr Patrick), R01DA045729 (Dr Patrick), and P50DA046351 (Dr Stein). Dr Hadland also reports grant support from the Thrasher Research Fund and the Academic Pediatric Association. The content of this article is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

Frailty is a highly prevalent syndrome in nursing homes, occurring in at least 50% of patients.¹ The frailty phenotype has been described by Fried and colleagues as impairment in ≥ 3 of 5 domains: unintentional weight loss, self-reported exhaustion, muscle weakness, slow gait speed, and low physical activity. By this definition, frailty is highly associated with poor quality of life and mortality.^2,3

In recent years, there has been evolving evidence of a relationship between frailty and chronic systemic inflammation.^4-6 Some degree of chronic inflammation is likely inherent to the aging process and increases the risk of frailty (so-called inflammaging) but is seen to a greater degree in many pathologic conditions in nursing homes, including cancer, organ failure, and chronic infection.^4,6-8

Dysphagia also is highly prevalent in nursing homes, affecting up to 60% of patients and is a strong predictor of hospital utilization and of mortality.^9,10 Overt aspiration pneumonitis and pneumonia are perhaps the best studied sequelae, but chronic occult microaspiration also is prevalent in this population.¹¹ Just as normal systemic inflammatory changes in aging may increase vulnerability to frailty with additional illness burden, normal aging changes in swallowing function may increase vulnerability to dysphagia and to microaspiration with additional illness burden.^12,13 In older adults, important risk factors for microaspiration include not only overt dysphagia, dementia, and other neurologic illnesses, but also general debility, weakness, and immobility.¹⁴

Matsuse and colleagues have described diffuse aspiration bronchiolitis (DAB) in patients with chronic microaspiration.¹⁴ DAB often goes undiagnosed.^14-16 As in frailty, weight loss and chronic anemia may be seen, and many of these patients are bedridden.^14,17 Episodes of macroaspiration and overt lobar pneumonia also may occur.¹⁴ Lung biopsy or autopsy reveals chronic bronchiolar inflammation and sometimes pulmonary fibrosis, but to date there have been no reports suggesting chronic systemic inflammation or elevated proinflammatory cytokines.^14,15,17 We present 3 patients with progressive weight loss, functional decline, and frailty in whom chronic microaspiration likely played a significant role.

Case 1 Presentation

A 68-year-old man with a 6-year history of rapidly progressive Parkinson disease was admitted to the Haley’s Cove Community Living Center (CLC) on the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital campus in Tampa, Florida for long-term care. The patient’s medical history also was significant for bipolar illness and for small cell carcinoma of the lung in sustained remission.

Medications included levodopa/carbidopa 50 mg/200 mg 4 times daily, entacapone 200 mg 4 times daily, lithium carbonate 600 mg every night at bedtime, lamotrigine 150 mg daily, quetiapine 200 mg every night at bedtime, pravastatin 40 mg every night at bedtime, omeprazole 20 mg daily, tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime, and aspirin 81 mg daily. He initially did well, but after 6 months the nursing staff began to notice the patient coughing during and after meals. Speech pathology evaluation revealed moderate oropharyngeal dysphagia, and his diet was downgraded to nectar-thickened liquids.

Over the subsequent 10 months, he became progressively weaker in physical therapy and more inactive, with about a 20-lb weight loss and mild hypoalbuminemia of 3.0 gm/dL. He had developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia during this period; a repeat swallow evaluation after the last episode revealed worsened dysphagia, and his physician suggested nil per os (NPO) status and an alternative feeding route. His guardian declined placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube, he was transferred to the inpatient hospice unit, and died 2 weeks later. An autopsy was declined.

Case 2 Presentation

A 66-year-old man with a medical history of multiple traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) was admitted to the CLC for long-term care. Sequelae of the TBIs included moderate dementia, spastic paraparesis with multiple pressure injuries, a well-controlled seizure disorder, and severe oropharyngeal dysphagia with NPO status and a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube. His medical history included TBIs and hepatitis C virus infection; medications included levetiracetam 1,000 mg twice daily, lamotrigine 25 mg twice daily, and cholecalciferol 2,000 U daily. He had multiple stage III pressure injuries and an ischial stage IV injury at the time of admission.

His 11-month stay in the CLC was characterized by progressively worsening weakness and inactivity, with a 25-lb weight loss in spite of adequate tube feeding. Serum albumin remained in the 2.0 to 2.5 gm/dL range, hemoglobin in the 7 to 9 gm/dL range without any obvious source of anemia. Most of the pressure injuries worsened during his stay in spite of aggressive wound care, and he developed a second stage IV sacral wound. A single C-reactive protein (CRP) level 2 months prior to his death was markedly elevated at 19.5 mg/dL. In spite of maintaining NPO status, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia, all of which responded well to treatment. Ultimately, he was found pulseless and apneic and resuscitation was unsuccessful. An autopsy revealed purulent material in the small airways.

Case 3 Presentation

A 65-year-old man with a long history of paranoid schizophrenia and severe gastroesophageal reflux disease had resided in the CLC for about 10 years. Medications included risperidone microspheres 37.5 mg every 2 weeks, valproic acid 500 mg 3 times daily and 1,000 mg every night at bedtime, lansoprazole 30 mg twice daily, ranitidine 150 mg every night at bedtime, sucralfate 1,000 mg 3 times daily, simvastatin 20 mg every night at bedtime, and tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime. He had done well for many years but developed some drooling and a modest resting tremor (but no other signs of pseudoparkinsonism) about 8 years after admission.

There had been no changes to his risperidone dosage. He also lost about 20 lb over a period of 1 year and became increasingly weak and dependent in gait, serum albumin dropped as low as 1.6 gm/dL, hemoglobin dropped to the 7 to 8 gm/dL range (without any other obvious source of anemia), and he developed a gradually worsening right-sided pleural effusion. CRP was chronically elevated at this point, in the 6 to 15 mg/dL range and as high as 17.2 mg/dL. Ultimately, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia over a period of 2 months. Swallowing evaluation at that time revealed severe oropharyngeal dysphagia and a PEG tube was placed. Due to concerns for possible antipsychotic-induced dysphagia, risperidone was discontinued, and quetiapine 400 mg a day was substituted. He did well over the subsequent year with no further pneumonia and advancement back to a regular diet. He regained all of the lost weight and began independent ambulation. Albumin improved to the 3 gm/dL range, hemoglobin to the 12 to 13 gm/dL range, and CRP had decreased to 0.7 mg/dL. The pleural effusion (believed to have been a parapneumonic effusion) had resolved.

Discussion

All 3 patients met the Fried criteria for frailty, although there were several confounding issues.² All 3 patients lost between 20 and 25 lb; all had clearly become weaker according to nursing and rehabilitation staff (although none were formally assessed for grip strength); and all had clear declines in their activity level. Patient 3 had a clear decrement in gait speed, but patient 1 had severe gait impairment due to Parkinson disease (although his gait in therapy had clearly worsened). Patient 2 was paraparetic and unable to ambulate. There also was evidence of limited biomarkers of systemic inflammation; all 3 patients’ albumin had decreased, and patients 2 and 3 had significant decrease in hemoglobin; but these commonplace clinical biomarkers are obviously multifactorially determined. We have limited data on our patients’ CRP levels; serial levels would have been more specific for systemic inflammation but were infrequently performed on the patients.

Multimorbidity and medical complexity are more the rule than the exception in frail geriatric patients,and it is difficult to separate the role of microaspiration from other confounding conditions that might have contributed to these patients’ evolving systemic inflammation and frailty.¹⁸ It might be argued that the decline for patient 1 was related to the underlying Parkinson disease (a progressive neurologic illness in which systemic inflammation has been reported), or that the decline of patient 2 was related to the worsening pressure injuries rather than to covert microaspiration.¹⁹ However, the TBIs for patient 2 and the schizophrenia for patient 3 would not be expected to be associated with frailty or with systemic inflammation. Furthermore, the frailty symptoms of patient 3 and inflammatory biomarkers improved after the risperidone, which was likely responsible for his microaspiration, was discontinued. All 3 patients were at risk for oropharyngeal dysphagia (antipsychotic medication is clearly associated with dysphagia²⁰); patient 2 demonstrated pathologic evidence of DAB at autopsy.

There is evolving evidence that chronic systemic inflammation and immune activation are key mechanisms in the pathogenesis of frailty.^4-6 It is known that elevated serum levels of proinflammatory cytokines, including tumor necrosis factor-α, interleukin-6, and CRP are directly associated with frailty and are inversely associated with levels of albumin, hemoglobin, insulin-like growth factor-1, and several micronutrients in frail individuals.^4-7,21,22 Chronic inflammation contributes to the pathophysiology of frailty through detrimental effects on a broad range of systems, including the musculoskeletal, endocrine, and hematopoietic systems and through nutritional dysregulation.^2,4,23 These changes may lead to further deleterious effects, creating a downward spiral of worsening frailty. For example, it seems likely that our patients’ progressive weakness further compromised airway protection, creating a vicious cycle of worsening microaspiration and chronic inflammation.

Conclusions

To date, the role of chronic microaspiration and DAB in chronic systemic inflammation or in frailty has not been explored. Given the prevalence of microaspiration in nursing home residents and the devastating consequences of frailty, though, this seems to be a crucial area of investigation. It is equally crucial for long-term care staff, both providers and nursing staff, to have a heightened awareness of covert microaspiration and a low threshold for referral to speech pathology for further investigation. Staff also should be aware of the utility of the Fried criteria to improve identification of frailty in general. It is probable that covert microaspiration will prove to be an important part of the differential diagnosis of frailty.

Frailty is a highly prevalent syndrome in nursing homes, occurring in at least 50% of patients.¹ The frailty phenotype has been described by Fried and colleagues as impairment in ≥ 3 of 5 domains: unintentional weight loss, self-reported exhaustion, muscle weakness, slow gait speed, and low physical activity. By this definition, frailty is highly associated with poor quality of life and mortality.^2,3

In recent years, there has been evolving evidence of a relationship between frailty and chronic systemic inflammation.^4-6 Some degree of chronic inflammation is likely inherent to the aging process and increases the risk of frailty (so-called inflammaging) but is seen to a greater degree in many pathologic conditions in nursing homes, including cancer, organ failure, and chronic infection.^4,6-8

Dysphagia also is highly prevalent in nursing homes, affecting up to 60% of patients and is a strong predictor of hospital utilization and of mortality.^9,10 Overt aspiration pneumonitis and pneumonia are perhaps the best studied sequelae, but chronic occult microaspiration also is prevalent in this population.¹¹ Just as normal systemic inflammatory changes in aging may increase vulnerability to frailty with additional illness burden, normal aging changes in swallowing function may increase vulnerability to dysphagia and to microaspiration with additional illness burden.^12,13 In older adults, important risk factors for microaspiration include not only overt dysphagia, dementia, and other neurologic illnesses, but also general debility, weakness, and immobility.¹⁴

Matsuse and colleagues have described diffuse aspiration bronchiolitis (DAB) in patients with chronic microaspiration.¹⁴ DAB often goes undiagnosed.^14-16 As in frailty, weight loss and chronic anemia may be seen, and many of these patients are bedridden.^14,17 Episodes of macroaspiration and overt lobar pneumonia also may occur.¹⁴ Lung biopsy or autopsy reveals chronic bronchiolar inflammation and sometimes pulmonary fibrosis, but to date there have been no reports suggesting chronic systemic inflammation or elevated proinflammatory cytokines.^14,15,17 We present 3 patients with progressive weight loss, functional decline, and frailty in whom chronic microaspiration likely played a significant role.

Case 1 Presentation

A 68-year-old man with a 6-year history of rapidly progressive Parkinson disease was admitted to the Haley’s Cove Community Living Center (CLC) on the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital campus in Tampa, Florida for long-term care. The patient’s medical history also was significant for bipolar illness and for small cell carcinoma of the lung in sustained remission.

Medications included levodopa/carbidopa 50 mg/200 mg 4 times daily, entacapone 200 mg 4 times daily, lithium carbonate 600 mg every night at bedtime, lamotrigine 150 mg daily, quetiapine 200 mg every night at bedtime, pravastatin 40 mg every night at bedtime, omeprazole 20 mg daily, tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime, and aspirin 81 mg daily. He initially did well, but after 6 months the nursing staff began to notice the patient coughing during and after meals. Speech pathology evaluation revealed moderate oropharyngeal dysphagia, and his diet was downgraded to nectar-thickened liquids.

Over the subsequent 10 months, he became progressively weaker in physical therapy and more inactive, with about a 20-lb weight loss and mild hypoalbuminemia of 3.0 gm/dL. He had developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia during this period; a repeat swallow evaluation after the last episode revealed worsened dysphagia, and his physician suggested nil per os (NPO) status and an alternative feeding route. His guardian declined placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube, he was transferred to the inpatient hospice unit, and died 2 weeks later. An autopsy was declined.

Case 2 Presentation

A 66-year-old man with a medical history of multiple traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) was admitted to the CLC for long-term care. Sequelae of the TBIs included moderate dementia, spastic paraparesis with multiple pressure injuries, a well-controlled seizure disorder, and severe oropharyngeal dysphagia with NPO status and a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube. His medical history included TBIs and hepatitis C virus infection; medications included levetiracetam 1,000 mg twice daily, lamotrigine 25 mg twice daily, and cholecalciferol 2,000 U daily. He had multiple stage III pressure injuries and an ischial stage IV injury at the time of admission.

His 11-month stay in the CLC was characterized by progressively worsening weakness and inactivity, with a 25-lb weight loss in spite of adequate tube feeding. Serum albumin remained in the 2.0 to 2.5 gm/dL range, hemoglobin in the 7 to 9 gm/dL range without any obvious source of anemia. Most of the pressure injuries worsened during his stay in spite of aggressive wound care, and he developed a second stage IV sacral wound. A single C-reactive protein (CRP) level 2 months prior to his death was markedly elevated at 19.5 mg/dL. In spite of maintaining NPO status, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia, all of which responded well to treatment. Ultimately, he was found pulseless and apneic and resuscitation was unsuccessful. An autopsy revealed purulent material in the small airways.

Case 3 Presentation

A 65-year-old man with a long history of paranoid schizophrenia and severe gastroesophageal reflux disease had resided in the CLC for about 10 years. Medications included risperidone microspheres 37.5 mg every 2 weeks, valproic acid 500 mg 3 times daily and 1,000 mg every night at bedtime, lansoprazole 30 mg twice daily, ranitidine 150 mg every night at bedtime, sucralfate 1,000 mg 3 times daily, simvastatin 20 mg every night at bedtime, and tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime. He had done well for many years but developed some drooling and a modest resting tremor (but no other signs of pseudoparkinsonism) about 8 years after admission.

There had been no changes to his risperidone dosage. He also lost about 20 lb over a period of 1 year and became increasingly weak and dependent in gait, serum albumin dropped as low as 1.6 gm/dL, hemoglobin dropped to the 7 to 8 gm/dL range (without any other obvious source of anemia), and he developed a gradually worsening right-sided pleural effusion. CRP was chronically elevated at this point, in the 6 to 15 mg/dL range and as high as 17.2 mg/dL. Ultimately, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia over a period of 2 months. Swallowing evaluation at that time revealed severe oropharyngeal dysphagia and a PEG tube was placed. Due to concerns for possible antipsychotic-induced dysphagia, risperidone was discontinued, and quetiapine 400 mg a day was substituted. He did well over the subsequent year with no further pneumonia and advancement back to a regular diet. He regained all of the lost weight and began independent ambulation. Albumin improved to the 3 gm/dL range, hemoglobin to the 12 to 13 gm/dL range, and CRP had decreased to 0.7 mg/dL. The pleural effusion (believed to have been a parapneumonic effusion) had resolved.

Discussion

All 3 patients met the Fried criteria for frailty, although there were several confounding issues.² All 3 patients lost between 20 and 25 lb; all had clearly become weaker according to nursing and rehabilitation staff (although none were formally assessed for grip strength); and all had clear declines in their activity level. Patient 3 had a clear decrement in gait speed, but patient 1 had severe gait impairment due to Parkinson disease (although his gait in therapy had clearly worsened). Patient 2 was paraparetic and unable to ambulate. There also was evidence of limited biomarkers of systemic inflammation; all 3 patients’ albumin had decreased, and patients 2 and 3 had significant decrease in hemoglobin; but these commonplace clinical biomarkers are obviously multifactorially determined. We have limited data on our patients’ CRP levels; serial levels would have been more specific for systemic inflammation but were infrequently performed on the patients.

Multimorbidity and medical complexity are more the rule than the exception in frail geriatric patients,and it is difficult to separate the role of microaspiration from other confounding conditions that might have contributed to these patients’ evolving systemic inflammation and frailty.¹⁸ It might be argued that the decline for patient 1 was related to the underlying Parkinson disease (a progressive neurologic illness in which systemic inflammation has been reported), or that the decline of patient 2 was related to the worsening pressure injuries rather than to covert microaspiration.¹⁹ However, the TBIs for patient 2 and the schizophrenia for patient 3 would not be expected to be associated with frailty or with systemic inflammation. Furthermore, the frailty symptoms of patient 3 and inflammatory biomarkers improved after the risperidone, which was likely responsible for his microaspiration, was discontinued. All 3 patients were at risk for oropharyngeal dysphagia (antipsychotic medication is clearly associated with dysphagia²⁰); patient 2 demonstrated pathologic evidence of DAB at autopsy.

There is evolving evidence that chronic systemic inflammation and immune activation are key mechanisms in the pathogenesis of frailty.^4-6 It is known that elevated serum levels of proinflammatory cytokines, including tumor necrosis factor-α, interleukin-6, and CRP are directly associated with frailty and are inversely associated with levels of albumin, hemoglobin, insulin-like growth factor-1, and several micronutrients in frail individuals.^4-7,21,22 Chronic inflammation contributes to the pathophysiology of frailty through detrimental effects on a broad range of systems, including the musculoskeletal, endocrine, and hematopoietic systems and through nutritional dysregulation.^2,4,23 These changes may lead to further deleterious effects, creating a downward spiral of worsening frailty. For example, it seems likely that our patients’ progressive weakness further compromised airway protection, creating a vicious cycle of worsening microaspiration and chronic inflammation.

Conclusions

To date, the role of chronic microaspiration and DAB in chronic systemic inflammation or in frailty has not been explored. Given the prevalence of microaspiration in nursing home residents and the devastating consequences of frailty, though, this seems to be a crucial area of investigation. It is equally crucial for long-term care staff, both providers and nursing staff, to have a heightened awareness of covert microaspiration and a low threshold for referral to speech pathology for further investigation. Staff also should be aware of the utility of the Fried criteria to improve identification of frailty in general. It is probable that covert microaspiration will prove to be an important part of the differential diagnosis of frailty.

Frailty is a highly prevalent syndrome in nursing homes, occurring in at least 50% of patients.¹ The frailty phenotype has been described by Fried and colleagues as impairment in ≥ 3 of 5 domains: unintentional weight loss, self-reported exhaustion, muscle weakness, slow gait speed, and low physical activity. By this definition, frailty is highly associated with poor quality of life and mortality.^2,3

In recent years, there has been evolving evidence of a relationship between frailty and chronic systemic inflammation.^4-6 Some degree of chronic inflammation is likely inherent to the aging process and increases the risk of frailty (so-called inflammaging) but is seen to a greater degree in many pathologic conditions in nursing homes, including cancer, organ failure, and chronic infection.^4,6-8

Dysphagia also is highly prevalent in nursing homes, affecting up to 60% of patients and is a strong predictor of hospital utilization and of mortality.^9,10 Overt aspiration pneumonitis and pneumonia are perhaps the best studied sequelae, but chronic occult microaspiration also is prevalent in this population.¹¹ Just as normal systemic inflammatory changes in aging may increase vulnerability to frailty with additional illness burden, normal aging changes in swallowing function may increase vulnerability to dysphagia and to microaspiration with additional illness burden.^12,13 In older adults, important risk factors for microaspiration include not only overt dysphagia, dementia, and other neurologic illnesses, but also general debility, weakness, and immobility.¹⁴

Matsuse and colleagues have described diffuse aspiration bronchiolitis (DAB) in patients with chronic microaspiration.¹⁴ DAB often goes undiagnosed.^14-16 As in frailty, weight loss and chronic anemia may be seen, and many of these patients are bedridden.^14,17 Episodes of macroaspiration and overt lobar pneumonia also may occur.¹⁴ Lung biopsy or autopsy reveals chronic bronchiolar inflammation and sometimes pulmonary fibrosis, but to date there have been no reports suggesting chronic systemic inflammation or elevated proinflammatory cytokines.^14,15,17 We present 3 patients with progressive weight loss, functional decline, and frailty in whom chronic microaspiration likely played a significant role.

Case 1 Presentation

A 68-year-old man with a 6-year history of rapidly progressive Parkinson disease was admitted to the Haley’s Cove Community Living Center (CLC) on the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital campus in Tampa, Florida for long-term care. The patient’s medical history also was significant for bipolar illness and for small cell carcinoma of the lung in sustained remission.

Medications included levodopa/carbidopa 50 mg/200 mg 4 times daily, entacapone 200 mg 4 times daily, lithium carbonate 600 mg every night at bedtime, lamotrigine 150 mg daily, quetiapine 200 mg every night at bedtime, pravastatin 40 mg every night at bedtime, omeprazole 20 mg daily, tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime, and aspirin 81 mg daily. He initially did well, but after 6 months the nursing staff began to notice the patient coughing during and after meals. Speech pathology evaluation revealed moderate oropharyngeal dysphagia, and his diet was downgraded to nectar-thickened liquids.

Over the subsequent 10 months, he became progressively weaker in physical therapy and more inactive, with about a 20-lb weight loss and mild hypoalbuminemia of 3.0 gm/dL. He had developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia during this period; a repeat swallow evaluation after the last episode revealed worsened dysphagia, and his physician suggested nil per os (NPO) status and an alternative feeding route. His guardian declined placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube, he was transferred to the inpatient hospice unit, and died 2 weeks later. An autopsy was declined.

Case 2 Presentation

A 66-year-old man with a medical history of multiple traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) was admitted to the CLC for long-term care. Sequelae of the TBIs included moderate dementia, spastic paraparesis with multiple pressure injuries, a well-controlled seizure disorder, and severe oropharyngeal dysphagia with NPO status and a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube. His medical history included TBIs and hepatitis C virus infection; medications included levetiracetam 1,000 mg twice daily, lamotrigine 25 mg twice daily, and cholecalciferol 2,000 U daily. He had multiple stage III pressure injuries and an ischial stage IV injury at the time of admission.

His 11-month stay in the CLC was characterized by progressively worsening weakness and inactivity, with a 25-lb weight loss in spite of adequate tube feeding. Serum albumin remained in the 2.0 to 2.5 gm/dL range, hemoglobin in the 7 to 9 gm/dL range without any obvious source of anemia. Most of the pressure injuries worsened during his stay in spite of aggressive wound care, and he developed a second stage IV sacral wound. A single C-reactive protein (CRP) level 2 months prior to his death was markedly elevated at 19.5 mg/dL. In spite of maintaining NPO status, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia, all of which responded well to treatment. Ultimately, he was found pulseless and apneic and resuscitation was unsuccessful. An autopsy revealed purulent material in the small airways.

Case 3 Presentation

A 65-year-old man with a long history of paranoid schizophrenia and severe gastroesophageal reflux disease had resided in the CLC for about 10 years. Medications included risperidone microspheres 37.5 mg every 2 weeks, valproic acid 500 mg 3 times daily and 1,000 mg every night at bedtime, lansoprazole 30 mg twice daily, ranitidine 150 mg every night at bedtime, sucralfate 1,000 mg 3 times daily, simvastatin 20 mg every night at bedtime, and tamsulosin 0.4 mg every night at bedtime. He had done well for many years but developed some drooling and a modest resting tremor (but no other signs of pseudoparkinsonism) about 8 years after admission.

There had been no changes to his risperidone dosage. He also lost about 20 lb over a period of 1 year and became increasingly weak and dependent in gait, serum albumin dropped as low as 1.6 gm/dL, hemoglobin dropped to the 7 to 8 gm/dL range (without any other obvious source of anemia), and he developed a gradually worsening right-sided pleural effusion. CRP was chronically elevated at this point, in the 6 to 15 mg/dL range and as high as 17.2 mg/dL. Ultimately, he developed 3 episodes of aspiration pneumonia over a period of 2 months. Swallowing evaluation at that time revealed severe oropharyngeal dysphagia and a PEG tube was placed. Due to concerns for possible antipsychotic-induced dysphagia, risperidone was discontinued, and quetiapine 400 mg a day was substituted. He did well over the subsequent year with no further pneumonia and advancement back to a regular diet. He regained all of the lost weight and began independent ambulation. Albumin improved to the 3 gm/dL range, hemoglobin to the 12 to 13 gm/dL range, and CRP had decreased to 0.7 mg/dL. The pleural effusion (believed to have been a parapneumonic effusion) had resolved.

Discussion

All 3 patients met the Fried criteria for frailty, although there were several confounding issues.² All 3 patients lost between 20 and 25 lb; all had clearly become weaker according to nursing and rehabilitation staff (although none were formally assessed for grip strength); and all had clear declines in their activity level. Patient 3 had a clear decrement in gait speed, but patient 1 had severe gait impairment due to Parkinson disease (although his gait in therapy had clearly worsened). Patient 2 was paraparetic and unable to ambulate. There also was evidence of limited biomarkers of systemic inflammation; all 3 patients’ albumin had decreased, and patients 2 and 3 had significant decrease in hemoglobin; but these commonplace clinical biomarkers are obviously multifactorially determined. We have limited data on our patients’ CRP levels; serial levels would have been more specific for systemic inflammation but were infrequently performed on the patients.

Multimorbidity and medical complexity are more the rule than the exception in frail geriatric patients,and it is difficult to separate the role of microaspiration from other confounding conditions that might have contributed to these patients’ evolving systemic inflammation and frailty.¹⁸ It might be argued that the decline for patient 1 was related to the underlying Parkinson disease (a progressive neurologic illness in which systemic inflammation has been reported), or that the decline of patient 2 was related to the worsening pressure injuries rather than to covert microaspiration.¹⁹ However, the TBIs for patient 2 and the schizophrenia for patient 3 would not be expected to be associated with frailty or with systemic inflammation. Furthermore, the frailty symptoms of patient 3 and inflammatory biomarkers improved after the risperidone, which was likely responsible for his microaspiration, was discontinued. All 3 patients were at risk for oropharyngeal dysphagia (antipsychotic medication is clearly associated with dysphagia²⁰); patient 2 demonstrated pathologic evidence of DAB at autopsy.

There is evolving evidence that chronic systemic inflammation and immune activation are key mechanisms in the pathogenesis of frailty.^4-6 It is known that elevated serum levels of proinflammatory cytokines, including tumor necrosis factor-α, interleukin-6, and CRP are directly associated with frailty and are inversely associated with levels of albumin, hemoglobin, insulin-like growth factor-1, and several micronutrients in frail individuals.^4-7,21,22 Chronic inflammation contributes to the pathophysiology of frailty through detrimental effects on a broad range of systems, including the musculoskeletal, endocrine, and hematopoietic systems and through nutritional dysregulation.^2,4,23 These changes may lead to further deleterious effects, creating a downward spiral of worsening frailty. For example, it seems likely that our patients’ progressive weakness further compromised airway protection, creating a vicious cycle of worsening microaspiration and chronic inflammation.

Conclusions

To date, the role of chronic microaspiration and DAB in chronic systemic inflammation or in frailty has not been explored. Given the prevalence of microaspiration in nursing home residents and the devastating consequences of frailty, though, this seems to be a crucial area of investigation. It is equally crucial for long-term care staff, both providers and nursing staff, to have a heightened awareness of covert microaspiration and a low threshold for referral to speech pathology for further investigation. Staff also should be aware of the utility of the Fried criteria to improve identification of frailty in general. It is probable that covert microaspiration will prove to be an important part of the differential diagnosis of frailty.

Hospitalizations related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) are potentially avoidable if timely and effective care is provided to the patient. The Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality has identified type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), urinary tract infections (UTIs), asthma, dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, angina without an inhospital procedure, and perforated appendix as ACSCs.^1,2 Identifying patients with ACSCs who are at risk for hospitalization is a potential measure to enhance primary care delivery and reduce preventable hospitalizations

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Clinical Pharmacy Practice Office implemented a guidance statement describing the role and impact of a clinical pharmacy specialist (CPS) in managing ACSCs.¹ Within the Veterans Health Administration, the CPS may function under a scope of practice within their area of expertise with the ability to prescribe medications, place consults, and order laboratory tests and additional referrals as appropriate. As hospitalizations related to ACSCs are potentially preventable with effective primary care, the CPS can play an essential primary care role to implement interventions targeted at reducing these hospitalizations.

At the William S. Middleton Memorial Veterans Hospital, in Madison, Wisconsin, multiple transitions of care and postdischarge services have been established to capture those patients who are at a high risk of rehospitalization. Studies have been completed regarding implementation of intensive case management programs for high-risk patients.³ Currently though, no standardized process or protocol exists that can identify and optimize primary care for patients with ACSCs who have been hospitalized but are predicted to be at low risk for rehospitalization. Although these patients may not require intensive case management like that of those at high risk, improvements can be made to optimize clinical resources, education, and patient self-monitoring to mitigate risk for hospitalization or rehospitalization. Therefore, this project aimed to evaluate the implementation of offering further referrals and care for patients who have been hospitalized but are considered low risk for hospitalization from ACSCs.

Methods

This quality improvement project to offer further referrals and care to patients considered low risk for hospitalization was implemented to enhance ambulatory-care provided services. All patients identified as being a low risk for hospitalization via a VA dashboard from July through September 2018 were included. Patients were identified based on age, chronic diseases, gender, and other patient-specific factors predetermined by the VA dashboard algorithm. Patients receiving hospice or palliative care and those no longer receiving primary care through the facility were excluded.

A pharmacy resident conducted a baseline chart review using a standardized template in the computerized patient record system (CPRS) to identify additional referrals or interventions a patient may benefit from based on any identified ACSC. Potential referral options included a CPS or nurse care manager disease management, whole health/wellness, educational classes, home monitoring equipment, specialty clinics, nutrition, cardiac or pulmonary rehabilitation, social work, and mental health. A pharmacy resident or the patient aligned care team (PACT) CPS reviewed the identified referrals with PACT members at interdisciplinary team meetings and determined which referrals to offer the patient. The pharmacy resident or designated PACT member reached out to the patient via telephone or during a clinic visit to offer and enter the referrals. If the patient agreed to any referrals, a chart review was conducted 3 months later to determine the percentage of initially agreed-upon referrals that the patient completed. Additionally, the number of emergency department (ED) visits and hospitalizations related to an ACSC at 3 months was collected.

Feasibility was assessed to evaluate potential service implementation and was measured by the time in minutes to complete the baseline chart review, time in minutes to offer referrals to the patient, and proportion of referrals that were completed at 3 months.⁴ As this quality improvement project was undertaken for programmatic evaluation, the University of Wisconsin-Madison Health Sciences Institutional Review Board determined that this project did not meet the federal definition of research and therefore review was not required. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results

A total of 78 veterans who had ≥ 1 ACSC-related hospitalization in the past year and who were categorized as low risk were identified, and 69 veterans were reviewed. Nine patients were not included based on hospice care and no longer receiving primary care through the facility. Eight patients were found to have optimized care with no further action warranted after review. Based on their assigned PACT, there was a range of 0 to 5 patients identified per team. Fifty-one patients were contacted, and 37 accepted ≥ 1 referral. Most of the patients were white and male (Table). The most common ACSCs were hypertension (68%), COPD (46%), and T2DM (30%); additional ACSCs included angina (18%), pneumonia (15%), UTIs (10%), CHF (6%), and asthma, dehydration, and perforated appendix (1.5% for each). Any ACSC listed as a diagnosis for a patient was included, regardless of whether it was related to a hospitalization. Most referrals were offered by pharmacists (pharmacy resident, 41%; CPS, 29%), followed by the nurse care manager (18%) and the primary care provider (12%). One patient passed away related to heart failure complications prior to being contacted to offer additional referrals. Of the 9 patients that were unable to be contacted, 4 did not respond to 3 phone call attempts and 5 had no documentation of referrals being offered after the initial chart review and recommendation was completed.

Most of the initially accepted referrals (n = 68) were for CPS disease management, whole health/wellness, and educational classes (Figure). Of the 28 initially accepted referrals for CPS disease management, most were for COPD (10) and hypertension (8), followed by neuropathic pain (3), vitamin D deficiency (3), hyperlipidemia (2), and T2DM (2). At 3 months, all referrals were completed except for 1 hypertension, 1 vitamin D deficiency, and 2 hyperlipidemia referrals. There were 6 COPD, 4 T2DM self-management, and 1 chronic pain class referrals made with 3 COPD and 1 T2DM referrals completed at 3 months. Two tobacco treatment and 2 palliative care referrals were specialty referrals accepted by patients with 1 palliative care referral completed at 3 months.

In terms of feasibility, the chart review took an average (SD) of 13 (4) minutes, and contacting the patient to offer referrals took an average of 8 (5) minutes. Most of the accepted referrals were completed by 3 months (42/68, 62%).

Comparing the 3 months prior to and the 3 months after offering referrals, there was a cumulative quantitative decrease in the number of ED visits (5 to 1) and hospitalizations (11 to 5). The 1 ED visit was for a patient who was unable to be contacted to offer additional referrals as were 4 of the hospitalizations. One of the hospitalizations was for a patient who was deemed to have optimized care with no additional referrals necessary.

Discussion

Evaluation of the review and referral process for patients at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC was a proactive approach toward optimizing primary care for veterans, and the process increased patient access to education and primary care. There was a high initial patient acceptance rate of referrals and a high completion rate when offered by PACT members. Based on the number of identified patients, the time spent completing chart reviews and contacting patients to offer referrals for each PACT CPS and team was feasible to conduct.

As there were 69 eligible patients identified over a 3-month period for a single VA facility, including all community-based outpatient clinics serving an estimated 130,000 veterans, the additional time and workload for an individual PACT to reach out to these patients is minimal. Completing the review and outreach process for an average of 21 minutes per patient for at most 5 patients per primary care provider team is feasible to complete during the recommended 4 hours of weekly CPS population health management responsibilities.

Limitations

Several limitations were identified with the implementation of the project. A variety of PACT members completed initial outreach to veterans regarding additional referrals, which may have resulted in a lack of consistency in the approach and discussion of offering referrals to patients. Although there may be a difference in how the team members made referral offers to patients and therefore varying acceptance rates by patients, the process was thought to be more generalizable to the PACT approach for providing care in the VA. In addition, the time to contact patients to offer referrals was not always documented in the electronic health record, making the documented time an estimate. Given that patients identified were managed by a variety of PACT members, there were differences noted among PACTs in terms of acceptability of offering referrals to patients.

While there was a decrease noted in ED visits and hospitalizations when comparing 3 months before and afterward, additional data are needed to provide further insight into this relationship. As the patients identified were at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC and had 1 or 2 hospitalizations within the year prior, additional time is warranted to compare 12-month ED visits and hospitalization rates postintervention. Finally, these findings may be limited in generalizability to other health care systems as the project was conducted among a specific, veteran patient population with PACT CPSs practicing independently within an established broad scope of practice.

Future Directions

Future directions include incorporating the review and referral process into the PACT CPS population health management responsibilities as a way to use all PACT members to enhance primary care delivered to veterans. To further elucidate the relationship between the referral process and hospitalization rates, a longer data collection period is needed.

Conclusions

Identifying patients at risk for hospitalization from an ACSC via a review and referral process by using the VA PACT structure and team members was feasible and led to increased patient access to primary care and additional services. The PACT CPS would benefit from using a similar approach for population health management for low risk for hospitalization patients or other identified chronic conditions.

Acknowledgments

Presented at the Wisconsin Pharmacy Residency Conference at the Pharmacy Society of Wisconsin Educational Conference April 10, 2019, in Madison, Wisconsin.

Hospitalizations related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) are potentially avoidable if timely and effective care is provided to the patient. The Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality has identified type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), urinary tract infections (UTIs), asthma, dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, angina without an inhospital procedure, and perforated appendix as ACSCs.^1,2 Identifying patients with ACSCs who are at risk for hospitalization is a potential measure to enhance primary care delivery and reduce preventable hospitalizations

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Clinical Pharmacy Practice Office implemented a guidance statement describing the role and impact of a clinical pharmacy specialist (CPS) in managing ACSCs.¹ Within the Veterans Health Administration, the CPS may function under a scope of practice within their area of expertise with the ability to prescribe medications, place consults, and order laboratory tests and additional referrals as appropriate. As hospitalizations related to ACSCs are potentially preventable with effective primary care, the CPS can play an essential primary care role to implement interventions targeted at reducing these hospitalizations.

At the William S. Middleton Memorial Veterans Hospital, in Madison, Wisconsin, multiple transitions of care and postdischarge services have been established to capture those patients who are at a high risk of rehospitalization. Studies have been completed regarding implementation of intensive case management programs for high-risk patients.³ Currently though, no standardized process or protocol exists that can identify and optimize primary care for patients with ACSCs who have been hospitalized but are predicted to be at low risk for rehospitalization. Although these patients may not require intensive case management like that of those at high risk, improvements can be made to optimize clinical resources, education, and patient self-monitoring to mitigate risk for hospitalization or rehospitalization. Therefore, this project aimed to evaluate the implementation of offering further referrals and care for patients who have been hospitalized but are considered low risk for hospitalization from ACSCs.

Methods

This quality improvement project to offer further referrals and care to patients considered low risk for hospitalization was implemented to enhance ambulatory-care provided services. All patients identified as being a low risk for hospitalization via a VA dashboard from July through September 2018 were included. Patients were identified based on age, chronic diseases, gender, and other patient-specific factors predetermined by the VA dashboard algorithm. Patients receiving hospice or palliative care and those no longer receiving primary care through the facility were excluded.

A pharmacy resident conducted a baseline chart review using a standardized template in the computerized patient record system (CPRS) to identify additional referrals or interventions a patient may benefit from based on any identified ACSC. Potential referral options included a CPS or nurse care manager disease management, whole health/wellness, educational classes, home monitoring equipment, specialty clinics, nutrition, cardiac or pulmonary rehabilitation, social work, and mental health. A pharmacy resident or the patient aligned care team (PACT) CPS reviewed the identified referrals with PACT members at interdisciplinary team meetings and determined which referrals to offer the patient. The pharmacy resident or designated PACT member reached out to the patient via telephone or during a clinic visit to offer and enter the referrals. If the patient agreed to any referrals, a chart review was conducted 3 months later to determine the percentage of initially agreed-upon referrals that the patient completed. Additionally, the number of emergency department (ED) visits and hospitalizations related to an ACSC at 3 months was collected.

Feasibility was assessed to evaluate potential service implementation and was measured by the time in minutes to complete the baseline chart review, time in minutes to offer referrals to the patient, and proportion of referrals that were completed at 3 months.⁴ As this quality improvement project was undertaken for programmatic evaluation, the University of Wisconsin-Madison Health Sciences Institutional Review Board determined that this project did not meet the federal definition of research and therefore review was not required. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results

A total of 78 veterans who had ≥ 1 ACSC-related hospitalization in the past year and who were categorized as low risk were identified, and 69 veterans were reviewed. Nine patients were not included based on hospice care and no longer receiving primary care through the facility. Eight patients were found to have optimized care with no further action warranted after review. Based on their assigned PACT, there was a range of 0 to 5 patients identified per team. Fifty-one patients were contacted, and 37 accepted ≥ 1 referral. Most of the patients were white and male (Table). The most common ACSCs were hypertension (68%), COPD (46%), and T2DM (30%); additional ACSCs included angina (18%), pneumonia (15%), UTIs (10%), CHF (6%), and asthma, dehydration, and perforated appendix (1.5% for each). Any ACSC listed as a diagnosis for a patient was included, regardless of whether it was related to a hospitalization. Most referrals were offered by pharmacists (pharmacy resident, 41%; CPS, 29%), followed by the nurse care manager (18%) and the primary care provider (12%). One patient passed away related to heart failure complications prior to being contacted to offer additional referrals. Of the 9 patients that were unable to be contacted, 4 did not respond to 3 phone call attempts and 5 had no documentation of referrals being offered after the initial chart review and recommendation was completed.

Most of the initially accepted referrals (n = 68) were for CPS disease management, whole health/wellness, and educational classes (Figure). Of the 28 initially accepted referrals for CPS disease management, most were for COPD (10) and hypertension (8), followed by neuropathic pain (3), vitamin D deficiency (3), hyperlipidemia (2), and T2DM (2). At 3 months, all referrals were completed except for 1 hypertension, 1 vitamin D deficiency, and 2 hyperlipidemia referrals. There were 6 COPD, 4 T2DM self-management, and 1 chronic pain class referrals made with 3 COPD and 1 T2DM referrals completed at 3 months. Two tobacco treatment and 2 palliative care referrals were specialty referrals accepted by patients with 1 palliative care referral completed at 3 months.

In terms of feasibility, the chart review took an average (SD) of 13 (4) minutes, and contacting the patient to offer referrals took an average of 8 (5) minutes. Most of the accepted referrals were completed by 3 months (42/68, 62%).

Comparing the 3 months prior to and the 3 months after offering referrals, there was a cumulative quantitative decrease in the number of ED visits (5 to 1) and hospitalizations (11 to 5). The 1 ED visit was for a patient who was unable to be contacted to offer additional referrals as were 4 of the hospitalizations. One of the hospitalizations was for a patient who was deemed to have optimized care with no additional referrals necessary.

Discussion

Evaluation of the review and referral process for patients at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC was a proactive approach toward optimizing primary care for veterans, and the process increased patient access to education and primary care. There was a high initial patient acceptance rate of referrals and a high completion rate when offered by PACT members. Based on the number of identified patients, the time spent completing chart reviews and contacting patients to offer referrals for each PACT CPS and team was feasible to conduct.

As there were 69 eligible patients identified over a 3-month period for a single VA facility, including all community-based outpatient clinics serving an estimated 130,000 veterans, the additional time and workload for an individual PACT to reach out to these patients is minimal. Completing the review and outreach process for an average of 21 minutes per patient for at most 5 patients per primary care provider team is feasible to complete during the recommended 4 hours of weekly CPS population health management responsibilities.

Limitations

Several limitations were identified with the implementation of the project. A variety of PACT members completed initial outreach to veterans regarding additional referrals, which may have resulted in a lack of consistency in the approach and discussion of offering referrals to patients. Although there may be a difference in how the team members made referral offers to patients and therefore varying acceptance rates by patients, the process was thought to be more generalizable to the PACT approach for providing care in the VA. In addition, the time to contact patients to offer referrals was not always documented in the electronic health record, making the documented time an estimate. Given that patients identified were managed by a variety of PACT members, there were differences noted among PACTs in terms of acceptability of offering referrals to patients.

While there was a decrease noted in ED visits and hospitalizations when comparing 3 months before and afterward, additional data are needed to provide further insight into this relationship. As the patients identified were at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC and had 1 or 2 hospitalizations within the year prior, additional time is warranted to compare 12-month ED visits and hospitalization rates postintervention. Finally, these findings may be limited in generalizability to other health care systems as the project was conducted among a specific, veteran patient population with PACT CPSs practicing independently within an established broad scope of practice.

Future Directions

Future directions include incorporating the review and referral process into the PACT CPS population health management responsibilities as a way to use all PACT members to enhance primary care delivered to veterans. To further elucidate the relationship between the referral process and hospitalization rates, a longer data collection period is needed.

Conclusions

Identifying patients at risk for hospitalization from an ACSC via a review and referral process by using the VA PACT structure and team members was feasible and led to increased patient access to primary care and additional services. The PACT CPS would benefit from using a similar approach for population health management for low risk for hospitalization patients or other identified chronic conditions.

Acknowledgments

Presented at the Wisconsin Pharmacy Residency Conference at the Pharmacy Society of Wisconsin Educational Conference April 10, 2019, in Madison, Wisconsin.

Hospitalizations related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) are potentially avoidable if timely and effective care is provided to the patient. The Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality has identified type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), urinary tract infections (UTIs), asthma, dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, angina without an inhospital procedure, and perforated appendix as ACSCs.^1,2 Identifying patients with ACSCs who are at risk for hospitalization is a potential measure to enhance primary care delivery and reduce preventable hospitalizations

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Clinical Pharmacy Practice Office implemented a guidance statement describing the role and impact of a clinical pharmacy specialist (CPS) in managing ACSCs.¹ Within the Veterans Health Administration, the CPS may function under a scope of practice within their area of expertise with the ability to prescribe medications, place consults, and order laboratory tests and additional referrals as appropriate. As hospitalizations related to ACSCs are potentially preventable with effective primary care, the CPS can play an essential primary care role to implement interventions targeted at reducing these hospitalizations.

At the William S. Middleton Memorial Veterans Hospital, in Madison, Wisconsin, multiple transitions of care and postdischarge services have been established to capture those patients who are at a high risk of rehospitalization. Studies have been completed regarding implementation of intensive case management programs for high-risk patients.³ Currently though, no standardized process or protocol exists that can identify and optimize primary care for patients with ACSCs who have been hospitalized but are predicted to be at low risk for rehospitalization. Although these patients may not require intensive case management like that of those at high risk, improvements can be made to optimize clinical resources, education, and patient self-monitoring to mitigate risk for hospitalization or rehospitalization. Therefore, this project aimed to evaluate the implementation of offering further referrals and care for patients who have been hospitalized but are considered low risk for hospitalization from ACSCs.

Methods

This quality improvement project to offer further referrals and care to patients considered low risk for hospitalization was implemented to enhance ambulatory-care provided services. All patients identified as being a low risk for hospitalization via a VA dashboard from July through September 2018 were included. Patients were identified based on age, chronic diseases, gender, and other patient-specific factors predetermined by the VA dashboard algorithm. Patients receiving hospice or palliative care and those no longer receiving primary care through the facility were excluded.

A pharmacy resident conducted a baseline chart review using a standardized template in the computerized patient record system (CPRS) to identify additional referrals or interventions a patient may benefit from based on any identified ACSC. Potential referral options included a CPS or nurse care manager disease management, whole health/wellness, educational classes, home monitoring equipment, specialty clinics, nutrition, cardiac or pulmonary rehabilitation, social work, and mental health. A pharmacy resident or the patient aligned care team (PACT) CPS reviewed the identified referrals with PACT members at interdisciplinary team meetings and determined which referrals to offer the patient. The pharmacy resident or designated PACT member reached out to the patient via telephone or during a clinic visit to offer and enter the referrals. If the patient agreed to any referrals, a chart review was conducted 3 months later to determine the percentage of initially agreed-upon referrals that the patient completed. Additionally, the number of emergency department (ED) visits and hospitalizations related to an ACSC at 3 months was collected.

Feasibility was assessed to evaluate potential service implementation and was measured by the time in minutes to complete the baseline chart review, time in minutes to offer referrals to the patient, and proportion of referrals that were completed at 3 months.⁴ As this quality improvement project was undertaken for programmatic evaluation, the University of Wisconsin-Madison Health Sciences Institutional Review Board determined that this project did not meet the federal definition of research and therefore review was not required. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results

A total of 78 veterans who had ≥ 1 ACSC-related hospitalization in the past year and who were categorized as low risk were identified, and 69 veterans were reviewed. Nine patients were not included based on hospice care and no longer receiving primary care through the facility. Eight patients were found to have optimized care with no further action warranted after review. Based on their assigned PACT, there was a range of 0 to 5 patients identified per team. Fifty-one patients were contacted, and 37 accepted ≥ 1 referral. Most of the patients were white and male (Table). The most common ACSCs were hypertension (68%), COPD (46%), and T2DM (30%); additional ACSCs included angina (18%), pneumonia (15%), UTIs (10%), CHF (6%), and asthma, dehydration, and perforated appendix (1.5% for each). Any ACSC listed as a diagnosis for a patient was included, regardless of whether it was related to a hospitalization. Most referrals were offered by pharmacists (pharmacy resident, 41%; CPS, 29%), followed by the nurse care manager (18%) and the primary care provider (12%). One patient passed away related to heart failure complications prior to being contacted to offer additional referrals. Of the 9 patients that were unable to be contacted, 4 did not respond to 3 phone call attempts and 5 had no documentation of referrals being offered after the initial chart review and recommendation was completed.

Most of the initially accepted referrals (n = 68) were for CPS disease management, whole health/wellness, and educational classes (Figure). Of the 28 initially accepted referrals for CPS disease management, most were for COPD (10) and hypertension (8), followed by neuropathic pain (3), vitamin D deficiency (3), hyperlipidemia (2), and T2DM (2). At 3 months, all referrals were completed except for 1 hypertension, 1 vitamin D deficiency, and 2 hyperlipidemia referrals. There were 6 COPD, 4 T2DM self-management, and 1 chronic pain class referrals made with 3 COPD and 1 T2DM referrals completed at 3 months. Two tobacco treatment and 2 palliative care referrals were specialty referrals accepted by patients with 1 palliative care referral completed at 3 months.

In terms of feasibility, the chart review took an average (SD) of 13 (4) minutes, and contacting the patient to offer referrals took an average of 8 (5) minutes. Most of the accepted referrals were completed by 3 months (42/68, 62%).

Comparing the 3 months prior to and the 3 months after offering referrals, there was a cumulative quantitative decrease in the number of ED visits (5 to 1) and hospitalizations (11 to 5). The 1 ED visit was for a patient who was unable to be contacted to offer additional referrals as were 4 of the hospitalizations. One of the hospitalizations was for a patient who was deemed to have optimized care with no additional referrals necessary.

Discussion

Evaluation of the review and referral process for patients at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC was a proactive approach toward optimizing primary care for veterans, and the process increased patient access to education and primary care. There was a high initial patient acceptance rate of referrals and a high completion rate when offered by PACT members. Based on the number of identified patients, the time spent completing chart reviews and contacting patients to offer referrals for each PACT CPS and team was feasible to conduct.

As there were 69 eligible patients identified over a 3-month period for a single VA facility, including all community-based outpatient clinics serving an estimated 130,000 veterans, the additional time and workload for an individual PACT to reach out to these patients is minimal. Completing the review and outreach process for an average of 21 minutes per patient for at most 5 patients per primary care provider team is feasible to complete during the recommended 4 hours of weekly CPS population health management responsibilities.

Limitations

Several limitations were identified with the implementation of the project. A variety of PACT members completed initial outreach to veterans regarding additional referrals, which may have resulted in a lack of consistency in the approach and discussion of offering referrals to patients. Although there may be a difference in how the team members made referral offers to patients and therefore varying acceptance rates by patients, the process was thought to be more generalizable to the PACT approach for providing care in the VA. In addition, the time to contact patients to offer referrals was not always documented in the electronic health record, making the documented time an estimate. Given that patients identified were managed by a variety of PACT members, there were differences noted among PACTs in terms of acceptability of offering referrals to patients.

While there was a decrease noted in ED visits and hospitalizations when comparing 3 months before and afterward, additional data are needed to provide further insight into this relationship. As the patients identified were at low risk for hospitalization from an ACSC and had 1 or 2 hospitalizations within the year prior, additional time is warranted to compare 12-month ED visits and hospitalization rates postintervention. Finally, these findings may be limited in generalizability to other health care systems as the project was conducted among a specific, veteran patient population with PACT CPSs practicing independently within an established broad scope of practice.

Future Directions

Future directions include incorporating the review and referral process into the PACT CPS population health management responsibilities as a way to use all PACT members to enhance primary care delivered to veterans. To further elucidate the relationship between the referral process and hospitalization rates, a longer data collection period is needed.

Conclusions

Identifying patients at risk for hospitalization from an ACSC via a review and referral process by using the VA PACT structure and team members was feasible and led to increased patient access to primary care and additional services. The PACT CPS would benefit from using a similar approach for population health management for low risk for hospitalization patients or other identified chronic conditions.

Acknowledgments

Presented at the Wisconsin Pharmacy Residency Conference at the Pharmacy Society of Wisconsin Educational Conference April 10, 2019, in Madison, Wisconsin.

The rise in prevalence of the community spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the US in early March 2020 led to hospital systems across the country preparing for an increase in critically ill patients.¹ The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Ann Arbor Healthcare System (VAAAHS) anticipated an increased census of veterans who would need hospital admission for severe COVID-19 as well as the potential need to receive patients from community hospitals in Southeast Michigan, the location of one of the worst outbreaks in the US at that time.²

Through the facility’s incident command center, a hospital operations group identified the postanesthesia care unit (PACU) as a space to convert to an intensive care unit (ICU) for patients with COVID-19 needing mechanical ventilation. Other hospitals throughout the world have created similar makeshift ICUs to help care for the surge of patients with COVID-19, recognizing the high level of monitoring and resources available in the perioperative setting.^3-5 These ICUs have been successfully created in operating rooms,³ recovery rooms,⁵ and procedural settings.⁴

Between March 27, 2020 and April 25, 2020, a great multidisciplinary effort enabled the VAAAHS PACU-ICU to care for critically ill veterans with COVID-19 from Southeast Michigan as well as civilian transfers from overwhelmed neighboring community hospitals. This article will discuss planning considerations, including facility preparation, equipment, and staffing models. The unique challenges faced in managing an open-plan surge-capacity ICU also will be discussed as well as the solutions that were enacted.

Methods

Hospital Preparation

Maintaining a 2-zone model in which patients with COVID-19 and without COVID-19 could be cared for separately was of major importance. The VAAAHS traditional ICU was converted into a 16-bed COVID-19 ICU and staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service. A separate wing of the hospital was converted into a 19-bed non-COVID-19 ICU, which also was staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service that increased its staffing of residents, fellows, and attending physicians to meet the increasing clinical demands. Elective major surgery cases were postponed, and surgeons managed the care of postoperative surgical ICU patients. This arrangement allowed the existing 4 anesthesiologist intensivists to staff the PACU COVID-19 ICU.

Considerations, including space requirements, staffing, equipment, infection control requirements, and ability for facilities to engineer a negative pressure space were factored into the decision to convert the PACU to an additional 12-bed ICU. This effectively tripled the VAAAHS ICU capacity, enabling patient transfers from the John D. Dingell VA Medical Center in Detroit, Michigan, which was being impacted by a surge of cases in Detroit. In addition, this allowed for the opening of the hospital for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 ICU transfers from hospitals in Southeast Michigan in order to fulfill the fourth VA mission to provide care and support to state and local communities for emergency management, public health, and safety.

PACU Preparation

PACU was selected as an overflow ICU due to its open floor plan, allowing patients on ventilators to be seen from a central nursing station. This would allow for the safe use of ventilators without central alarm capabilities (especially anesthesia machines). Given the risk of a circuit disconnect, all ventilators without central alarm capabilities needed to be seen and heard within the space to ensure patient safety.

Facilities Management was able to construct temporary barriers with vinyl covered sheetrock and plexiglass to partition the central nursing workstation from the patient area in a U-shape (Figure 1). The patient area was turned into a negative pressure space where strict airborne precautions could be observed. Although the air handling unit serving this space is equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, it was mechanically manipulated to ensure that all air coming from the space was discharged through exhaust and not recirculated into another occupied space within the hospital. Total air exchange rates were measured and calculated for both the positive and negative spaces to ensure they met or exceeded at least 6 air changes per hour, as recommended by Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance.^6,7 A differential pressure indicator was installed to provide staff with the ability to monitor the pressure relationship between the 2 spaces in real time.

Twelve patient care beds were created. A traditionally engineered airborne infection isolation room in PACU served as a procedure room for aerosol-generating procedures, especially intubation, extubation, use of high-flow nasal cannula, and tracheostomy placement. Strict airborne precautions were taken within the patient area. The area inside the nursing station was positively pressurized to allow for surgical masks only to be required for the comfort of health care workers (Figure 2). A clear donning and doffing workflow was created for movement between the nursing area and the patient care area.

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment (PPE) was of paramount importance in this open care unit. Airborne precautions were used in the entire patient care area. Powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) were used when possible to conserve the supply of N95 masks. Each health care worker was issued a reusable PAPR hood, which was cleaned by the user after each use by wiping the exterior of the entire hood with virucidal wipes. The brand and active ingredient of the virucidal wipes varied by availability of supplies, but the “virus kill time” was clearly labeled on each container. Each health care worker had a paper bag for storing his or her PAPR hood between usage to allow drying and ventilation. PAPR units were charged in between uses and shared by all clinical staff. Two layers of nonsterile gloves were worn.

Because of the open care area, attention had to be given to adhere to infection control policies if health care workers wanted to care for multiple patients while in the area. A new gown was placed over the existing gown, and the outer layer of gloves was removed. The under layer of gloves was then sanitized with hand sanitizer, and a new pair of outer gloves was then worn.

Equipment

Much of the ICU-level equipment needed was already present within the operating room (OR) area. Existing patient monitors were used and connected to a central monitoring station present in the nurses station. Relevant contents of the ICU storage room were duplicated and placed on shelves in the patient care area. Out-of-use anesthesia carts were used for a dedicated COVID-19 invasive line cart. A designated ultrasound with cardiac and vascular access probes was assigned to the PACU-ICU. Anesthesia machines were brought into the PACU-ICU and prepared with viral filters in line to prevent contamination of the machines, in keeping with national guidance from the American Society of Anesthesiologists and Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation.⁸

Multidisciplinary Staffing Model

With the reduced surgical and procedural case load due to halting nonemergent operations, the Anesthesiology and Perioperative Care Service was able to staff the PACU-ICU with critical care anesthesiologists, nurse anesthetists, residents, and PACU and procedural nurses without hindering access to emergent surgeries. A separate preoperative area was maintained with an 8-bed capacity for both preoperative and postoperative management of non-COVID-19 surgical patients.

The staffing model was designed using guidance on the expansion of ICU staffing with non-ICU resources from the Society of Critical Care Medicine as well as local guidance on appropriate nursing ratios (Figure 3).⁹ Given the high acuity and dynamic nature of COVID-19 coupled with the unique considerations that exist using anesthesia machines as long-term ICU ventilators, 24-hour inhospital attending intensivist coverage was provided in the ICU by 4 critical care anesthesiologists who rotated between 12-hour day and night shifts. The critical care anesthesiologists led a team of anesthesiology and surgery residents and ICU advanced practice providers dedicated solely to the PACU-ICU. Non-ICU anesthesiologists helped with procedures such as intubation and invasive line placement and provided coverage of the ICU patients during sign-out and rounding. Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) performed intubations and helped offload respiratory therapists (one of the resources most in shortage) by managing and weaning ventilators and were instrumental in prone positioning of patients. Dedicated ICU nurses were deployed every shift to oversee the unit and act as a resource to the PACU nurses. Fortunately, many PACU nurses had prior ICU training and experience, and nurses from outpatient areas also were recruited to help with patient care. Together, they provided direct patient care. OR nurses assisted with delivering supplies, medications and transporting specimens to the laboratory, as no formal hospital tube station was present in the PACU.

Because of the open-unit setting, nurses practiced bundled care and staggered their turns in the patient care area. For example, a nurse who entered to administer medication to patient A, could then receive communication to check the urine output for patient B and do so without completely doffing and redonning. This allowed preservation of PPE and reduced time in PPE for the health care providers (HCPs).

A scheduled daily meeting included staff from PACU-ICU; Medical ICU (MICU), which also treated patients with COVID-19; and the Palliative Care Service (Figure 4). Patients with single-organ failure were preferentially sent to PACU-ICU, as the ability to do renal replacement therapy (RRT) in an open unit proved difficult. The palliative care team and VAAAHS social workers assisted both MICU and PACU-ICU with communicating with patients’ families, which provided a great help during a clinically demanding time. Physical therapists increased their staffing of the ICU to specifically help with mobilization of patients with COVID-19 and acute respiratory distress syndrome, given the prolonged mechanical ventilation courses that were seen. Other consulting services frequently involved included infectious disease and nephrology.

Challenges and Solutions

Communication between staff located within the patient area and staff located in the nursing station was difficult given the loud noise generated by a PAPR and the plexiglass walls that separated the areas. Multiple techniques were attempted to overcome this. Dry erase boards were placed within the space to facilitate requests, but these were found to be time consuming. Two-way radios worked well if the users were wearing N95s but were harder to communicate when users were wearing PAPRs. Baby monitors were purchased to facilitate 2-way communication and were useful at times although quieter than desired. Vocera B3000N Communication Badges, which were already utilized in the perioperative period at the facility, could be utilized underneath PPE and were ultimately the best form of clear communication between staff within the patient care area and outside the negative pressure zone. In accordance with company guidance, these mobile devices were cleaned with virucidal wipes after use.¹⁰

Communication with patients’ families was critically important. The ICU team, palliative care team, or social workers made daily telephone calls to family members. The facility telehealth coordinator provided a designated tablet device to enable the intensivists to video conference with the patients’ families at bedside, utilizing virtual care manager appointments. This allowed families to see and interact with their loved ones despite the prohibition of family visitors. Every effort was made to utilize video calling daily; however, clinical demands as well as Internet and technological constraints from individual family members intermittently precluded video calls.

Clinical Challenges

Patients with severe COVID-19 infections requiring mechanical ventilation have proven to be exceptionally high-acuity patients with myriad organ-based complications reported.¹¹ Specific to our PACU-ICU, we determined that it was impractical to arrange for continuous RRT given the amount of training PACU nursing staff would have required and the limited ICU nursing staff in the PACU-ICU. Intermittent hemodialysis required replumbing for water supply and drainage but was ultimately not required as our facility expanded the number of continuous RRT machines available, allowing all patients in the COVID-19 ICU who required RRT to stay in the 16-bed ICU. Daily communication with the MICU allowed for safe transfer of patients with imminent needs for RRT to the MICU, providing a coordinated strategy for the deployment of scarce resources across our expanded ICU footprint.

Using anesthesia machines as ICU ventilators proved challenging, despite following best practice guidance.⁸ Notably, anesthesia machines are not actively humidified and require very high fresh gas flows, necessitating the addition of heat moisture exchangers (HME) to the circuit. Also, viral filters were placed in the circuit to prevent machine contamination. The addition of the HME and viral filters to each circuit increased the present dead space and led todifficulty in providing adequate ventilation to patients who already may have had a high proportion of physiologic dead space. The high fresh gas flows used still seemed inadequate in preventing moisture buildup in the machine parts, necessitating frequent exchanges of viral filters, HMEs, and circuits to prevent high peak airway pressures. In addition, anesthesia machines directly sample gas from the patient's breathing circuit, creating the risk for contamination of the space. This required a reconfiguration to allow for a suction scavenging system by VAAAHS biomedical engineers. Also, anesthesia machines are not designed for long-term ventilation and have different ventilation modes compared with modern ICU ventilators. Although they were used for several patients when the PACU-ICU opened, the hospital was able to acquire additional ICU ventilators, and extensive or prolonged use of anesthesia machine ventilators was avoided.

Infection Control

The open care setting provided unique infection control issues that had to be addressed.¹² The open setting allowed preservation of PPE and the ability for bundled care to be delivered easily. The VAAAHS infection control team worked closely with the ICU team to develop practices to ensure both patient and health care worker protection. Notable challenges included donning new gowns between patients when a PAPR was already being worn, leading to draping of new gowns over existing gowns when going between patients. True hand hygiene was also difficult, as health care workers did not want to completely remove gloves while in the patient care area. Layering of 2 pairs of gloves allowed the outer gloves to be removed after care of each patient, at which time alcohol gel was applied to the inner gloves, a new gown was placed over the existing gown, and a new pair of gloves was layered on top.

Although patients were intubated for long periods in the PACU-ICU, there was concern for increased risk of exposure of health care workers after extubation given the inability to contain the coughing patients within a private room. If a patient did well, they were transferred to a private room on the general medical floors within 24 hours of extubation to minimize this risk.

Privacy

The open care design meant less privacy for patients than would be provided in a private room. Curtains were drawn around patient beds as much as possible, especially for nursing care, but priority was given to visualization of the ventilator when a HCP was not present to ensure safety at all times. The majority of patients cared for in the PACU-ICU were intubated and sedated on arrival, but thankfully many were extubated. After extubation privacy in the open care area became more of an issue and may have led to more nighttime disturbances and substandard delirium prevention measures. Priority was given to expediting the transfer of these patients to private rooms on the general medical floor once their respiratory status was deemed stable.

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic is truly an unprecedented event in our nation’s history, which has led to the first nationwide authorization of the fourth mission of VA to provide support for national, state, and local public health. The PACU-ICU was designed, engineered, built, and staffed by perioperative HCPs through an exceptional multidisciplinary effort in a matter of days. Through this dedication of health care workers and staff, the VAAAHS was able to care for critically ill veterans from Southeast Michigan and serve the community during a time of overwhelming demand on the national health care system.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the outstanding team of administrators, engineers, physical therapists, pharmacists, nurses, advanced practice providers, CRNAs, respiratory therapists, and physicians who made it possible to respond to our veterans’ and our community’s needs in a time of unprecedented demand on our health care system. A special thank you to Eric Deters, Chief Strategy Officer; Brittany McClure, ICU Nurse Manager; and Mark Dotson, Chief Supply Chain Officer. It was a privilege to serve on this mission together.

The rise in prevalence of the community spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the US in early March 2020 led to hospital systems across the country preparing for an increase in critically ill patients.¹ The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Ann Arbor Healthcare System (VAAAHS) anticipated an increased census of veterans who would need hospital admission for severe COVID-19 as well as the potential need to receive patients from community hospitals in Southeast Michigan, the location of one of the worst outbreaks in the US at that time.²

Through the facility’s incident command center, a hospital operations group identified the postanesthesia care unit (PACU) as a space to convert to an intensive care unit (ICU) for patients with COVID-19 needing mechanical ventilation. Other hospitals throughout the world have created similar makeshift ICUs to help care for the surge of patients with COVID-19, recognizing the high level of monitoring and resources available in the perioperative setting.^3-5 These ICUs have been successfully created in operating rooms,³ recovery rooms,⁵ and procedural settings.⁴

Between March 27, 2020 and April 25, 2020, a great multidisciplinary effort enabled the VAAAHS PACU-ICU to care for critically ill veterans with COVID-19 from Southeast Michigan as well as civilian transfers from overwhelmed neighboring community hospitals. This article will discuss planning considerations, including facility preparation, equipment, and staffing models. The unique challenges faced in managing an open-plan surge-capacity ICU also will be discussed as well as the solutions that were enacted.

Methods

Hospital Preparation

Maintaining a 2-zone model in which patients with COVID-19 and without COVID-19 could be cared for separately was of major importance. The VAAAHS traditional ICU was converted into a 16-bed COVID-19 ICU and staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service. A separate wing of the hospital was converted into a 19-bed non-COVID-19 ICU, which also was staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service that increased its staffing of residents, fellows, and attending physicians to meet the increasing clinical demands. Elective major surgery cases were postponed, and surgeons managed the care of postoperative surgical ICU patients. This arrangement allowed the existing 4 anesthesiologist intensivists to staff the PACU COVID-19 ICU.

Considerations, including space requirements, staffing, equipment, infection control requirements, and ability for facilities to engineer a negative pressure space were factored into the decision to convert the PACU to an additional 12-bed ICU. This effectively tripled the VAAAHS ICU capacity, enabling patient transfers from the John D. Dingell VA Medical Center in Detroit, Michigan, which was being impacted by a surge of cases in Detroit. In addition, this allowed for the opening of the hospital for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 ICU transfers from hospitals in Southeast Michigan in order to fulfill the fourth VA mission to provide care and support to state and local communities for emergency management, public health, and safety.

PACU Preparation

PACU was selected as an overflow ICU due to its open floor plan, allowing patients on ventilators to be seen from a central nursing station. This would allow for the safe use of ventilators without central alarm capabilities (especially anesthesia machines). Given the risk of a circuit disconnect, all ventilators without central alarm capabilities needed to be seen and heard within the space to ensure patient safety.

Facilities Management was able to construct temporary barriers with vinyl covered sheetrock and plexiglass to partition the central nursing workstation from the patient area in a U-shape (Figure 1). The patient area was turned into a negative pressure space where strict airborne precautions could be observed. Although the air handling unit serving this space is equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, it was mechanically manipulated to ensure that all air coming from the space was discharged through exhaust and not recirculated into another occupied space within the hospital. Total air exchange rates were measured and calculated for both the positive and negative spaces to ensure they met or exceeded at least 6 air changes per hour, as recommended by Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance.^6,7 A differential pressure indicator was installed to provide staff with the ability to monitor the pressure relationship between the 2 spaces in real time.

Twelve patient care beds were created. A traditionally engineered airborne infection isolation room in PACU served as a procedure room for aerosol-generating procedures, especially intubation, extubation, use of high-flow nasal cannula, and tracheostomy placement. Strict airborne precautions were taken within the patient area. The area inside the nursing station was positively pressurized to allow for surgical masks only to be required for the comfort of health care workers (Figure 2). A clear donning and doffing workflow was created for movement between the nursing area and the patient care area.

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment (PPE) was of paramount importance in this open care unit. Airborne precautions were used in the entire patient care area. Powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) were used when possible to conserve the supply of N95 masks. Each health care worker was issued a reusable PAPR hood, which was cleaned by the user after each use by wiping the exterior of the entire hood with virucidal wipes. The brand and active ingredient of the virucidal wipes varied by availability of supplies, but the “virus kill time” was clearly labeled on each container. Each health care worker had a paper bag for storing his or her PAPR hood between usage to allow drying and ventilation. PAPR units were charged in between uses and shared by all clinical staff. Two layers of nonsterile gloves were worn.

Because of the open care area, attention had to be given to adhere to infection control policies if health care workers wanted to care for multiple patients while in the area. A new gown was placed over the existing gown, and the outer layer of gloves was removed. The under layer of gloves was then sanitized with hand sanitizer, and a new pair of outer gloves was then worn.

Equipment

Much of the ICU-level equipment needed was already present within the operating room (OR) area. Existing patient monitors were used and connected to a central monitoring station present in the nurses station. Relevant contents of the ICU storage room were duplicated and placed on shelves in the patient care area. Out-of-use anesthesia carts were used for a dedicated COVID-19 invasive line cart. A designated ultrasound with cardiac and vascular access probes was assigned to the PACU-ICU. Anesthesia machines were brought into the PACU-ICU and prepared with viral filters in line to prevent contamination of the machines, in keeping with national guidance from the American Society of Anesthesiologists and Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation.⁸

Multidisciplinary Staffing Model

With the reduced surgical and procedural case load due to halting nonemergent operations, the Anesthesiology and Perioperative Care Service was able to staff the PACU-ICU with critical care anesthesiologists, nurse anesthetists, residents, and PACU and procedural nurses without hindering access to emergent surgeries. A separate preoperative area was maintained with an 8-bed capacity for both preoperative and postoperative management of non-COVID-19 surgical patients.

The staffing model was designed using guidance on the expansion of ICU staffing with non-ICU resources from the Society of Critical Care Medicine as well as local guidance on appropriate nursing ratios (Figure 3).⁹ Given the high acuity and dynamic nature of COVID-19 coupled with the unique considerations that exist using anesthesia machines as long-term ICU ventilators, 24-hour inhospital attending intensivist coverage was provided in the ICU by 4 critical care anesthesiologists who rotated between 12-hour day and night shifts. The critical care anesthesiologists led a team of anesthesiology and surgery residents and ICU advanced practice providers dedicated solely to the PACU-ICU. Non-ICU anesthesiologists helped with procedures such as intubation and invasive line placement and provided coverage of the ICU patients during sign-out and rounding. Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) performed intubations and helped offload respiratory therapists (one of the resources most in shortage) by managing and weaning ventilators and were instrumental in prone positioning of patients. Dedicated ICU nurses were deployed every shift to oversee the unit and act as a resource to the PACU nurses. Fortunately, many PACU nurses had prior ICU training and experience, and nurses from outpatient areas also were recruited to help with patient care. Together, they provided direct patient care. OR nurses assisted with delivering supplies, medications and transporting specimens to the laboratory, as no formal hospital tube station was present in the PACU.

Because of the open-unit setting, nurses practiced bundled care and staggered their turns in the patient care area. For example, a nurse who entered to administer medication to patient A, could then receive communication to check the urine output for patient B and do so without completely doffing and redonning. This allowed preservation of PPE and reduced time in PPE for the health care providers (HCPs).

A scheduled daily meeting included staff from PACU-ICU; Medical ICU (MICU), which also treated patients with COVID-19; and the Palliative Care Service (Figure 4). Patients with single-organ failure were preferentially sent to PACU-ICU, as the ability to do renal replacement therapy (RRT) in an open unit proved difficult. The palliative care team and VAAAHS social workers assisted both MICU and PACU-ICU with communicating with patients’ families, which provided a great help during a clinically demanding time. Physical therapists increased their staffing of the ICU to specifically help with mobilization of patients with COVID-19 and acute respiratory distress syndrome, given the prolonged mechanical ventilation courses that were seen. Other consulting services frequently involved included infectious disease and nephrology.

Challenges and Solutions

Communication between staff located within the patient area and staff located in the nursing station was difficult given the loud noise generated by a PAPR and the plexiglass walls that separated the areas. Multiple techniques were attempted to overcome this. Dry erase boards were placed within the space to facilitate requests, but these were found to be time consuming. Two-way radios worked well if the users were wearing N95s but were harder to communicate when users were wearing PAPRs. Baby monitors were purchased to facilitate 2-way communication and were useful at times although quieter than desired. Vocera B3000N Communication Badges, which were already utilized in the perioperative period at the facility, could be utilized underneath PPE and were ultimately the best form of clear communication between staff within the patient care area and outside the negative pressure zone. In accordance with company guidance, these mobile devices were cleaned with virucidal wipes after use.¹⁰

Communication with patients’ families was critically important. The ICU team, palliative care team, or social workers made daily telephone calls to family members. The facility telehealth coordinator provided a designated tablet device to enable the intensivists to video conference with the patients’ families at bedside, utilizing virtual care manager appointments. This allowed families to see and interact with their loved ones despite the prohibition of family visitors. Every effort was made to utilize video calling daily; however, clinical demands as well as Internet and technological constraints from individual family members intermittently precluded video calls.

Clinical Challenges

Patients with severe COVID-19 infections requiring mechanical ventilation have proven to be exceptionally high-acuity patients with myriad organ-based complications reported.¹¹ Specific to our PACU-ICU, we determined that it was impractical to arrange for continuous RRT given the amount of training PACU nursing staff would have required and the limited ICU nursing staff in the PACU-ICU. Intermittent hemodialysis required replumbing for water supply and drainage but was ultimately not required as our facility expanded the number of continuous RRT machines available, allowing all patients in the COVID-19 ICU who required RRT to stay in the 16-bed ICU. Daily communication with the MICU allowed for safe transfer of patients with imminent needs for RRT to the MICU, providing a coordinated strategy for the deployment of scarce resources across our expanded ICU footprint.

Using anesthesia machines as ICU ventilators proved challenging, despite following best practice guidance.⁸ Notably, anesthesia machines are not actively humidified and require very high fresh gas flows, necessitating the addition of heat moisture exchangers (HME) to the circuit. Also, viral filters were placed in the circuit to prevent machine contamination. The addition of the HME and viral filters to each circuit increased the present dead space and led todifficulty in providing adequate ventilation to patients who already may have had a high proportion of physiologic dead space. The high fresh gas flows used still seemed inadequate in preventing moisture buildup in the machine parts, necessitating frequent exchanges of viral filters, HMEs, and circuits to prevent high peak airway pressures. In addition, anesthesia machines directly sample gas from the patient's breathing circuit, creating the risk for contamination of the space. This required a reconfiguration to allow for a suction scavenging system by VAAAHS biomedical engineers. Also, anesthesia machines are not designed for long-term ventilation and have different ventilation modes compared with modern ICU ventilators. Although they were used for several patients when the PACU-ICU opened, the hospital was able to acquire additional ICU ventilators, and extensive or prolonged use of anesthesia machine ventilators was avoided.

Infection Control

The open care setting provided unique infection control issues that had to be addressed.¹² The open setting allowed preservation of PPE and the ability for bundled care to be delivered easily. The VAAAHS infection control team worked closely with the ICU team to develop practices to ensure both patient and health care worker protection. Notable challenges included donning new gowns between patients when a PAPR was already being worn, leading to draping of new gowns over existing gowns when going between patients. True hand hygiene was also difficult, as health care workers did not want to completely remove gloves while in the patient care area. Layering of 2 pairs of gloves allowed the outer gloves to be removed after care of each patient, at which time alcohol gel was applied to the inner gloves, a new gown was placed over the existing gown, and a new pair of gloves was layered on top.

Although patients were intubated for long periods in the PACU-ICU, there was concern for increased risk of exposure of health care workers after extubation given the inability to contain the coughing patients within a private room. If a patient did well, they were transferred to a private room on the general medical floors within 24 hours of extubation to minimize this risk.

Privacy

The open care design meant less privacy for patients than would be provided in a private room. Curtains were drawn around patient beds as much as possible, especially for nursing care, but priority was given to visualization of the ventilator when a HCP was not present to ensure safety at all times. The majority of patients cared for in the PACU-ICU were intubated and sedated on arrival, but thankfully many were extubated. After extubation privacy in the open care area became more of an issue and may have led to more nighttime disturbances and substandard delirium prevention measures. Priority was given to expediting the transfer of these patients to private rooms on the general medical floor once their respiratory status was deemed stable.

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic is truly an unprecedented event in our nation’s history, which has led to the first nationwide authorization of the fourth mission of VA to provide support for national, state, and local public health. The PACU-ICU was designed, engineered, built, and staffed by perioperative HCPs through an exceptional multidisciplinary effort in a matter of days. Through this dedication of health care workers and staff, the VAAAHS was able to care for critically ill veterans from Southeast Michigan and serve the community during a time of overwhelming demand on the national health care system.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the outstanding team of administrators, engineers, physical therapists, pharmacists, nurses, advanced practice providers, CRNAs, respiratory therapists, and physicians who made it possible to respond to our veterans’ and our community’s needs in a time of unprecedented demand on our health care system. A special thank you to Eric Deters, Chief Strategy Officer; Brittany McClure, ICU Nurse Manager; and Mark Dotson, Chief Supply Chain Officer. It was a privilege to serve on this mission together.

The rise in prevalence of the community spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the US in early March 2020 led to hospital systems across the country preparing for an increase in critically ill patients.¹ The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Ann Arbor Healthcare System (VAAAHS) anticipated an increased census of veterans who would need hospital admission for severe COVID-19 as well as the potential need to receive patients from community hospitals in Southeast Michigan, the location of one of the worst outbreaks in the US at that time.²

Through the facility’s incident command center, a hospital operations group identified the postanesthesia care unit (PACU) as a space to convert to an intensive care unit (ICU) for patients with COVID-19 needing mechanical ventilation. Other hospitals throughout the world have created similar makeshift ICUs to help care for the surge of patients with COVID-19, recognizing the high level of monitoring and resources available in the perioperative setting.^3-5 These ICUs have been successfully created in operating rooms,³ recovery rooms,⁵ and procedural settings.⁴

Between March 27, 2020 and April 25, 2020, a great multidisciplinary effort enabled the VAAAHS PACU-ICU to care for critically ill veterans with COVID-19 from Southeast Michigan as well as civilian transfers from overwhelmed neighboring community hospitals. This article will discuss planning considerations, including facility preparation, equipment, and staffing models. The unique challenges faced in managing an open-plan surge-capacity ICU also will be discussed as well as the solutions that were enacted.

Methods

Hospital Preparation

Maintaining a 2-zone model in which patients with COVID-19 and without COVID-19 could be cared for separately was of major importance. The VAAAHS traditional ICU was converted into a 16-bed COVID-19 ICU and staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service. A separate wing of the hospital was converted into a 19-bed non-COVID-19 ICU, which also was staffed by the Pulmonary Critical Care Service that increased its staffing of residents, fellows, and attending physicians to meet the increasing clinical demands. Elective major surgery cases were postponed, and surgeons managed the care of postoperative surgical ICU patients. This arrangement allowed the existing 4 anesthesiologist intensivists to staff the PACU COVID-19 ICU.

Considerations, including space requirements, staffing, equipment, infection control requirements, and ability for facilities to engineer a negative pressure space were factored into the decision to convert the PACU to an additional 12-bed ICU. This effectively tripled the VAAAHS ICU capacity, enabling patient transfers from the John D. Dingell VA Medical Center in Detroit, Michigan, which was being impacted by a surge of cases in Detroit. In addition, this allowed for the opening of the hospital for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 ICU transfers from hospitals in Southeast Michigan in order to fulfill the fourth VA mission to provide care and support to state and local communities for emergency management, public health, and safety.

PACU Preparation

PACU was selected as an overflow ICU due to its open floor plan, allowing patients on ventilators to be seen from a central nursing station. This would allow for the safe use of ventilators without central alarm capabilities (especially anesthesia machines). Given the risk of a circuit disconnect, all ventilators without central alarm capabilities needed to be seen and heard within the space to ensure patient safety.

Facilities Management was able to construct temporary barriers with vinyl covered sheetrock and plexiglass to partition the central nursing workstation from the patient area in a U-shape (Figure 1). The patient area was turned into a negative pressure space where strict airborne precautions could be observed. Although the air handling unit serving this space is equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, it was mechanically manipulated to ensure that all air coming from the space was discharged through exhaust and not recirculated into another occupied space within the hospital. Total air exchange rates were measured and calculated for both the positive and negative spaces to ensure they met or exceeded at least 6 air changes per hour, as recommended by Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance.^6,7 A differential pressure indicator was installed to provide staff with the ability to monitor the pressure relationship between the 2 spaces in real time.

Twelve patient care beds were created. A traditionally engineered airborne infection isolation room in PACU served as a procedure room for aerosol-generating procedures, especially intubation, extubation, use of high-flow nasal cannula, and tracheostomy placement. Strict airborne precautions were taken within the patient area. The area inside the nursing station was positively pressurized to allow for surgical masks only to be required for the comfort of health care workers (Figure 2). A clear donning and doffing workflow was created for movement between the nursing area and the patient care area.

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment (PPE) was of paramount importance in this open care unit. Airborne precautions were used in the entire patient care area. Powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) were used when possible to conserve the supply of N95 masks. Each health care worker was issued a reusable PAPR hood, which was cleaned by the user after each use by wiping the exterior of the entire hood with virucidal wipes. The brand and active ingredient of the virucidal wipes varied by availability of supplies, but the “virus kill time” was clearly labeled on each container. Each health care worker had a paper bag for storing his or her PAPR hood between usage to allow drying and ventilation. PAPR units were charged in between uses and shared by all clinical staff. Two layers of nonsterile gloves were worn.

Because of the open care area, attention had to be given to adhere to infection control policies if health care workers wanted to care for multiple patients while in the area. A new gown was placed over the existing gown, and the outer layer of gloves was removed. The under layer of gloves was then sanitized with hand sanitizer, and a new pair of outer gloves was then worn.

Equipment

Much of the ICU-level equipment needed was already present within the operating room (OR) area. Existing patient monitors were used and connected to a central monitoring station present in the nurses station. Relevant contents of the ICU storage room were duplicated and placed on shelves in the patient care area. Out-of-use anesthesia carts were used for a dedicated COVID-19 invasive line cart. A designated ultrasound with cardiac and vascular access probes was assigned to the PACU-ICU. Anesthesia machines were brought into the PACU-ICU and prepared with viral filters in line to prevent contamination of the machines, in keeping with national guidance from the American Society of Anesthesiologists and Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation.⁸

Multidisciplinary Staffing Model

With the reduced surgical and procedural case load due to halting nonemergent operations, the Anesthesiology and Perioperative Care Service was able to staff the PACU-ICU with critical care anesthesiologists, nurse anesthetists, residents, and PACU and procedural nurses without hindering access to emergent surgeries. A separate preoperative area was maintained with an 8-bed capacity for both preoperative and postoperative management of non-COVID-19 surgical patients.

The staffing model was designed using guidance on the expansion of ICU staffing with non-ICU resources from the Society of Critical Care Medicine as well as local guidance on appropriate nursing ratios (Figure 3).⁹ Given the high acuity and dynamic nature of COVID-19 coupled with the unique considerations that exist using anesthesia machines as long-term ICU ventilators, 24-hour inhospital attending intensivist coverage was provided in the ICU by 4 critical care anesthesiologists who rotated between 12-hour day and night shifts. The critical care anesthesiologists led a team of anesthesiology and surgery residents and ICU advanced practice providers dedicated solely to the PACU-ICU. Non-ICU anesthesiologists helped with procedures such as intubation and invasive line placement and provided coverage of the ICU patients during sign-out and rounding. Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) performed intubations and helped offload respiratory therapists (one of the resources most in shortage) by managing and weaning ventilators and were instrumental in prone positioning of patients. Dedicated ICU nurses were deployed every shift to oversee the unit and act as a resource to the PACU nurses. Fortunately, many PACU nurses had prior ICU training and experience, and nurses from outpatient areas also were recruited to help with patient care. Together, they provided direct patient care. OR nurses assisted with delivering supplies, medications and transporting specimens to the laboratory, as no formal hospital tube station was present in the PACU.

Because of the open-unit setting, nurses practiced bundled care and staggered their turns in the patient care area. For example, a nurse who entered to administer medication to patient A, could then receive communication to check the urine output for patient B and do so without completely doffing and redonning. This allowed preservation of PPE and reduced time in PPE for the health care providers (HCPs).

A scheduled daily meeting included staff from PACU-ICU; Medical ICU (MICU), which also treated patients with COVID-19; and the Palliative Care Service (Figure 4). Patients with single-organ failure were preferentially sent to PACU-ICU, as the ability to do renal replacement therapy (RRT) in an open unit proved difficult. The palliative care team and VAAAHS social workers assisted both MICU and PACU-ICU with communicating with patients’ families, which provided a great help during a clinically demanding time. Physical therapists increased their staffing of the ICU to specifically help with mobilization of patients with COVID-19 and acute respiratory distress syndrome, given the prolonged mechanical ventilation courses that were seen. Other consulting services frequently involved included infectious disease and nephrology.

Challenges and Solutions

Communication between staff located within the patient area and staff located in the nursing station was difficult given the loud noise generated by a PAPR and the plexiglass walls that separated the areas. Multiple techniques were attempted to overcome this. Dry erase boards were placed within the space to facilitate requests, but these were found to be time consuming. Two-way radios worked well if the users were wearing N95s but were harder to communicate when users were wearing PAPRs. Baby monitors were purchased to facilitate 2-way communication and were useful at times although quieter than desired. Vocera B3000N Communication Badges, which were already utilized in the perioperative period at the facility, could be utilized underneath PPE and were ultimately the best form of clear communication between staff within the patient care area and outside the negative pressure zone. In accordance with company guidance, these mobile devices were cleaned with virucidal wipes after use.¹⁰

Communication with patients’ families was critically important. The ICU team, palliative care team, or social workers made daily telephone calls to family members. The facility telehealth coordinator provided a designated tablet device to enable the intensivists to video conference with the patients’ families at bedside, utilizing virtual care manager appointments. This allowed families to see and interact with their loved ones despite the prohibition of family visitors. Every effort was made to utilize video calling daily; however, clinical demands as well as Internet and technological constraints from individual family members intermittently precluded video calls.

Clinical Challenges

Patients with severe COVID-19 infections requiring mechanical ventilation have proven to be exceptionally high-acuity patients with myriad organ-based complications reported.¹¹ Specific to our PACU-ICU, we determined that it was impractical to arrange for continuous RRT given the amount of training PACU nursing staff would have required and the limited ICU nursing staff in the PACU-ICU. Intermittent hemodialysis required replumbing for water supply and drainage but was ultimately not required as our facility expanded the number of continuous RRT machines available, allowing all patients in the COVID-19 ICU who required RRT to stay in the 16-bed ICU. Daily communication with the MICU allowed for safe transfer of patients with imminent needs for RRT to the MICU, providing a coordinated strategy for the deployment of scarce resources across our expanded ICU footprint.

Using anesthesia machines as ICU ventilators proved challenging, despite following best practice guidance.⁸ Notably, anesthesia machines are not actively humidified and require very high fresh gas flows, necessitating the addition of heat moisture exchangers (HME) to the circuit. Also, viral filters were placed in the circuit to prevent machine contamination. The addition of the HME and viral filters to each circuit increased the present dead space and led todifficulty in providing adequate ventilation to patients who already may have had a high proportion of physiologic dead space. The high fresh gas flows used still seemed inadequate in preventing moisture buildup in the machine parts, necessitating frequent exchanges of viral filters, HMEs, and circuits to prevent high peak airway pressures. In addition, anesthesia machines directly sample gas from the patient's breathing circuit, creating the risk for contamination of the space. This required a reconfiguration to allow for a suction scavenging system by VAAAHS biomedical engineers. Also, anesthesia machines are not designed for long-term ventilation and have different ventilation modes compared with modern ICU ventilators. Although they were used for several patients when the PACU-ICU opened, the hospital was able to acquire additional ICU ventilators, and extensive or prolonged use of anesthesia machine ventilators was avoided.

Infection Control

The open care setting provided unique infection control issues that had to be addressed.¹² The open setting allowed preservation of PPE and the ability for bundled care to be delivered easily. The VAAAHS infection control team worked closely with the ICU team to develop practices to ensure both patient and health care worker protection. Notable challenges included donning new gowns between patients when a PAPR was already being worn, leading to draping of new gowns over existing gowns when going between patients. True hand hygiene was also difficult, as health care workers did not want to completely remove gloves while in the patient care area. Layering of 2 pairs of gloves allowed the outer gloves to be removed after care of each patient, at which time alcohol gel was applied to the inner gloves, a new gown was placed over the existing gown, and a new pair of gloves was layered on top.

Although patients were intubated for long periods in the PACU-ICU, there was concern for increased risk of exposure of health care workers after extubation given the inability to contain the coughing patients within a private room. If a patient did well, they were transferred to a private room on the general medical floors within 24 hours of extubation to minimize this risk.

Privacy

The open care design meant less privacy for patients than would be provided in a private room. Curtains were drawn around patient beds as much as possible, especially for nursing care, but priority was given to visualization of the ventilator when a HCP was not present to ensure safety at all times. The majority of patients cared for in the PACU-ICU were intubated and sedated on arrival, but thankfully many were extubated. After extubation privacy in the open care area became more of an issue and may have led to more nighttime disturbances and substandard delirium prevention measures. Priority was given to expediting the transfer of these patients to private rooms on the general medical floor once their respiratory status was deemed stable.

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic is truly an unprecedented event in our nation’s history, which has led to the first nationwide authorization of the fourth mission of VA to provide support for national, state, and local public health. The PACU-ICU was designed, engineered, built, and staffed by perioperative HCPs through an exceptional multidisciplinary effort in a matter of days. Through this dedication of health care workers and staff, the VAAAHS was able to care for critically ill veterans from Southeast Michigan and serve the community during a time of overwhelming demand on the national health care system.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the outstanding team of administrators, engineers, physical therapists, pharmacists, nurses, advanced practice providers, CRNAs, respiratory therapists, and physicians who made it possible to respond to our veterans’ and our community’s needs in a time of unprecedented demand on our health care system. A special thank you to Eric Deters, Chief Strategy Officer; Brittany McClure, ICU Nurse Manager; and Mark Dotson, Chief Supply Chain Officer. It was a privilege to serve on this mission together.

Over the last several decades science has fallen off this country’s radar screen. Yes, STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) has recently had a brief moment in the spotlight as a buzzword de jour. But the critical importance of careful and systematic investigation into the world around us using observation and trial and error is a tough sell to a large segment of our population.

SDI Productions/iStock/Getty Images

The COVID-19 pandemic is providing an excellent opportunity for science and medicine to showcase their star qualities. Of course some people in leadership positions persist in disregarding the value of scientific investigation. But I get the feeling that the fear generated by the pandemic is creating some converts among many previous science skeptics. This gathering enthusiasm among the general population is a predictably slow process because that’s the way science works. It often doesn’t provide quick answers. And it is difficult for the nonscientist to see the beauty in the reality that the things we thought were true 2 months ago are likely to be proven wrong today as more observations accumulate.

Unfortunately, even in this time of renewal, science and medicine continue to generate a bumper crop of bad apples. A recent New York Times article examines the career of one such unscrupulous physician/scientist whose recent exploits threaten to undo much of the positive image the pandemic has cast on science (“The Doctor Behind the Disputed Covid Data,” by Ellen Gabler and Roni Caryn Rabin, The New York Times, July 27, 2020). The subject of the article is the physician who was responsible for providing some of the large data sets on which several papers were published about the apparent ineffectiveness and danger of using hydroxychloroquine in COVID-19 patients. The authenticity of the data sets recently has been seriously questioned, and the articles have been retracted by the journals in which they had appeared.

Based on numerous interviews with coworkers, the Times reporters present a strong case that this individual’s long history of unreliability make his association with allegedly fraudulent data set not surprising but maybe even predictable. At one point in his training, there appears to have been serious questions about advancing the physician to the next level. Despite these concerns, he was allowed to continue and complete his specialty training. It is of note that in his last year of clinical practice, the physician became the subject of three serious malpractice claims that question his competence.

I suspect that some of you have crossed paths with physicians whose competence and/or moral character you found concerning. Were they peers? Were you the individual’s supervisor or was he or she your mentor? How did you respond? Did anyone respond at all?

There has been a lot written and said in recent months about how and when to respond to respond to sexual harassment in the workplace. But I don’t recall reading any articles that discuss how one should respond to incompetence. Of course competency can be a relative term, but in most cases significant incompetence is hard to miss because it tends to be repeated.

It is easy for the airports and subway systems to post signs that say “If you see something say something.” It’s a different story for hospitals and medical schools that may have systems in place for reporting and following up on poor practice. But my sense is that there are too many cases that slip through the cracks.

This is another example of a problem for which I don’t have a solution. However, if this column prompts just one of you who sees something to say something then I have had a good day.
 

Dr. Wilkoff practiced primary care pediatrics in Brunswick, Maine, for nearly 40 years. He has authored several books on behavioral pediatrics, including “How to Say No to Your Toddler.” Email him at pdnews@mdedge.com.

Over the last several decades science has fallen off this country’s radar screen. Yes, STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) has recently had a brief moment in the spotlight as a buzzword de jour. But the critical importance of careful and systematic investigation into the world around us using observation and trial and error is a tough sell to a large segment of our population.

SDI Productions/iStock/Getty Images

The COVID-19 pandemic is providing an excellent opportunity for science and medicine to showcase their star qualities. Of course some people in leadership positions persist in disregarding the value of scientific investigation. But I get the feeling that the fear generated by the pandemic is creating some converts among many previous science skeptics. This gathering enthusiasm among the general population is a predictably slow process because that’s the way science works. It often doesn’t provide quick answers. And it is difficult for the nonscientist to see the beauty in the reality that the things we thought were true 2 months ago are likely to be proven wrong today as more observations accumulate.

Unfortunately, even in this time of renewal, science and medicine continue to generate a bumper crop of bad apples. A recent New York Times article examines the career of one such unscrupulous physician/scientist whose recent exploits threaten to undo much of the positive image the pandemic has cast on science (“The Doctor Behind the Disputed Covid Data,” by Ellen Gabler and Roni Caryn Rabin, The New York Times, July 27, 2020). The subject of the article is the physician who was responsible for providing some of the large data sets on which several papers were published about the apparent ineffectiveness and danger of using hydroxychloroquine in COVID-19 patients. The authenticity of the data sets recently has been seriously questioned, and the articles have been retracted by the journals in which they had appeared.

Based on numerous interviews with coworkers, the Times reporters present a strong case that this individual’s long history of unreliability make his association with allegedly fraudulent data set not surprising but maybe even predictable. At one point in his training, there appears to have been serious questions about advancing the physician to the next level. Despite these concerns, he was allowed to continue and complete his specialty training. It is of note that in his last year of clinical practice, the physician became the subject of three serious malpractice claims that question his competence.

I suspect that some of you have crossed paths with physicians whose competence and/or moral character you found concerning. Were they peers? Were you the individual’s supervisor or was he or she your mentor? How did you respond? Did anyone respond at all?

There has been a lot written and said in recent months about how and when to respond to respond to sexual harassment in the workplace. But I don’t recall reading any articles that discuss how one should respond to incompetence. Of course competency can be a relative term, but in most cases significant incompetence is hard to miss because it tends to be repeated.

It is easy for the airports and subway systems to post signs that say “If you see something say something.” It’s a different story for hospitals and medical schools that may have systems in place for reporting and following up on poor practice. But my sense is that there are too many cases that slip through the cracks.

This is another example of a problem for which I don’t have a solution. However, if this column prompts just one of you who sees something to say something then I have had a good day.
 

Dr. Wilkoff practiced primary care pediatrics in Brunswick, Maine, for nearly 40 years. He has authored several books on behavioral pediatrics, including “How to Say No to Your Toddler.” Email him at pdnews@mdedge.com.

Over the last several decades science has fallen off this country’s radar screen. Yes, STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) has recently had a brief moment in the spotlight as a buzzword de jour. But the critical importance of careful and systematic investigation into the world around us using observation and trial and error is a tough sell to a large segment of our population.

SDI Productions/iStock/Getty Images

The COVID-19 pandemic is providing an excellent opportunity for science and medicine to showcase their star qualities. Of course some people in leadership positions persist in disregarding the value of scientific investigation. But I get the feeling that the fear generated by the pandemic is creating some converts among many previous science skeptics. This gathering enthusiasm among the general population is a predictably slow process because that’s the way science works. It often doesn’t provide quick answers. And it is difficult for the nonscientist to see the beauty in the reality that the things we thought were true 2 months ago are likely to be proven wrong today as more observations accumulate.

Unfortunately, even in this time of renewal, science and medicine continue to generate a bumper crop of bad apples. A recent New York Times article examines the career of one such unscrupulous physician/scientist whose recent exploits threaten to undo much of the positive image the pandemic has cast on science (“The Doctor Behind the Disputed Covid Data,” by Ellen Gabler and Roni Caryn Rabin, The New York Times, July 27, 2020). The subject of the article is the physician who was responsible for providing some of the large data sets on which several papers were published about the apparent ineffectiveness and danger of using hydroxychloroquine in COVID-19 patients. The authenticity of the data sets recently has been seriously questioned, and the articles have been retracted by the journals in which they had appeared.

Based on numerous interviews with coworkers, the Times reporters present a strong case that this individual’s long history of unreliability make his association with allegedly fraudulent data set not surprising but maybe even predictable. At one point in his training, there appears to have been serious questions about advancing the physician to the next level. Despite these concerns, he was allowed to continue and complete his specialty training. It is of note that in his last year of clinical practice, the physician became the subject of three serious malpractice claims that question his competence.

I suspect that some of you have crossed paths with physicians whose competence and/or moral character you found concerning. Were they peers? Were you the individual’s supervisor or was he or she your mentor? How did you respond? Did anyone respond at all?

There has been a lot written and said in recent months about how and when to respond to respond to sexual harassment in the workplace. But I don’t recall reading any articles that discuss how one should respond to incompetence. Of course competency can be a relative term, but in most cases significant incompetence is hard to miss because it tends to be repeated.

It is easy for the airports and subway systems to post signs that say “If you see something say something.” It’s a different story for hospitals and medical schools that may have systems in place for reporting and following up on poor practice. But my sense is that there are too many cases that slip through the cracks.

This is another example of a problem for which I don’t have a solution. However, if this column prompts just one of you who sees something to say something then I have had a good day.
 

Dr. Wilkoff practiced primary care pediatrics in Brunswick, Maine, for nearly 40 years. He has authored several books on behavioral pediatrics, including “How to Say No to Your Toddler.” Email him at pdnews@mdedge.com.

From the Department of Medicine, Division of Cardiology, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL.

Abstract

Objective: To review selected process-of-care interventions that can be applied both during the hospitalization and during the transitional care period to help address the persistent challenge of heart failure readmissions.

Methods: Review of the literature.

Results: Process-of-care interventions that can be implemented to reduce readmissions of heart failure patients include: accurately identifying heart failure patients; providing disease education; titrating guideline-directed medical therapy; ensuring discharge readiness; arranging close discharge follow-up; identifying and addressing social barriers; following up by telephone; using home health; and addressing comorbidities. Importantly, the heart failure hospitalization is an opportunity to set up outpatient success, and setting up feedback loops can aid in post-discharge monitoring.

Conclusion: We encourage teams to consider local capabilities when selecting processes to improve; begin by improving something small to build capacity and team morale, and continually iterate and reexamine processes, as health care systems are continually evolving.

Keywords: heart failure; process improvement; quality improvement; readmission; rehospitalization; transitional care.

The growing population of patients affected by heart failure continues to challenge health systems. The increasing prevalence is paralleled by the rising costs of managing heart failure, which are projected to grow from $30.7 billion in 2012 to $69.8 billion in 2030.¹ A significant portion of these costs relate to readmission after an index heart failure hospitalization. The statistics are staggering: for patients hospitalized with heart failure, approximately 15% to 20% are readmitted within 30 days.^2,3 Though recent temporal trends suggest a modest reduction in readmission rates, there is a concerning correlation with increasing mortality,³ and a recognition that readmission rate decreases may relate to subtle changes in coding-based risk adjustment.⁴ Despite these concerns, efforts to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization command significant attention.

Process improvement methodologies may be helpful in reducing hospital readmissions. Various approaches have been employed, and results have been mixed. An analysis of 70 participating hospitals in the American Heart Association’s Get With the Guidelines initiative found that, while overall readmission rates declined by 1.0% over 3 years, only 1 hospital achieved a 20% reduction in readmission rates.⁵

It is notably difficult to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization. One challenge is that patients with heart failure often have multiple comorbidities, and approximately 50% to 60% of 30-day readmissions after heart failure hospitalization arise from noncardiac causes.¹ Another challenge is that a significant fraction of readmissions in general—perhaps 75%—may not be avoidable.⁶

Recent excellent systematic reviews and meta-analyses provide comprehensive overviews of process improvement strategies that can be used to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalizations.^7-9 Yet despite this extensive knowledge, few reports discuss the process of actually implementing these changes: the process of process improvement. Here, we seek to not only highlight some of the most promising potential interventions to reduce heart failure readmissions, but also to discuss a process improvement framework to help engender success, using our experience as a case study. We schematize process improvement efforts as having several distinct phases (Figure 1): processes delivered during the hospitalization and prior to discharge; feedback loops set up to maintain clinical stability at home; and the postdischarge clinic visit as an opportunity to further stabilize the patient and advance the plan of care. The discussion of these interventions follows this organization.

During Hospitalization

The heart failure hospitalization can be used as an opportunity to set up outpatient success, with several goals to target during the index admission. One goal is identifying the root causes of the heart failure syndrome and correcting those root causes, if possible. For example, patients in whom the heart failure syndrome is secondary to valvular heart disease may benefit from transcatheter aortic valve replacement.¹⁰ Another clinical goal is decongesting the patient, which is associated with lower readmission rates.^11,12 These goals focus on the medical aspects of heart failure care. However, beyond these medical aspects, a patient must be equipped to successfully manage the disease at home.

To support medical and nonmedical interventions for hospitalized heart failure patients, a critical first step is identifying patients with heart failure. This accomplishes at least 2 objectives. First, early identification allows early initiation of interventions, such as heart failure education and social work evaluation. Early initiation of these interventions allows sufficient time during the hospitalization to make meaningful progress on these fronts. Second, early identification allows an opportunity for the delivery of cardiology specialty care, which may help with identifying and correcting root causes of the heart failure syndrome. Such access to cardiology has been shown to improve inpatient mortality and readmission rates.¹³

In smaller hospitals, identification of patients with heart failure can be as simple as reviewing overnight admissions. More advanced strategies, such as screeners based on brain natriuretic peptide (BNP) levels and administration of intravenous diuretics, can be employed.^14,15 In the near future, deep learning-based natural language processing will be applied to mine full-text data in the electronic health record to identify heart failure hospitalizations.¹⁶

In the hospital, patients can also receive education about heart failure disease management. This education is a cornerstone of reducing heart failure readmissions. A recent systematic review of nurse education interventions demonstrated reductions in readmissions, hospitalizations, and costs.¹⁷ However, the efficacy of heart failure education hinges on many other variables. For patients to adhere to water restriction and daily weights, for example, there must also be patient understanding, compliance, and accessibility to providers to recommend how to strike the fluid balance. Education is therefore necessary, but not sufficient, for setting up outpatient success.

The hospitalization also represents an important time to start or uptitrate guideline-directed medical therapy (GDMT) for heart failure. Doing so takes advantage of an important opportunity to reduce the risk of readmission and even reverse the disease process.¹⁸ Uptitration of GDMT in patients with heart failure with reduced ejection fraction is associated with a decreased risk of mortality, while discontinuation is associated with an increased risk of mortality.¹⁹ However, recent registry data indicate that intensity of GDMT is just as likely to be decreased as increased during the hospitalization.²⁰ Nevertheless, predischarge initiation of medications may be associated with higher attained doses in follow-up.²¹

Preparing for Discharge

Preparing a patient for discharge after a heart failure hospitalization involves stabilizing the medical condition as well as ensuring that the patient and caregivers have the medication, equipment, and self-care resources at home necessary to manage the condition. Several frameworks have been put forth to help care teams analyze a patient’s readiness for discharge. One is the B-PREPARED score,²² a validated instrument to discriminate among patients with regard to their readiness to discharge from the hospital. This instrument highlights the importance of several key factors that should be addressed during the discharge process, including counseling and written instructions about medications and their side effects; information about equipment needs and community resources; and information on activity levels and restrictions. Nurse education and discharge coordination can improve patients’ perception of discharge readiness,²³ although whether this discharge readiness translates into improved readmission rates appears to depend on the specific follow-up intervention design.⁹

Prior to discharge, it is important to arrange postdischarge follow-up appointments, as emphasized by the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association (ACC/AHA) guidelines.²⁴ The use of nurse navigators can help with planning follow-up appointments. For example, the ACC Patient Navigator Program was applied in a single-center study of 120 patients randomized to the program versus usual care.²⁵ This study found a significant increase in patient education and follow-up appointments compared to usual care, and a numerical decrease in hospital readmissions, although the finding was not statistically significant.²⁵

A third critical component of preparing for discharge is identifying and addressing social barriers to care. In a study of patients stratified by household income, patients in the lowest income quartile had a higher readmission rate than patients in the highest income quartile.²⁶ Poverty also correlates with heart failure mortality.²⁷ Social factors play an important role in many aspects of patients’ ability to manage their health, including self-care, medication adherence, and ability to follow-up. Identifying these social factors prior to discharge is the first step to addressing them. While few studies specifically address the role of social workers in the management of heart failure care, the general medical literature suggests that social workers embedded in transitional care teams can augment readmission reduction efforts.²⁸

After Discharge

Patients recently discharged from the hospital who have not yet attended their postdischarge appointment are in an incredibly vulnerable phase of care. Patients who are discharged from the hospital may not yet be connected with outpatient care. During this initial transitional care period, feedback loops involving patient communication back to the clinic, and clinic communication back to the patient, are critical to helping patients remain stable. For example, consider monitoring weights daily after hospital discharge. A patient at home can report increasing weights to a provider, who can then recommend an increased dose of diuretic. The patient can complete the feedback loop by taking the extra medication and monitoring the return of weight back to normal.

While daily weight monitoring is a simple process improvement that relies on the principle of establishing feedback loops, many other strategies exist. One commonly employed tool is the postdischarge telephone follow-up call, which is often coupled with other interventions in a comprehensive care bundle.⁸ During the telephone call, several process-of-care defects can be corrected, including missing medications or missing information on appointment times.

Beyond the telephone, newer technologies show promise for helping develop feedback loops for patients at home. One such technology is telemonitoring, whereby physiologic information such as weight, heart rate, and blood pressure is collected and sent back to a monitoring center. While the principle holds promise, several studies have not demonstrated significantly different outcomes as compared to usual care.^13,29 Another promising technology is the CardioMEMS device (Abbott, Inc., Atlanta, GA), which can remotely transmit the pulmonary artery pressure, a physiologic signal which correlates with volume overload. There is now strong evidence supporting the efficacy of pulmonary artery pressure–guided heart failure management.^30,31

Finally, home visits can be an efficient way to communicate symptoms, enable clinical assessment, and provide recommendations. One program that implemented home visits, 24-hour nurses available by call, and telephone follow-up showed a statistically significant reduction in readmissions.³² Furthermore, a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials comparing home health to usual care showed decreased readmissions and mortality.³³ The efficacy may be in strengthening the feedback loop—home care improves compliance with weight monitoring, fluid restriction, and medications.³⁴ These studies provide a strong rationale for the benefits of home health in stabilizing heart failure patients postdischarge. Indeed, nurse home visits were 1 of the 2 process interventions in a Cochrane review of randomized controlled trials that were shown to statistically significantly decrease readmissions and mortality.⁹ These data underscore the importance of feedback loops for helping ensure patients are clinically stable.

Postdischarge Follow-Up Clinic Visit

The first clinic appointment postdischarge is an important check-in to help advance patient care. Several key tasks can be achieved during the postdischarge visit. First, the patient can be clinically stabilized by adjusting diuretic therapy. If the patient is clinically stable, GDMT can be uptitrated. Second, education around symptoms, medications, diet, and exercise can be reinforced. Finally, clinicians can help connect patients to other members of the multidisciplinary care team, including specialist care, home health, or cardiac rehabilitation.

Achieving 7-day follow-up visits after discharge has been a point of emphasis in national guidelines.²⁴ The ACC promotes a “See You in 7” challenge, advising that all patients discharged with a diagnosis of heart failure have a follow-up appointment within 7 days. Yet based on the latest available data, arrival rates to the postdischarge clinic are dismal, hovering around 30%.³⁵ In a multicenter observational study of hospitals participating in the “See You in 7” collaborative, hospitals were able to increase their 7-day follow-up appointment rates by 2% to 3%, and also noted an absolute decrease in readmission rates by 1% to 2%.³⁶ We have demonstrated, using a mathematical approach called queuing theory, that discharge appointment wait times and clinic access can be significantly improved by providing a modest capacity buffer to clinic availability.³⁷ Those interested in applying this model to their own clinical practice may do so with a free online calculator at http://hfresearch.org.

Another important aspect of postdischarge follow-up is appropriate management of the comorbidity burden, which, as noted, is often significant in patients hospitalized with heart failure.³⁸ For instance, in recent cohorts of hospitalized heart failure patients, the incidence of hypertension was 78%, coronary artery disease was more than 50%, atrial fibrillation was more than 40%, and diabetes was nearly 40%.³⁹ Given this burden of comorbidity, it is not surprising that only 35% of readmissions after an index heart failure hospitalization are for recurrent heart failure.⁴⁰ Coordinating care among primary care physicians and relevant subspecialists is thus essential. Phone calls and secure electronic messages are very helpful in achieving this. There is increasing interest in more nimble care models, such as the patient-centered specialty practice⁴¹ or the dyspnea clinic, to help bring coordinated resources to the patient.⁴²

Process of Process Improvement: Our Experiences

The previous sections outline a series of potential process improvements clinical teams and health systems can implement to impact heart failure readmissions. A plan on paper, however, does not equal a plan in actuality. How does one go about implementing these changes? We offer our local experience starting a heart failure transitional care program as a case study, then draw lessons learned as a set of practical tips for local teams to employ. What we hope to highlight is that there is a large difference between a completed process for transitional care of heart failure patients, and the process of developing that process itself. The former is the hardware, the latter is the software. The latter does not typically get highlighted, but it is absolutely critical to unlocking the capabilities of a team and the institution.

In 2015, Northwestern Memorial Hospital adopted a novel payment arrangement from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services for Medicare patients being discharged from the hospital with heart failure. Known as Bundled Payments for Care Improvement,⁴³ this bundled payment model incentivized Northwestern Memorial Hospital charge, principally by reducing hospital readmissions and by collaborating with skilled nursing facilities to control length of stay.

We approached this problem by drawing on the available literature,^44,45 and by first creating a schematic of our high-level approach, which comprised 3 major elements (Figure 2): identification of hospitalized heart failure patients, delivery of a care bundle to hospitalized heart failure patients in hospital, and coordinating postdischarge care, centered on a telephone call and a postdischarge visit.

We then proceeded by building out, in stepwise fashion, each component of our value chain, using Agile techniques as a guiding principle.⁴⁶ Agile, a productivity and process improvement mindset with roots in software development, emphasizes tackling 1 problem at a time, building out new features sequentially and completely, recognizing that the end user does not derive value from a program until new functionality is available for use. Rather than wholesale monolithic change, Agile emphasizes rapid iteration, prototyping, and discarding innovations not found to be helpful. The notion is to stand up new, incremental features rapidly, with each incremental improvement delivering value and helping to accelerate overall change.

Our experience building a robust way to identify heart failure cases is a good example of Agile process improvement in practice. At our hospital, identification of patients with heart failure was a challenge because more than half of heart failure patients are admitted to noncardiology floors. We developed a simple electronic health record query to detect heart failure patients, relying on parameters such as administration of intravenous diuretic or levels of BNP exceeding 100 ng/dL. We deployed this query, finding very high sensitivity for detection of heart failure patients.¹⁴ Patients found to have heart failure were then populated into a list in the electronic health record, which made patients’ heart failure status visible to all members of the health care team. Using this list, we were able to automate several processes necessary for heart failure care. For example, the list made it possible for cardiologists to know if there was a patient who perhaps needed cardiology consultation. Nurse navigators could know which patients needed heart failure education without having to be actively consulted by the admitting team. The same nurse navigators could then know upon discharge which patients needed a follow-up telephone call at 48 hours.

This list of heart failure patients was the end product, which was built through prototyping and iteration. For example, with our initial BNP cutoff of 300 ng/dL, we recognized we were missing several cases, and lowered the cutoff for the screener to 100 ng/dL. When we were satisfied this process was working well, we moved on to the next problem to tackle, avoiding trying to work on too many things at once. By doing so, we were able to focus our process improvement resources on 1 problem at a time, building up a suite of interventions. For our hospital, we settled on a bundle of interventions, captured by the mnemonic HEART:

Heart doctor sees patient in the hospital

Education about heart failure in the hospital

After-visit summary with 7-day appointment printed

Reach out to the patient by telephone within 72 hours

Treat the patient in clinic by the 7-day visit

Conclusion

We would like to emphasize that the elements of our heart failure readmissions interventions were not all put in place at once. This was an iterative process that proceeded in a stepwise fashion, with each step improving the care of our patients. We learned a number of lessons from our experience. First, we would advise that teams not try to do everything. One program simply cannot implement all possible readmission reduction interventions, and certainly not all at once. Trade-offs should be made, and interventions more likely to succeed in the local environment should be prioritized. In addition, interventions that do not fit and do not create synergy with the local practice environment should not be pursued.

Second, we would advise teams to start small, tackling a known problem in heart failure transitions of care first. This initial intuition is often right. An example might be improving 7-day appointments upon discharge. Starting with a problem that can be tackled builds process improvement muscle and improves team morale. Third, we would advise teams to consistently iterate on designs, tweaking and improving performance. Complex organizations always evolve; processes that work 1 year may fail the next because another element of the organization may have changed.

Finally, the framework presented in Figure 1 may be helpful in guiding how to structure interventions. Considering interventions to be delivered in the hospital, interventions to be delivered in the clinic, and how to set up feedback loops to support patients as outpatients help develop a comprehensive heart failure readmissions reduction program.

Corresponding author: R. Kannan Mutharasan, MD, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, 676 North Saint Clair St., Arkes Pavilion, Suite 7-038, Chicago, IL 60611;kannanm@northwestern.edu.

Financial disclosures: None.

From the Department of Medicine, Division of Cardiology, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL.

Abstract

Objective: To review selected process-of-care interventions that can be applied both during the hospitalization and during the transitional care period to help address the persistent challenge of heart failure readmissions.

Methods: Review of the literature.

Results: Process-of-care interventions that can be implemented to reduce readmissions of heart failure patients include: accurately identifying heart failure patients; providing disease education; titrating guideline-directed medical therapy; ensuring discharge readiness; arranging close discharge follow-up; identifying and addressing social barriers; following up by telephone; using home health; and addressing comorbidities. Importantly, the heart failure hospitalization is an opportunity to set up outpatient success, and setting up feedback loops can aid in post-discharge monitoring.

Conclusion: We encourage teams to consider local capabilities when selecting processes to improve; begin by improving something small to build capacity and team morale, and continually iterate and reexamine processes, as health care systems are continually evolving.

Keywords: heart failure; process improvement; quality improvement; readmission; rehospitalization; transitional care.

The growing population of patients affected by heart failure continues to challenge health systems. The increasing prevalence is paralleled by the rising costs of managing heart failure, which are projected to grow from $30.7 billion in 2012 to $69.8 billion in 2030.¹ A significant portion of these costs relate to readmission after an index heart failure hospitalization. The statistics are staggering: for patients hospitalized with heart failure, approximately 15% to 20% are readmitted within 30 days.^2,3 Though recent temporal trends suggest a modest reduction in readmission rates, there is a concerning correlation with increasing mortality,³ and a recognition that readmission rate decreases may relate to subtle changes in coding-based risk adjustment.⁴ Despite these concerns, efforts to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization command significant attention.

Process improvement methodologies may be helpful in reducing hospital readmissions. Various approaches have been employed, and results have been mixed. An analysis of 70 participating hospitals in the American Heart Association’s Get With the Guidelines initiative found that, while overall readmission rates declined by 1.0% over 3 years, only 1 hospital achieved a 20% reduction in readmission rates.⁵

It is notably difficult to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization. One challenge is that patients with heart failure often have multiple comorbidities, and approximately 50% to 60% of 30-day readmissions after heart failure hospitalization arise from noncardiac causes.¹ Another challenge is that a significant fraction of readmissions in general—perhaps 75%—may not be avoidable.⁶

Recent excellent systematic reviews and meta-analyses provide comprehensive overviews of process improvement strategies that can be used to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalizations.^7-9 Yet despite this extensive knowledge, few reports discuss the process of actually implementing these changes: the process of process improvement. Here, we seek to not only highlight some of the most promising potential interventions to reduce heart failure readmissions, but also to discuss a process improvement framework to help engender success, using our experience as a case study. We schematize process improvement efforts as having several distinct phases (Figure 1): processes delivered during the hospitalization and prior to discharge; feedback loops set up to maintain clinical stability at home; and the postdischarge clinic visit as an opportunity to further stabilize the patient and advance the plan of care. The discussion of these interventions follows this organization.

During Hospitalization

The heart failure hospitalization can be used as an opportunity to set up outpatient success, with several goals to target during the index admission. One goal is identifying the root causes of the heart failure syndrome and correcting those root causes, if possible. For example, patients in whom the heart failure syndrome is secondary to valvular heart disease may benefit from transcatheter aortic valve replacement.¹⁰ Another clinical goal is decongesting the patient, which is associated with lower readmission rates.^11,12 These goals focus on the medical aspects of heart failure care. However, beyond these medical aspects, a patient must be equipped to successfully manage the disease at home.

To support medical and nonmedical interventions for hospitalized heart failure patients, a critical first step is identifying patients with heart failure. This accomplishes at least 2 objectives. First, early identification allows early initiation of interventions, such as heart failure education and social work evaluation. Early initiation of these interventions allows sufficient time during the hospitalization to make meaningful progress on these fronts. Second, early identification allows an opportunity for the delivery of cardiology specialty care, which may help with identifying and correcting root causes of the heart failure syndrome. Such access to cardiology has been shown to improve inpatient mortality and readmission rates.¹³

In smaller hospitals, identification of patients with heart failure can be as simple as reviewing overnight admissions. More advanced strategies, such as screeners based on brain natriuretic peptide (BNP) levels and administration of intravenous diuretics, can be employed.^14,15 In the near future, deep learning-based natural language processing will be applied to mine full-text data in the electronic health record to identify heart failure hospitalizations.¹⁶

In the hospital, patients can also receive education about heart failure disease management. This education is a cornerstone of reducing heart failure readmissions. A recent systematic review of nurse education interventions demonstrated reductions in readmissions, hospitalizations, and costs.¹⁷ However, the efficacy of heart failure education hinges on many other variables. For patients to adhere to water restriction and daily weights, for example, there must also be patient understanding, compliance, and accessibility to providers to recommend how to strike the fluid balance. Education is therefore necessary, but not sufficient, for setting up outpatient success.

The hospitalization also represents an important time to start or uptitrate guideline-directed medical therapy (GDMT) for heart failure. Doing so takes advantage of an important opportunity to reduce the risk of readmission and even reverse the disease process.¹⁸ Uptitration of GDMT in patients with heart failure with reduced ejection fraction is associated with a decreased risk of mortality, while discontinuation is associated with an increased risk of mortality.¹⁹ However, recent registry data indicate that intensity of GDMT is just as likely to be decreased as increased during the hospitalization.²⁰ Nevertheless, predischarge initiation of medications may be associated with higher attained doses in follow-up.²¹

Preparing for Discharge

Preparing a patient for discharge after a heart failure hospitalization involves stabilizing the medical condition as well as ensuring that the patient and caregivers have the medication, equipment, and self-care resources at home necessary to manage the condition. Several frameworks have been put forth to help care teams analyze a patient’s readiness for discharge. One is the B-PREPARED score,²² a validated instrument to discriminate among patients with regard to their readiness to discharge from the hospital. This instrument highlights the importance of several key factors that should be addressed during the discharge process, including counseling and written instructions about medications and their side effects; information about equipment needs and community resources; and information on activity levels and restrictions. Nurse education and discharge coordination can improve patients’ perception of discharge readiness,²³ although whether this discharge readiness translates into improved readmission rates appears to depend on the specific follow-up intervention design.⁹

Prior to discharge, it is important to arrange postdischarge follow-up appointments, as emphasized by the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association (ACC/AHA) guidelines.²⁴ The use of nurse navigators can help with planning follow-up appointments. For example, the ACC Patient Navigator Program was applied in a single-center study of 120 patients randomized to the program versus usual care.²⁵ This study found a significant increase in patient education and follow-up appointments compared to usual care, and a numerical decrease in hospital readmissions, although the finding was not statistically significant.²⁵

A third critical component of preparing for discharge is identifying and addressing social barriers to care. In a study of patients stratified by household income, patients in the lowest income quartile had a higher readmission rate than patients in the highest income quartile.²⁶ Poverty also correlates with heart failure mortality.²⁷ Social factors play an important role in many aspects of patients’ ability to manage their health, including self-care, medication adherence, and ability to follow-up. Identifying these social factors prior to discharge is the first step to addressing them. While few studies specifically address the role of social workers in the management of heart failure care, the general medical literature suggests that social workers embedded in transitional care teams can augment readmission reduction efforts.²⁸

After Discharge

Patients recently discharged from the hospital who have not yet attended their postdischarge appointment are in an incredibly vulnerable phase of care. Patients who are discharged from the hospital may not yet be connected with outpatient care. During this initial transitional care period, feedback loops involving patient communication back to the clinic, and clinic communication back to the patient, are critical to helping patients remain stable. For example, consider monitoring weights daily after hospital discharge. A patient at home can report increasing weights to a provider, who can then recommend an increased dose of diuretic. The patient can complete the feedback loop by taking the extra medication and monitoring the return of weight back to normal.

While daily weight monitoring is a simple process improvement that relies on the principle of establishing feedback loops, many other strategies exist. One commonly employed tool is the postdischarge telephone follow-up call, which is often coupled with other interventions in a comprehensive care bundle.⁸ During the telephone call, several process-of-care defects can be corrected, including missing medications or missing information on appointment times.

Beyond the telephone, newer technologies show promise for helping develop feedback loops for patients at home. One such technology is telemonitoring, whereby physiologic information such as weight, heart rate, and blood pressure is collected and sent back to a monitoring center. While the principle holds promise, several studies have not demonstrated significantly different outcomes as compared to usual care.^13,29 Another promising technology is the CardioMEMS device (Abbott, Inc., Atlanta, GA), which can remotely transmit the pulmonary artery pressure, a physiologic signal which correlates with volume overload. There is now strong evidence supporting the efficacy of pulmonary artery pressure–guided heart failure management.^30,31

Finally, home visits can be an efficient way to communicate symptoms, enable clinical assessment, and provide recommendations. One program that implemented home visits, 24-hour nurses available by call, and telephone follow-up showed a statistically significant reduction in readmissions.³² Furthermore, a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials comparing home health to usual care showed decreased readmissions and mortality.³³ The efficacy may be in strengthening the feedback loop—home care improves compliance with weight monitoring, fluid restriction, and medications.³⁴ These studies provide a strong rationale for the benefits of home health in stabilizing heart failure patients postdischarge. Indeed, nurse home visits were 1 of the 2 process interventions in a Cochrane review of randomized controlled trials that were shown to statistically significantly decrease readmissions and mortality.⁹ These data underscore the importance of feedback loops for helping ensure patients are clinically stable.

Postdischarge Follow-Up Clinic Visit

The first clinic appointment postdischarge is an important check-in to help advance patient care. Several key tasks can be achieved during the postdischarge visit. First, the patient can be clinically stabilized by adjusting diuretic therapy. If the patient is clinically stable, GDMT can be uptitrated. Second, education around symptoms, medications, diet, and exercise can be reinforced. Finally, clinicians can help connect patients to other members of the multidisciplinary care team, including specialist care, home health, or cardiac rehabilitation.

Achieving 7-day follow-up visits after discharge has been a point of emphasis in national guidelines.²⁴ The ACC promotes a “See You in 7” challenge, advising that all patients discharged with a diagnosis of heart failure have a follow-up appointment within 7 days. Yet based on the latest available data, arrival rates to the postdischarge clinic are dismal, hovering around 30%.³⁵ In a multicenter observational study of hospitals participating in the “See You in 7” collaborative, hospitals were able to increase their 7-day follow-up appointment rates by 2% to 3%, and also noted an absolute decrease in readmission rates by 1% to 2%.³⁶ We have demonstrated, using a mathematical approach called queuing theory, that discharge appointment wait times and clinic access can be significantly improved by providing a modest capacity buffer to clinic availability.³⁷ Those interested in applying this model to their own clinical practice may do so with a free online calculator at http://hfresearch.org.

Another important aspect of postdischarge follow-up is appropriate management of the comorbidity burden, which, as noted, is often significant in patients hospitalized with heart failure.³⁸ For instance, in recent cohorts of hospitalized heart failure patients, the incidence of hypertension was 78%, coronary artery disease was more than 50%, atrial fibrillation was more than 40%, and diabetes was nearly 40%.³⁹ Given this burden of comorbidity, it is not surprising that only 35% of readmissions after an index heart failure hospitalization are for recurrent heart failure.⁴⁰ Coordinating care among primary care physicians and relevant subspecialists is thus essential. Phone calls and secure electronic messages are very helpful in achieving this. There is increasing interest in more nimble care models, such as the patient-centered specialty practice⁴¹ or the dyspnea clinic, to help bring coordinated resources to the patient.⁴²

Process of Process Improvement: Our Experiences

The previous sections outline a series of potential process improvements clinical teams and health systems can implement to impact heart failure readmissions. A plan on paper, however, does not equal a plan in actuality. How does one go about implementing these changes? We offer our local experience starting a heart failure transitional care program as a case study, then draw lessons learned as a set of practical tips for local teams to employ. What we hope to highlight is that there is a large difference between a completed process for transitional care of heart failure patients, and the process of developing that process itself. The former is the hardware, the latter is the software. The latter does not typically get highlighted, but it is absolutely critical to unlocking the capabilities of a team and the institution.

In 2015, Northwestern Memorial Hospital adopted a novel payment arrangement from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services for Medicare patients being discharged from the hospital with heart failure. Known as Bundled Payments for Care Improvement,⁴³ this bundled payment model incentivized Northwestern Memorial Hospital charge, principally by reducing hospital readmissions and by collaborating with skilled nursing facilities to control length of stay.

We approached this problem by drawing on the available literature,^44,45 and by first creating a schematic of our high-level approach, which comprised 3 major elements (Figure 2): identification of hospitalized heart failure patients, delivery of a care bundle to hospitalized heart failure patients in hospital, and coordinating postdischarge care, centered on a telephone call and a postdischarge visit.

We then proceeded by building out, in stepwise fashion, each component of our value chain, using Agile techniques as a guiding principle.⁴⁶ Agile, a productivity and process improvement mindset with roots in software development, emphasizes tackling 1 problem at a time, building out new features sequentially and completely, recognizing that the end user does not derive value from a program until new functionality is available for use. Rather than wholesale monolithic change, Agile emphasizes rapid iteration, prototyping, and discarding innovations not found to be helpful. The notion is to stand up new, incremental features rapidly, with each incremental improvement delivering value and helping to accelerate overall change.

Our experience building a robust way to identify heart failure cases is a good example of Agile process improvement in practice. At our hospital, identification of patients with heart failure was a challenge because more than half of heart failure patients are admitted to noncardiology floors. We developed a simple electronic health record query to detect heart failure patients, relying on parameters such as administration of intravenous diuretic or levels of BNP exceeding 100 ng/dL. We deployed this query, finding very high sensitivity for detection of heart failure patients.¹⁴ Patients found to have heart failure were then populated into a list in the electronic health record, which made patients’ heart failure status visible to all members of the health care team. Using this list, we were able to automate several processes necessary for heart failure care. For example, the list made it possible for cardiologists to know if there was a patient who perhaps needed cardiology consultation. Nurse navigators could know which patients needed heart failure education without having to be actively consulted by the admitting team. The same nurse navigators could then know upon discharge which patients needed a follow-up telephone call at 48 hours.

This list of heart failure patients was the end product, which was built through prototyping and iteration. For example, with our initial BNP cutoff of 300 ng/dL, we recognized we were missing several cases, and lowered the cutoff for the screener to 100 ng/dL. When we were satisfied this process was working well, we moved on to the next problem to tackle, avoiding trying to work on too many things at once. By doing so, we were able to focus our process improvement resources on 1 problem at a time, building up a suite of interventions. For our hospital, we settled on a bundle of interventions, captured by the mnemonic HEART:

Heart doctor sees patient in the hospital

Education about heart failure in the hospital

After-visit summary with 7-day appointment printed

Reach out to the patient by telephone within 72 hours

Treat the patient in clinic by the 7-day visit

Conclusion

We would like to emphasize that the elements of our heart failure readmissions interventions were not all put in place at once. This was an iterative process that proceeded in a stepwise fashion, with each step improving the care of our patients. We learned a number of lessons from our experience. First, we would advise that teams not try to do everything. One program simply cannot implement all possible readmission reduction interventions, and certainly not all at once. Trade-offs should be made, and interventions more likely to succeed in the local environment should be prioritized. In addition, interventions that do not fit and do not create synergy with the local practice environment should not be pursued.

Second, we would advise teams to start small, tackling a known problem in heart failure transitions of care first. This initial intuition is often right. An example might be improving 7-day appointments upon discharge. Starting with a problem that can be tackled builds process improvement muscle and improves team morale. Third, we would advise teams to consistently iterate on designs, tweaking and improving performance. Complex organizations always evolve; processes that work 1 year may fail the next because another element of the organization may have changed.

Finally, the framework presented in Figure 1 may be helpful in guiding how to structure interventions. Considering interventions to be delivered in the hospital, interventions to be delivered in the clinic, and how to set up feedback loops to support patients as outpatients help develop a comprehensive heart failure readmissions reduction program.

Corresponding author: R. Kannan Mutharasan, MD, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, 676 North Saint Clair St., Arkes Pavilion, Suite 7-038, Chicago, IL 60611;kannanm@northwestern.edu.

Financial disclosures: None.

From the Department of Medicine, Division of Cardiology, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL.

Abstract

Objective: To review selected process-of-care interventions that can be applied both during the hospitalization and during the transitional care period to help address the persistent challenge of heart failure readmissions.

Methods: Review of the literature.

Results: Process-of-care interventions that can be implemented to reduce readmissions of heart failure patients include: accurately identifying heart failure patients; providing disease education; titrating guideline-directed medical therapy; ensuring discharge readiness; arranging close discharge follow-up; identifying and addressing social barriers; following up by telephone; using home health; and addressing comorbidities. Importantly, the heart failure hospitalization is an opportunity to set up outpatient success, and setting up feedback loops can aid in post-discharge monitoring.

Conclusion: We encourage teams to consider local capabilities when selecting processes to improve; begin by improving something small to build capacity and team morale, and continually iterate and reexamine processes, as health care systems are continually evolving.

Keywords: heart failure; process improvement; quality improvement; readmission; rehospitalization; transitional care.

The growing population of patients affected by heart failure continues to challenge health systems. The increasing prevalence is paralleled by the rising costs of managing heart failure, which are projected to grow from $30.7 billion in 2012 to $69.8 billion in 2030.¹ A significant portion of these costs relate to readmission after an index heart failure hospitalization. The statistics are staggering: for patients hospitalized with heart failure, approximately 15% to 20% are readmitted within 30 days.^2,3 Though recent temporal trends suggest a modest reduction in readmission rates, there is a concerning correlation with increasing mortality,³ and a recognition that readmission rate decreases may relate to subtle changes in coding-based risk adjustment.⁴ Despite these concerns, efforts to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization command significant attention.

Process improvement methodologies may be helpful in reducing hospital readmissions. Various approaches have been employed, and results have been mixed. An analysis of 70 participating hospitals in the American Heart Association’s Get With the Guidelines initiative found that, while overall readmission rates declined by 1.0% over 3 years, only 1 hospital achieved a 20% reduction in readmission rates.⁵

It is notably difficult to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalization. One challenge is that patients with heart failure often have multiple comorbidities, and approximately 50% to 60% of 30-day readmissions after heart failure hospitalization arise from noncardiac causes.¹ Another challenge is that a significant fraction of readmissions in general—perhaps 75%—may not be avoidable.⁶

Recent excellent systematic reviews and meta-analyses provide comprehensive overviews of process improvement strategies that can be used to reduce readmissions after heart failure hospitalizations.^7-9 Yet despite this extensive knowledge, few reports discuss the process of actually implementing these changes: the process of process improvement. Here, we seek to not only highlight some of the most promising potential interventions to reduce heart failure readmissions, but also to discuss a process improvement framework to help engender success, using our experience as a case study. We schematize process improvement efforts as having several distinct phases (Figure 1): processes delivered during the hospitalization and prior to discharge; feedback loops set up to maintain clinical stability at home; and the postdischarge clinic visit as an opportunity to further stabilize the patient and advance the plan of care. The discussion of these interventions follows this organization.

During Hospitalization

The heart failure hospitalization can be used as an opportunity to set up outpatient success, with several goals to target during the index admission. One goal is identifying the root causes of the heart failure syndrome and correcting those root causes, if possible. For example, patients in whom the heart failure syndrome is secondary to valvular heart disease may benefit from transcatheter aortic valve replacement.¹⁰ Another clinical goal is decongesting the patient, which is associated with lower readmission rates.^11,12 These goals focus on the medical aspects of heart failure care. However, beyond these medical aspects, a patient must be equipped to successfully manage the disease at home.

To support medical and nonmedical interventions for hospitalized heart failure patients, a critical first step is identifying patients with heart failure. This accomplishes at least 2 objectives. First, early identification allows early initiation of interventions, such as heart failure education and social work evaluation. Early initiation of these interventions allows sufficient time during the hospitalization to make meaningful progress on these fronts. Second, early identification allows an opportunity for the delivery of cardiology specialty care, which may help with identifying and correcting root causes of the heart failure syndrome. Such access to cardiology has been shown to improve inpatient mortality and readmission rates.¹³

In smaller hospitals, identification of patients with heart failure can be as simple as reviewing overnight admissions. More advanced strategies, such as screeners based on brain natriuretic peptide (BNP) levels and administration of intravenous diuretics, can be employed.^14,15 In the near future, deep learning-based natural language processing will be applied to mine full-text data in the electronic health record to identify heart failure hospitalizations.¹⁶

In the hospital, patients can also receive education about heart failure disease management. This education is a cornerstone of reducing heart failure readmissions. A recent systematic review of nurse education interventions demonstrated reductions in readmissions, hospitalizations, and costs.¹⁷ However, the efficacy of heart failure education hinges on many other variables. For patients to adhere to water restriction and daily weights, for example, there must also be patient understanding, compliance, and accessibility to providers to recommend how to strike the fluid balance. Education is therefore necessary, but not sufficient, for setting up outpatient success.

The hospitalization also represents an important time to start or uptitrate guideline-directed medical therapy (GDMT) for heart failure. Doing so takes advantage of an important opportunity to reduce the risk of readmission and even reverse the disease process.¹⁸ Uptitration of GDMT in patients with heart failure with reduced ejection fraction is associated with a decreased risk of mortality, while discontinuation is associated with an increased risk of mortality.¹⁹ However, recent registry data indicate that intensity of GDMT is just as likely to be decreased as increased during the hospitalization.²⁰ Nevertheless, predischarge initiation of medications may be associated with higher attained doses in follow-up.²¹

Preparing for Discharge

Preparing a patient for discharge after a heart failure hospitalization involves stabilizing the medical condition as well as ensuring that the patient and caregivers have the medication, equipment, and self-care resources at home necessary to manage the condition. Several frameworks have been put forth to help care teams analyze a patient’s readiness for discharge. One is the B-PREPARED score,²² a validated instrument to discriminate among patients with regard to their readiness to discharge from the hospital. This instrument highlights the importance of several key factors that should be addressed during the discharge process, including counseling and written instructions about medications and their side effects; information about equipment needs and community resources; and information on activity levels and restrictions. Nurse education and discharge coordination can improve patients’ perception of discharge readiness,²³ although whether this discharge readiness translates into improved readmission rates appears to depend on the specific follow-up intervention design.⁹

Prior to discharge, it is important to arrange postdischarge follow-up appointments, as emphasized by the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association (ACC/AHA) guidelines.²⁴ The use of nurse navigators can help with planning follow-up appointments. For example, the ACC Patient Navigator Program was applied in a single-center study of 120 patients randomized to the program versus usual care.²⁵ This study found a significant increase in patient education and follow-up appointments compared to usual care, and a numerical decrease in hospital readmissions, although the finding was not statistically significant.²⁵

A third critical component of preparing for discharge is identifying and addressing social barriers to care. In a study of patients stratified by household income, patients in the lowest income quartile had a higher readmission rate than patients in the highest income quartile.²⁶ Poverty also correlates with heart failure mortality.²⁷ Social factors play an important role in many aspects of patients’ ability to manage their health, including self-care, medication adherence, and ability to follow-up. Identifying these social factors prior to discharge is the first step to addressing them. While few studies specifically address the role of social workers in the management of heart failure care, the general medical literature suggests that social workers embedded in transitional care teams can augment readmission reduction efforts.²⁸

After Discharge

Patients recently discharged from the hospital who have not yet attended their postdischarge appointment are in an incredibly vulnerable phase of care. Patients who are discharged from the hospital may not yet be connected with outpatient care. During this initial transitional care period, feedback loops involving patient communication back to the clinic, and clinic communication back to the patient, are critical to helping patients remain stable. For example, consider monitoring weights daily after hospital discharge. A patient at home can report increasing weights to a provider, who can then recommend an increased dose of diuretic. The patient can complete the feedback loop by taking the extra medication and monitoring the return of weight back to normal.

While daily weight monitoring is a simple process improvement that relies on the principle of establishing feedback loops, many other strategies exist. One commonly employed tool is the postdischarge telephone follow-up call, which is often coupled with other interventions in a comprehensive care bundle.⁸ During the telephone call, several process-of-care defects can be corrected, including missing medications or missing information on appointment times.

Beyond the telephone, newer technologies show promise for helping develop feedback loops for patients at home. One such technology is telemonitoring, whereby physiologic information such as weight, heart rate, and blood pressure is collected and sent back to a monitoring center. While the principle holds promise, several studies have not demonstrated significantly different outcomes as compared to usual care.^13,29 Another promising technology is the CardioMEMS device (Abbott, Inc., Atlanta, GA), which can remotely transmit the pulmonary artery pressure, a physiologic signal which correlates with volume overload. There is now strong evidence supporting the efficacy of pulmonary artery pressure–guided heart failure management.^30,31

Finally, home visits can be an efficient way to communicate symptoms, enable clinical assessment, and provide recommendations. One program that implemented home visits, 24-hour nurses available by call, and telephone follow-up showed a statistically significant reduction in readmissions.³² Furthermore, a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials comparing home health to usual care showed decreased readmissions and mortality.³³ The efficacy may be in strengthening the feedback loop—home care improves compliance with weight monitoring, fluid restriction, and medications.³⁴ These studies provide a strong rationale for the benefits of home health in stabilizing heart failure patients postdischarge. Indeed, nurse home visits were 1 of the 2 process interventions in a Cochrane review of randomized controlled trials that were shown to statistically significantly decrease readmissions and mortality.⁹ These data underscore the importance of feedback loops for helping ensure patients are clinically stable.

Postdischarge Follow-Up Clinic Visit

The first clinic appointment postdischarge is an important check-in to help advance patient care. Several key tasks can be achieved during the postdischarge visit. First, the patient can be clinically stabilized by adjusting diuretic therapy. If the patient is clinically stable, GDMT can be uptitrated. Second, education around symptoms, medications, diet, and exercise can be reinforced. Finally, clinicians can help connect patients to other members of the multidisciplinary care team, including specialist care, home health, or cardiac rehabilitation.

Achieving 7-day follow-up visits after discharge has been a point of emphasis in national guidelines.²⁴ The ACC promotes a “See You in 7” challenge, advising that all patients discharged with a diagnosis of heart failure have a follow-up appointment within 7 days. Yet based on the latest available data, arrival rates to the postdischarge clinic are dismal, hovering around 30%.³⁵ In a multicenter observational study of hospitals participating in the “See You in 7” collaborative, hospitals were able to increase their 7-day follow-up appointment rates by 2% to 3%, and also noted an absolute decrease in readmission rates by 1% to 2%.³⁶ We have demonstrated, using a mathematical approach called queuing theory, that discharge appointment wait times and clinic access can be significantly improved by providing a modest capacity buffer to clinic availability.³⁷ Those interested in applying this model to their own clinical practice may do so with a free online calculator at http://hfresearch.org.

Another important aspect of postdischarge follow-up is appropriate management of the comorbidity burden, which, as noted, is often significant in patients hospitalized with heart failure.³⁸ For instance, in recent cohorts of hospitalized heart failure patients, the incidence of hypertension was 78%, coronary artery disease was more than 50%, atrial fibrillation was more than 40%, and diabetes was nearly 40%.³⁹ Given this burden of comorbidity, it is not surprising that only 35% of readmissions after an index heart failure hospitalization are for recurrent heart failure.⁴⁰ Coordinating care among primary care physicians and relevant subspecialists is thus essential. Phone calls and secure electronic messages are very helpful in achieving this. There is increasing interest in more nimble care models, such as the patient-centered specialty practice⁴¹ or the dyspnea clinic, to help bring coordinated resources to the patient.⁴²

Process of Process Improvement: Our Experiences

The previous sections outline a series of potential process improvements clinical teams and health systems can implement to impact heart failure readmissions. A plan on paper, however, does not equal a plan in actuality. How does one go about implementing these changes? We offer our local experience starting a heart failure transitional care program as a case study, then draw lessons learned as a set of practical tips for local teams to employ. What we hope to highlight is that there is a large difference between a completed process for transitional care of heart failure patients, and the process of developing that process itself. The former is the hardware, the latter is the software. The latter does not typically get highlighted, but it is absolutely critical to unlocking the capabilities of a team and the institution.

In 2015, Northwestern Memorial Hospital adopted a novel payment arrangement from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services for Medicare patients being discharged from the hospital with heart failure. Known as Bundled Payments for Care Improvement,⁴³ this bundled payment model incentivized Northwestern Memorial Hospital charge, principally by reducing hospital readmissions and by collaborating with skilled nursing facilities to control length of stay.

We approached this problem by drawing on the available literature,^44,45 and by first creating a schematic of our high-level approach, which comprised 3 major elements (Figure 2): identification of hospitalized heart failure patients, delivery of a care bundle to hospitalized heart failure patients in hospital, and coordinating postdischarge care, centered on a telephone call and a postdischarge visit.

We then proceeded by building out, in stepwise fashion, each component of our value chain, using Agile techniques as a guiding principle.⁴⁶ Agile, a productivity and process improvement mindset with roots in software development, emphasizes tackling 1 problem at a time, building out new features sequentially and completely, recognizing that the end user does not derive value from a program until new functionality is available for use. Rather than wholesale monolithic change, Agile emphasizes rapid iteration, prototyping, and discarding innovations not found to be helpful. The notion is to stand up new, incremental features rapidly, with each incremental improvement delivering value and helping to accelerate overall change.

Our experience building a robust way to identify heart failure cases is a good example of Agile process improvement in practice. At our hospital, identification of patients with heart failure was a challenge because more than half of heart failure patients are admitted to noncardiology floors. We developed a simple electronic health record query to detect heart failure patients, relying on parameters such as administration of intravenous diuretic or levels of BNP exceeding 100 ng/dL. We deployed this query, finding very high sensitivity for detection of heart failure patients.¹⁴ Patients found to have heart failure were then populated into a list in the electronic health record, which made patients’ heart failure status visible to all members of the health care team. Using this list, we were able to automate several processes necessary for heart failure care. For example, the list made it possible for cardiologists to know if there was a patient who perhaps needed cardiology consultation. Nurse navigators could know which patients needed heart failure education without having to be actively consulted by the admitting team. The same nurse navigators could then know upon discharge which patients needed a follow-up telephone call at 48 hours.

This list of heart failure patients was the end product, which was built through prototyping and iteration. For example, with our initial BNP cutoff of 300 ng/dL, we recognized we were missing several cases, and lowered the cutoff for the screener to 100 ng/dL. When we were satisfied this process was working well, we moved on to the next problem to tackle, avoiding trying to work on too many things at once. By doing so, we were able to focus our process improvement resources on 1 problem at a time, building up a suite of interventions. For our hospital, we settled on a bundle of interventions, captured by the mnemonic HEART:

Heart doctor sees patient in the hospital

Education about heart failure in the hospital

After-visit summary with 7-day appointment printed

Reach out to the patient by telephone within 72 hours

Treat the patient in clinic by the 7-day visit

Conclusion

We would like to emphasize that the elements of our heart failure readmissions interventions were not all put in place at once. This was an iterative process that proceeded in a stepwise fashion, with each step improving the care of our patients. We learned a number of lessons from our experience. First, we would advise that teams not try to do everything. One program simply cannot implement all possible readmission reduction interventions, and certainly not all at once. Trade-offs should be made, and interventions more likely to succeed in the local environment should be prioritized. In addition, interventions that do not fit and do not create synergy with the local practice environment should not be pursued.

Second, we would advise teams to start small, tackling a known problem in heart failure transitions of care first. This initial intuition is often right. An example might be improving 7-day appointments upon discharge. Starting with a problem that can be tackled builds process improvement muscle and improves team morale. Third, we would advise teams to consistently iterate on designs, tweaking and improving performance. Complex organizations always evolve; processes that work 1 year may fail the next because another element of the organization may have changed.

Finally, the framework presented in Figure 1 may be helpful in guiding how to structure interventions. Considering interventions to be delivered in the hospital, interventions to be delivered in the clinic, and how to set up feedback loops to support patients as outpatients help develop a comprehensive heart failure readmissions reduction program.

Corresponding author: R. Kannan Mutharasan, MD, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, 676 North Saint Clair St., Arkes Pavilion, Suite 7-038, Chicago, IL 60611;kannanm@northwestern.edu.

Financial disclosures: None.

From the Department of Surgery, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO.

Abstract

Background: Patients undergoing colorectal surgery are at high risk for postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE). Early ambulation has been encouraged to lower rates of VTE, but evidence demonstrating its effectiveness outside of a bundle is limited.

Objective: To create a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol in an effort to reduce postoperative VTE.

Methods: A single-center, retrospective, comparative study of patients who underwent colectomy or proctectomy was conducted. Outcomes of patients operated on prior to protocol implementation were compared with a cohort after implementation. The intervention studied was the implementation of a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol. The primary endpoint was postoperative VTE.

Results: There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group (n = 253) in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). After the protocol was implemented, ambulation rates on postoperative days 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively The VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% versus a rate of 0.4% in the postintervention group (P = 0.02).

Conclusion: Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a significant reduction in VTE. Commitment from patients, families, nurses, physician extenders, and physicians is critical to the success of the program.

Keywords: VTE; pulmonary embolism; deep vein thrombosis; postoperative; quality improvement.

Postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE) is a significant source of morbidity, mortality, and cost.^1,2 Colorectal surgery patients are at particularly high risk for VTE due to positioning during surgery, pelvic dissection, and other conditions often found in these patients, such as cancer and inflammatory bowel disease.³ A National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) analysis demonstrated an overall rate of VTE in colorectal surgery patients of 2.4%, although other studies have demonstrated rates up to 9%, even in those receiving appropriate chemoprophylaxis.^4-6 Many of these VTEs occur in the postdischarge setting. In a NSQIP study of colorectal surgery patients, the rate of VTE between discharge and 30 days was 0.47%.⁷ The cost burdenfor a postoperative VTE has been estimated to be more than $18,000.⁸

Studies from NSQIP have identified multiple factors associated with VTE in colorectal surgery patients, but NSQIP does not record ambulation as a standard variable.⁹ Multiple strategies have been implemented to reduce postoperative VTE. Often, these studies focus on increasing compliance with appropriate chemoprophylaxis, risk stratification, or bundling multiple strategies.^10,11 However, despite the fact that postsurgical ambulation is widely encouraged and recommended by the American Society of Colon and Rectal Surgeons clinical practice guidelines, there is little evidence demonstrating the role of ambulation alone in the reduction of VTE.^4,12 The purpose of this study was to create a multidisciplinary protocol to increase postoperative ambulation and evaluate its effect on VTE.

Methods

Setting

This study was conducted at a single academic tertiary care center.

Patients and Outcome Measures

All patients undergoing colectomy or proctectomy by surgeons in the section of colon and rectal surgery at a single institution between January 2011 and March 2017 were included. Colectomy and proctectomy were defined by CPT codes 44140, 44141, 44143, 44144, 44145, 44146, 44147, 44150, 44151, 44155, 44156, 44157, 44158, 44160, 44204, 44205, 44206, 44207, 44208, 44210, 44211, 44212, 44213, 45110, 45111, 45112, 45113, 45114, 45116, 45119, 45120, 45121, 45123, 45126, 45160, 45395, and 45397. The primary outcome of VTE within 30 days, including deep venous thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE), was measured using institution-specific data from NSQIP in both the pre-intervention and postintervention setting. The occurrence of both DVT and PE in 1 patient was counted as a single event of VTE. Ambulation rate on postoperative day (POD) 0, 1, and 2 was calculated by NSQIP in the pre-intervention setting (our institution-specific NSQIP recorded ambulation data for an unrelated project) and by review of the electronic health record in the postintervention setting, as this institution-specific variable was no longer being collected. Ambulation was defined as getting out of bed and taking at least 1 step. The threshold for ambulating each day was once on POD 0 and twice on PODs 1 and 2. Patients with missing ambulation data were excluded from the analysis. Both prior to and throughout the intervention, all patients were given VTE chemoprophylaxis with either low-dose unfractionated heparin or low-molecular-weight heparin prior to induction of anesthesia, with chemoprophylaxis extending an additional 21 days after discharge (unless specifically contraindicated); sequential compression devices; and standard orders to ambulate 3 times daily from POD 0 as part of the standard Enhanced Recovery After Surgery protocol.

Analysis

Statistical analysis was performed using univariate analysis. Chi-square test and univariate logistic regression were used to determine the association between ambulation rates and VTE in the pre-intervention group. Chi-square test was also used to compare ambulation and VTE rates between the pre-intervention and postintervention groups. Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle fidelity (the degree to which a PDSA cycle is carried out in accordance with the guiding principles of its use) was measured by recording the ambulation rates both before and after the intervention.¹³ Statistical analysis was performed using SAS Version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). This study was reviewed by the Washington University School of Medicine Institutional Review Board and deemed to be quality improvement, not human subjects research, and therefore did not require formal approval.

 

 

Baseline Outcome Rates

A total of 1762 patients were identified during the pre-intervention period. The overall VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% (n = 48), with 39 DVTs (2.2%) and 13 PEs (0.7%). Pre-intervention ambulation data were available on 590 patients. Baseline ambulation rates on PODs 0, 1, and 2 were 36.4% (213/590), 47.3% (279/590), and 50.2% (296/590), respectively. Patients who did not ambulate on POD 0 had a VTE rate of 4.3%, as compared to 0.9% in those who did ambulate (Table 1). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 1 had a VTE rate of 4.8%, compared to 1.1% in those who did ambulate (odds ratio [OR], 4.66; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.34 to 16.28). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 2 had a VTE rate of 5.4%, compared to 0.7% in those who did. Finally, those who ambulated twice on both PODs 1 and 2 had a 0% rate of VTE, compared to 4.9% in those who did not ambulate on both PODs.

Ambulation Protocol

After baseline outcome rates had been established, a multidisciplinary team of medical assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, and physicians worked together to identify all processes that involved postoperative ambulation. Given the significant differences in VTE rates between patients who ambulated and those that did not, we created a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol using the PDSA method.¹⁴ Multiple points of patient contact were chosen for intervention, and the ambulation protocol was implemented in June 2018 and continued for 7 months.

Patients were observed from their initial office visit with a surgeon, during the preoperative education encounter, and in the operating room and on the surgical ward until discharge. Representatives from multiple disciplines who encountered patients at various times in the process, including medical assistants, patient care technicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, physical therapists, and physicians, participated in a kick-off meeting to identify difficulties they encounter when encouraging patient ambulation. The following 4 areas were identified.

Barriers to Patient Ambulation

Patient Expectations. Patients did not appear to have a clear expectation of what their ambulation goals were postoperatively, despite the fact that each patient is given an operative pathway booklet that includes their goals for each day, including ambulation. The consensus was that patients were overwhelmed with the amount of information and, oftentimes, the severity of their diagnosis, so the information regarding ambulation was not retained. Nurses commented that patients frequently stated that they did not think their surgeon wanted them to get out of bed postoperatively.

Electronic Orders. There was confusion within the nursing staff regarding orders in the electronic health record compared to physician expectations. Orders stated patients should ambulate 3 times daily, but did not specify on which postoperative day this should start. Often, nursing verbal sign-out from the post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) would be an order for bedrest, despite no clear origin of this order. This created confusion among the nursing staff as to what the appropriate ambulation orders should be.

Nursing Workflow. The initial state of the nursing workflow was not conducive to evaluating for, or assisting with, ambulation. With no set time to assist and evaluate patients for ambulation, it turned into a task nurses needed to accomplish when they had extra time. With increasing demands of charting in the electronic health record, nurses often had to skip ambulation in order to accomplish other tasks.

Family Expectations. In addition to patient expectations, family members often had expectations that were not congruent with the planned postoperative course. Nurses stated family members would often tell them that they did not feel that their family member should be ambulating so soon after surgery. Often these family members had not attended preoperative education sessions with the patient. This was compounded by the uncertainty among the nursing staff regarding what exactly the ambulation orders were.

Interventions

Targeted interventions were created to address these 4 barriers to ambulation identified by staff.

Preoperative Education. Although all elective patients received a printed operative pathway booklet describing daily goals, including ambulation, patients still did not have a sufficient understanding of what was expected of them. The education session was modified to increase the time spent on both the expectation for and the rationale behind ambulation. That section of the education session ended with a verbal commitment and read-back of the expectations for ambulation by the patient.

Clarification of Electronic Orders. Postoperative orders within the colorectal standard pathway were changed, including specific time frames and frequency, to match the information provided in the patient education booklet. These orders were for ambulation within 4 hours of arrival to the floor, and the orders also noted that no patient should be on bedrest unless explicitly stated. From POD 1, all patients were to ambulate at least twice daily for the remainder of the hospital stay (patients were encouraged to walk 4 times daily, but we set a minimum expectation of twice daily for the order set). These orders were clarified with in-person meetings with the nursing staff and leadership from the PACU and the colorectal surgical ward.

Adjusted Nursing Workflow. Nurses were interviewed and asked to create a plan regarding how they could better incorporate ambulation into their daily workflow. Ambulation assessment was incorporated into the twice-per-shift recording of vital signs and patient safety assessment. This was recorded into the electronic health record at the same time as the patients’ vital signs. This allowed nurses to keep track of which patients would need extra assistance in ambulation and which patients were doing well on their own with the assistance of family. It also helped focus the resources of physical therapy and the single ambulation technician on the floor and to assist patients who needed more assistance.

Creation of Ambulation Encouragement Signs. The authors discovered that despite patients being told preoperatively about ambulation expectations, friends and family are not always included in these conversations. As nurses frequently cited both patients and family as reasons patients thought they should not walk, multiple signs inviting patients to take an active role in their recovery by ambulating were created and placed around the unit. The signs outlined the expectations of being out of bed and taking at least 1 step on the day of surgery and walking at least 4 times per day thereafter. In addition, we addressed frequently asked questions around issues such as walking with intravenous poles and urinary catheters. The posters were signed by all staff colorectal surgeons.

Results

Over the course of 7 months (June 2018 to December 2018), 253 postintervention patients were identified (Table 2). There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). The postintervention group was slightly older (60 versus 57 years) and had a higher percentage of patients with an American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status score greater than 2 (66.8% versus 51.2%). The postintervention group also had higher rates of both malignancy (53.4% versus 33.3%) and inflammatory bowel disease (18.2% versus 14.4%).

The fidelity of the PDSA cycle was measured by pre-intervention and postintervention ambulation rates. Ambulation rates on POD 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively (Table 3). The VTE rate decreased from 2.7% to 0.4% (P = 0.02), with 1 DVT and 0 PEs. It should be noted that the only patient who developed a VTE postintervention did not ambulate on PODs 0, 1, or 2.

Discussion

Postoperative VTE is a severe complication for postoperative colorectal surgery patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that increasing ambulation is associated with a lower rate of overall complications, and, when incorporated into a bundle, is associated with decreased rates of VTE.^11,15 However, this is the first study to our knowledge demonstrating that creation of an ambulation protocol alone is associated with a decrease in VTE.

Analysis of pre-intervention data demonstrated a strong association between ambulation and an absence of VTE. No patient who ambulated on PODs 0, 1, and 2 developed a VTE. Based on those results, we moved forward with creating the ambulation protocol. While ambulation stayed stable on POD 0, there were 60% and 65% increases on PODs 1 and 2, respectively. Nurses cited late arrival to the floor for second and third start cases as the primary difficulty in getting patients to ambulate more on POD 0.

We believe the key to the success of the ambulation protocol was its multidisciplinary nature. Certainly, the easiest way to create an ambulation protocol is to change the postoperative orders to state patients must walk 4 times per day. However, if the nursing staff is unable or unwilling to carry out these orders, the orders serve little purpose. In order to make lasting changes, all stakeholders in the process must be identified. In our case, stakeholders included surgery and nursing leadership, surgeons, nurse practitioners, nurses, medical assistants, physical therapists, patient care technicians, and patients. This is where we utilized kaizen, a core principle of Lean methodology that empowers employees at the level of the work being carried out to propose ideas for improvement.¹⁶ From the beginning of the patient experience, the health care practitioners who were carrying out each step of the process were best able to identify the problems and create solutions. In addition, stakeholders were given regular updates regarding how their efforts were increasing ambulation rates and the results at the end of the study period.

This study also demonstrates that, in a health care system increasingly focused on both quality and cost, significant improvements in quality can be made without increasing cost or resource utilization. Early in the process, it was proposed that the only way to increase the ambulation rate would be to increase the number of physical therapists, nurses, and nursing assistants. However, after identifying the root causes of the problem, the solutions had more to do with improving workflow and fixing problem areas identified by the staff.

In addition to having a positive effect on the outcome studied, collaborative projects such as this between physicians and nurses may lead to increased nursing job satisfaction. A meta-analysis of 31 studies identified nurse-physician collaboration and autonomy as 2 factors that correlate most strongly with nursing satisfaction.¹⁷ A Cochrane review also suggests that practice-based interprofessional collaboration may lead to improved health care processes and outcomes.¹⁸

This study has several limitations. Pre-intervention ambulation rates were abstracted from institution-specific NSQIP data, and missing data were excluded from analysis. Also, due to the retrospective collection of the pre-intervention data, the distance of ambulation could not be quantified. The bar for ambulation is low, as patients were only required to get out of bed and walk 1 step. However, we feel that getting out of bed and taking even 1 step is substantially better than complete bedrest. It is likely that once patients cross the threshold of taking 1 step, they are more likely to ambulate. An area of future study may be to more precisely define the relationship between the quantity of ambulation in steps and its effect on VTE. Finally, we acknowledge that while there is no direct increase in costs, implementing an ambulation protocol does take time from all who participate in the project.

Conclusion

Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a decrease in postoperative VTE rates in colorectal surgery patients. A multidisciplinary approach is critical to identify the underlying problems and propose effective solutions. Further studies are required to better correlate the distance of ambulation and its effect on VTE. However, this study shows that even a minimum of 1 step is associated with decreased VTE rates.

Corresponding author: Aneel Damle, MD, MBA, Colon & Rectal Surgery Associates, 3433 Broadway St. NE, Suite 115, Minneapolis, MN 55413; adamle@CRSAL.org.

Financial disclosures: None.

From the Department of Surgery, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO.

Abstract

Background: Patients undergoing colorectal surgery are at high risk for postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE). Early ambulation has been encouraged to lower rates of VTE, but evidence demonstrating its effectiveness outside of a bundle is limited.

Objective: To create a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol in an effort to reduce postoperative VTE.

Methods: A single-center, retrospective, comparative study of patients who underwent colectomy or proctectomy was conducted. Outcomes of patients operated on prior to protocol implementation were compared with a cohort after implementation. The intervention studied was the implementation of a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol. The primary endpoint was postoperative VTE.

Results: There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group (n = 253) in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). After the protocol was implemented, ambulation rates on postoperative days 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively The VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% versus a rate of 0.4% in the postintervention group (P = 0.02).

Conclusion: Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a significant reduction in VTE. Commitment from patients, families, nurses, physician extenders, and physicians is critical to the success of the program.

Keywords: VTE; pulmonary embolism; deep vein thrombosis; postoperative; quality improvement.

Postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE) is a significant source of morbidity, mortality, and cost.^1,2 Colorectal surgery patients are at particularly high risk for VTE due to positioning during surgery, pelvic dissection, and other conditions often found in these patients, such as cancer and inflammatory bowel disease.³ A National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) analysis demonstrated an overall rate of VTE in colorectal surgery patients of 2.4%, although other studies have demonstrated rates up to 9%, even in those receiving appropriate chemoprophylaxis.^4-6 Many of these VTEs occur in the postdischarge setting. In a NSQIP study of colorectal surgery patients, the rate of VTE between discharge and 30 days was 0.47%.⁷ The cost burdenfor a postoperative VTE has been estimated to be more than $18,000.⁸

Studies from NSQIP have identified multiple factors associated with VTE in colorectal surgery patients, but NSQIP does not record ambulation as a standard variable.⁹ Multiple strategies have been implemented to reduce postoperative VTE. Often, these studies focus on increasing compliance with appropriate chemoprophylaxis, risk stratification, or bundling multiple strategies.^10,11 However, despite the fact that postsurgical ambulation is widely encouraged and recommended by the American Society of Colon and Rectal Surgeons clinical practice guidelines, there is little evidence demonstrating the role of ambulation alone in the reduction of VTE.^4,12 The purpose of this study was to create a multidisciplinary protocol to increase postoperative ambulation and evaluate its effect on VTE.

Methods

Setting

This study was conducted at a single academic tertiary care center.

Patients and Outcome Measures

All patients undergoing colectomy or proctectomy by surgeons in the section of colon and rectal surgery at a single institution between January 2011 and March 2017 were included. Colectomy and proctectomy were defined by CPT codes 44140, 44141, 44143, 44144, 44145, 44146, 44147, 44150, 44151, 44155, 44156, 44157, 44158, 44160, 44204, 44205, 44206, 44207, 44208, 44210, 44211, 44212, 44213, 45110, 45111, 45112, 45113, 45114, 45116, 45119, 45120, 45121, 45123, 45126, 45160, 45395, and 45397. The primary outcome of VTE within 30 days, including deep venous thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE), was measured using institution-specific data from NSQIP in both the pre-intervention and postintervention setting. The occurrence of both DVT and PE in 1 patient was counted as a single event of VTE. Ambulation rate on postoperative day (POD) 0, 1, and 2 was calculated by NSQIP in the pre-intervention setting (our institution-specific NSQIP recorded ambulation data for an unrelated project) and by review of the electronic health record in the postintervention setting, as this institution-specific variable was no longer being collected. Ambulation was defined as getting out of bed and taking at least 1 step. The threshold for ambulating each day was once on POD 0 and twice on PODs 1 and 2. Patients with missing ambulation data were excluded from the analysis. Both prior to and throughout the intervention, all patients were given VTE chemoprophylaxis with either low-dose unfractionated heparin or low-molecular-weight heparin prior to induction of anesthesia, with chemoprophylaxis extending an additional 21 days after discharge (unless specifically contraindicated); sequential compression devices; and standard orders to ambulate 3 times daily from POD 0 as part of the standard Enhanced Recovery After Surgery protocol.

Analysis

Statistical analysis was performed using univariate analysis. Chi-square test and univariate logistic regression were used to determine the association between ambulation rates and VTE in the pre-intervention group. Chi-square test was also used to compare ambulation and VTE rates between the pre-intervention and postintervention groups. Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle fidelity (the degree to which a PDSA cycle is carried out in accordance with the guiding principles of its use) was measured by recording the ambulation rates both before and after the intervention.¹³ Statistical analysis was performed using SAS Version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). This study was reviewed by the Washington University School of Medicine Institutional Review Board and deemed to be quality improvement, not human subjects research, and therefore did not require formal approval.

 

 

Baseline Outcome Rates

A total of 1762 patients were identified during the pre-intervention period. The overall VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% (n = 48), with 39 DVTs (2.2%) and 13 PEs (0.7%). Pre-intervention ambulation data were available on 590 patients. Baseline ambulation rates on PODs 0, 1, and 2 were 36.4% (213/590), 47.3% (279/590), and 50.2% (296/590), respectively. Patients who did not ambulate on POD 0 had a VTE rate of 4.3%, as compared to 0.9% in those who did ambulate (Table 1). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 1 had a VTE rate of 4.8%, compared to 1.1% in those who did ambulate (odds ratio [OR], 4.66; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.34 to 16.28). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 2 had a VTE rate of 5.4%, compared to 0.7% in those who did. Finally, those who ambulated twice on both PODs 1 and 2 had a 0% rate of VTE, compared to 4.9% in those who did not ambulate on both PODs.

Ambulation Protocol

After baseline outcome rates had been established, a multidisciplinary team of medical assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, and physicians worked together to identify all processes that involved postoperative ambulation. Given the significant differences in VTE rates between patients who ambulated and those that did not, we created a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol using the PDSA method.¹⁴ Multiple points of patient contact were chosen for intervention, and the ambulation protocol was implemented in June 2018 and continued for 7 months.

Patients were observed from their initial office visit with a surgeon, during the preoperative education encounter, and in the operating room and on the surgical ward until discharge. Representatives from multiple disciplines who encountered patients at various times in the process, including medical assistants, patient care technicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, physical therapists, and physicians, participated in a kick-off meeting to identify difficulties they encounter when encouraging patient ambulation. The following 4 areas were identified.

Barriers to Patient Ambulation

Patient Expectations. Patients did not appear to have a clear expectation of what their ambulation goals were postoperatively, despite the fact that each patient is given an operative pathway booklet that includes their goals for each day, including ambulation. The consensus was that patients were overwhelmed with the amount of information and, oftentimes, the severity of their diagnosis, so the information regarding ambulation was not retained. Nurses commented that patients frequently stated that they did not think their surgeon wanted them to get out of bed postoperatively.

Electronic Orders. There was confusion within the nursing staff regarding orders in the electronic health record compared to physician expectations. Orders stated patients should ambulate 3 times daily, but did not specify on which postoperative day this should start. Often, nursing verbal sign-out from the post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) would be an order for bedrest, despite no clear origin of this order. This created confusion among the nursing staff as to what the appropriate ambulation orders should be.

Nursing Workflow. The initial state of the nursing workflow was not conducive to evaluating for, or assisting with, ambulation. With no set time to assist and evaluate patients for ambulation, it turned into a task nurses needed to accomplish when they had extra time. With increasing demands of charting in the electronic health record, nurses often had to skip ambulation in order to accomplish other tasks.

Family Expectations. In addition to patient expectations, family members often had expectations that were not congruent with the planned postoperative course. Nurses stated family members would often tell them that they did not feel that their family member should be ambulating so soon after surgery. Often these family members had not attended preoperative education sessions with the patient. This was compounded by the uncertainty among the nursing staff regarding what exactly the ambulation orders were.

Interventions

Targeted interventions were created to address these 4 barriers to ambulation identified by staff.

Preoperative Education. Although all elective patients received a printed operative pathway booklet describing daily goals, including ambulation, patients still did not have a sufficient understanding of what was expected of them. The education session was modified to increase the time spent on both the expectation for and the rationale behind ambulation. That section of the education session ended with a verbal commitment and read-back of the expectations for ambulation by the patient.

Clarification of Electronic Orders. Postoperative orders within the colorectal standard pathway were changed, including specific time frames and frequency, to match the information provided in the patient education booklet. These orders were for ambulation within 4 hours of arrival to the floor, and the orders also noted that no patient should be on bedrest unless explicitly stated. From POD 1, all patients were to ambulate at least twice daily for the remainder of the hospital stay (patients were encouraged to walk 4 times daily, but we set a minimum expectation of twice daily for the order set). These orders were clarified with in-person meetings with the nursing staff and leadership from the PACU and the colorectal surgical ward.

Adjusted Nursing Workflow. Nurses were interviewed and asked to create a plan regarding how they could better incorporate ambulation into their daily workflow. Ambulation assessment was incorporated into the twice-per-shift recording of vital signs and patient safety assessment. This was recorded into the electronic health record at the same time as the patients’ vital signs. This allowed nurses to keep track of which patients would need extra assistance in ambulation and which patients were doing well on their own with the assistance of family. It also helped focus the resources of physical therapy and the single ambulation technician on the floor and to assist patients who needed more assistance.

Creation of Ambulation Encouragement Signs. The authors discovered that despite patients being told preoperatively about ambulation expectations, friends and family are not always included in these conversations. As nurses frequently cited both patients and family as reasons patients thought they should not walk, multiple signs inviting patients to take an active role in their recovery by ambulating were created and placed around the unit. The signs outlined the expectations of being out of bed and taking at least 1 step on the day of surgery and walking at least 4 times per day thereafter. In addition, we addressed frequently asked questions around issues such as walking with intravenous poles and urinary catheters. The posters were signed by all staff colorectal surgeons.

Results

Over the course of 7 months (June 2018 to December 2018), 253 postintervention patients were identified (Table 2). There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). The postintervention group was slightly older (60 versus 57 years) and had a higher percentage of patients with an American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status score greater than 2 (66.8% versus 51.2%). The postintervention group also had higher rates of both malignancy (53.4% versus 33.3%) and inflammatory bowel disease (18.2% versus 14.4%).

The fidelity of the PDSA cycle was measured by pre-intervention and postintervention ambulation rates. Ambulation rates on POD 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively (Table 3). The VTE rate decreased from 2.7% to 0.4% (P = 0.02), with 1 DVT and 0 PEs. It should be noted that the only patient who developed a VTE postintervention did not ambulate on PODs 0, 1, or 2.

Discussion

Postoperative VTE is a severe complication for postoperative colorectal surgery patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that increasing ambulation is associated with a lower rate of overall complications, and, when incorporated into a bundle, is associated with decreased rates of VTE.^11,15 However, this is the first study to our knowledge demonstrating that creation of an ambulation protocol alone is associated with a decrease in VTE.

Analysis of pre-intervention data demonstrated a strong association between ambulation and an absence of VTE. No patient who ambulated on PODs 0, 1, and 2 developed a VTE. Based on those results, we moved forward with creating the ambulation protocol. While ambulation stayed stable on POD 0, there were 60% and 65% increases on PODs 1 and 2, respectively. Nurses cited late arrival to the floor for second and third start cases as the primary difficulty in getting patients to ambulate more on POD 0.

We believe the key to the success of the ambulation protocol was its multidisciplinary nature. Certainly, the easiest way to create an ambulation protocol is to change the postoperative orders to state patients must walk 4 times per day. However, if the nursing staff is unable or unwilling to carry out these orders, the orders serve little purpose. In order to make lasting changes, all stakeholders in the process must be identified. In our case, stakeholders included surgery and nursing leadership, surgeons, nurse practitioners, nurses, medical assistants, physical therapists, patient care technicians, and patients. This is where we utilized kaizen, a core principle of Lean methodology that empowers employees at the level of the work being carried out to propose ideas for improvement.¹⁶ From the beginning of the patient experience, the health care practitioners who were carrying out each step of the process were best able to identify the problems and create solutions. In addition, stakeholders were given regular updates regarding how their efforts were increasing ambulation rates and the results at the end of the study period.

This study also demonstrates that, in a health care system increasingly focused on both quality and cost, significant improvements in quality can be made without increasing cost or resource utilization. Early in the process, it was proposed that the only way to increase the ambulation rate would be to increase the number of physical therapists, nurses, and nursing assistants. However, after identifying the root causes of the problem, the solutions had more to do with improving workflow and fixing problem areas identified by the staff.

In addition to having a positive effect on the outcome studied, collaborative projects such as this between physicians and nurses may lead to increased nursing job satisfaction. A meta-analysis of 31 studies identified nurse-physician collaboration and autonomy as 2 factors that correlate most strongly with nursing satisfaction.¹⁷ A Cochrane review also suggests that practice-based interprofessional collaboration may lead to improved health care processes and outcomes.¹⁸

This study has several limitations. Pre-intervention ambulation rates were abstracted from institution-specific NSQIP data, and missing data were excluded from analysis. Also, due to the retrospective collection of the pre-intervention data, the distance of ambulation could not be quantified. The bar for ambulation is low, as patients were only required to get out of bed and walk 1 step. However, we feel that getting out of bed and taking even 1 step is substantially better than complete bedrest. It is likely that once patients cross the threshold of taking 1 step, they are more likely to ambulate. An area of future study may be to more precisely define the relationship between the quantity of ambulation in steps and its effect on VTE. Finally, we acknowledge that while there is no direct increase in costs, implementing an ambulation protocol does take time from all who participate in the project.

Conclusion

Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a decrease in postoperative VTE rates in colorectal surgery patients. A multidisciplinary approach is critical to identify the underlying problems and propose effective solutions. Further studies are required to better correlate the distance of ambulation and its effect on VTE. However, this study shows that even a minimum of 1 step is associated with decreased VTE rates.

Corresponding author: Aneel Damle, MD, MBA, Colon & Rectal Surgery Associates, 3433 Broadway St. NE, Suite 115, Minneapolis, MN 55413; adamle@CRSAL.org.

Financial disclosures: None.

From the Department of Surgery, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO.

Abstract

Background: Patients undergoing colorectal surgery are at high risk for postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE). Early ambulation has been encouraged to lower rates of VTE, but evidence demonstrating its effectiveness outside of a bundle is limited.

Objective: To create a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol in an effort to reduce postoperative VTE.

Methods: A single-center, retrospective, comparative study of patients who underwent colectomy or proctectomy was conducted. Outcomes of patients operated on prior to protocol implementation were compared with a cohort after implementation. The intervention studied was the implementation of a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol. The primary endpoint was postoperative VTE.

Results: There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group (n = 253) in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). After the protocol was implemented, ambulation rates on postoperative days 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively The VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% versus a rate of 0.4% in the postintervention group (P = 0.02).

Conclusion: Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a significant reduction in VTE. Commitment from patients, families, nurses, physician extenders, and physicians is critical to the success of the program.

Keywords: VTE; pulmonary embolism; deep vein thrombosis; postoperative; quality improvement.

Postoperative venous thromboembolism (VTE) is a significant source of morbidity, mortality, and cost.^1,2 Colorectal surgery patients are at particularly high risk for VTE due to positioning during surgery, pelvic dissection, and other conditions often found in these patients, such as cancer and inflammatory bowel disease.³ A National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) analysis demonstrated an overall rate of VTE in colorectal surgery patients of 2.4%, although other studies have demonstrated rates up to 9%, even in those receiving appropriate chemoprophylaxis.^4-6 Many of these VTEs occur in the postdischarge setting. In a NSQIP study of colorectal surgery patients, the rate of VTE between discharge and 30 days was 0.47%.⁷ The cost burdenfor a postoperative VTE has been estimated to be more than $18,000.⁸

Studies from NSQIP have identified multiple factors associated with VTE in colorectal surgery patients, but NSQIP does not record ambulation as a standard variable.⁹ Multiple strategies have been implemented to reduce postoperative VTE. Often, these studies focus on increasing compliance with appropriate chemoprophylaxis, risk stratification, or bundling multiple strategies.^10,11 However, despite the fact that postsurgical ambulation is widely encouraged and recommended by the American Society of Colon and Rectal Surgeons clinical practice guidelines, there is little evidence demonstrating the role of ambulation alone in the reduction of VTE.^4,12 The purpose of this study was to create a multidisciplinary protocol to increase postoperative ambulation and evaluate its effect on VTE.

Methods

Setting

This study was conducted at a single academic tertiary care center.

Patients and Outcome Measures

All patients undergoing colectomy or proctectomy by surgeons in the section of colon and rectal surgery at a single institution between January 2011 and March 2017 were included. Colectomy and proctectomy were defined by CPT codes 44140, 44141, 44143, 44144, 44145, 44146, 44147, 44150, 44151, 44155, 44156, 44157, 44158, 44160, 44204, 44205, 44206, 44207, 44208, 44210, 44211, 44212, 44213, 45110, 45111, 45112, 45113, 45114, 45116, 45119, 45120, 45121, 45123, 45126, 45160, 45395, and 45397. The primary outcome of VTE within 30 days, including deep venous thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE), was measured using institution-specific data from NSQIP in both the pre-intervention and postintervention setting. The occurrence of both DVT and PE in 1 patient was counted as a single event of VTE. Ambulation rate on postoperative day (POD) 0, 1, and 2 was calculated by NSQIP in the pre-intervention setting (our institution-specific NSQIP recorded ambulation data for an unrelated project) and by review of the electronic health record in the postintervention setting, as this institution-specific variable was no longer being collected. Ambulation was defined as getting out of bed and taking at least 1 step. The threshold for ambulating each day was once on POD 0 and twice on PODs 1 and 2. Patients with missing ambulation data were excluded from the analysis. Both prior to and throughout the intervention, all patients were given VTE chemoprophylaxis with either low-dose unfractionated heparin or low-molecular-weight heparin prior to induction of anesthesia, with chemoprophylaxis extending an additional 21 days after discharge (unless specifically contraindicated); sequential compression devices; and standard orders to ambulate 3 times daily from POD 0 as part of the standard Enhanced Recovery After Surgery protocol.

Analysis

Statistical analysis was performed using univariate analysis. Chi-square test and univariate logistic regression were used to determine the association between ambulation rates and VTE in the pre-intervention group. Chi-square test was also used to compare ambulation and VTE rates between the pre-intervention and postintervention groups. Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle fidelity (the degree to which a PDSA cycle is carried out in accordance with the guiding principles of its use) was measured by recording the ambulation rates both before and after the intervention.¹³ Statistical analysis was performed using SAS Version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). This study was reviewed by the Washington University School of Medicine Institutional Review Board and deemed to be quality improvement, not human subjects research, and therefore did not require formal approval.

 

 

Baseline Outcome Rates

A total of 1762 patients were identified during the pre-intervention period. The overall VTE rate in the pre-intervention group was 2.7% (n = 48), with 39 DVTs (2.2%) and 13 PEs (0.7%). Pre-intervention ambulation data were available on 590 patients. Baseline ambulation rates on PODs 0, 1, and 2 were 36.4% (213/590), 47.3% (279/590), and 50.2% (296/590), respectively. Patients who did not ambulate on POD 0 had a VTE rate of 4.3%, as compared to 0.9% in those who did ambulate (Table 1). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 1 had a VTE rate of 4.8%, compared to 1.1% in those who did ambulate (odds ratio [OR], 4.66; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.34 to 16.28). Patients who did not ambulate twice on POD 2 had a VTE rate of 5.4%, compared to 0.7% in those who did. Finally, those who ambulated twice on both PODs 1 and 2 had a 0% rate of VTE, compared to 4.9% in those who did not ambulate on both PODs.

Ambulation Protocol

After baseline outcome rates had been established, a multidisciplinary team of medical assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, and physicians worked together to identify all processes that involved postoperative ambulation. Given the significant differences in VTE rates between patients who ambulated and those that did not, we created a multidisciplinary ambulation protocol using the PDSA method.¹⁴ Multiple points of patient contact were chosen for intervention, and the ambulation protocol was implemented in June 2018 and continued for 7 months.

Patients were observed from their initial office visit with a surgeon, during the preoperative education encounter, and in the operating room and on the surgical ward until discharge. Representatives from multiple disciplines who encountered patients at various times in the process, including medical assistants, patient care technicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, physical therapists, and physicians, participated in a kick-off meeting to identify difficulties they encounter when encouraging patient ambulation. The following 4 areas were identified.

Barriers to Patient Ambulation

Patient Expectations. Patients did not appear to have a clear expectation of what their ambulation goals were postoperatively, despite the fact that each patient is given an operative pathway booklet that includes their goals for each day, including ambulation. The consensus was that patients were overwhelmed with the amount of information and, oftentimes, the severity of their diagnosis, so the information regarding ambulation was not retained. Nurses commented that patients frequently stated that they did not think their surgeon wanted them to get out of bed postoperatively.

Electronic Orders. There was confusion within the nursing staff regarding orders in the electronic health record compared to physician expectations. Orders stated patients should ambulate 3 times daily, but did not specify on which postoperative day this should start. Often, nursing verbal sign-out from the post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) would be an order for bedrest, despite no clear origin of this order. This created confusion among the nursing staff as to what the appropriate ambulation orders should be.

Nursing Workflow. The initial state of the nursing workflow was not conducive to evaluating for, or assisting with, ambulation. With no set time to assist and evaluate patients for ambulation, it turned into a task nurses needed to accomplish when they had extra time. With increasing demands of charting in the electronic health record, nurses often had to skip ambulation in order to accomplish other tasks.

Family Expectations. In addition to patient expectations, family members often had expectations that were not congruent with the planned postoperative course. Nurses stated family members would often tell them that they did not feel that their family member should be ambulating so soon after surgery. Often these family members had not attended preoperative education sessions with the patient. This was compounded by the uncertainty among the nursing staff regarding what exactly the ambulation orders were.

Interventions

Targeted interventions were created to address these 4 barriers to ambulation identified by staff.

Preoperative Education. Although all elective patients received a printed operative pathway booklet describing daily goals, including ambulation, patients still did not have a sufficient understanding of what was expected of them. The education session was modified to increase the time spent on both the expectation for and the rationale behind ambulation. That section of the education session ended with a verbal commitment and read-back of the expectations for ambulation by the patient.

Clarification of Electronic Orders. Postoperative orders within the colorectal standard pathway were changed, including specific time frames and frequency, to match the information provided in the patient education booklet. These orders were for ambulation within 4 hours of arrival to the floor, and the orders also noted that no patient should be on bedrest unless explicitly stated. From POD 1, all patients were to ambulate at least twice daily for the remainder of the hospital stay (patients were encouraged to walk 4 times daily, but we set a minimum expectation of twice daily for the order set). These orders were clarified with in-person meetings with the nursing staff and leadership from the PACU and the colorectal surgical ward.

Adjusted Nursing Workflow. Nurses were interviewed and asked to create a plan regarding how they could better incorporate ambulation into their daily workflow. Ambulation assessment was incorporated into the twice-per-shift recording of vital signs and patient safety assessment. This was recorded into the electronic health record at the same time as the patients’ vital signs. This allowed nurses to keep track of which patients would need extra assistance in ambulation and which patients were doing well on their own with the assistance of family. It also helped focus the resources of physical therapy and the single ambulation technician on the floor and to assist patients who needed more assistance.

Creation of Ambulation Encouragement Signs. The authors discovered that despite patients being told preoperatively about ambulation expectations, friends and family are not always included in these conversations. As nurses frequently cited both patients and family as reasons patients thought they should not walk, multiple signs inviting patients to take an active role in their recovery by ambulating were created and placed around the unit. The signs outlined the expectations of being out of bed and taking at least 1 step on the day of surgery and walking at least 4 times per day thereafter. In addition, we addressed frequently asked questions around issues such as walking with intravenous poles and urinary catheters. The posters were signed by all staff colorectal surgeons.

Results

Over the course of 7 months (June 2018 to December 2018), 253 postintervention patients were identified (Table 2). There was no difference between the pre-intervention group (n = 1762) and the postintervention group in terms of sex, race, origin, emergency status, operative time, and the majority of medical comorbidities (with the exception of smoking status and congestive heart failure). The postintervention group was slightly older (60 versus 57 years) and had a higher percentage of patients with an American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status score greater than 2 (66.8% versus 51.2%). The postintervention group also had higher rates of both malignancy (53.4% versus 33.3%) and inflammatory bowel disease (18.2% versus 14.4%).

The fidelity of the PDSA cycle was measured by pre-intervention and postintervention ambulation rates. Ambulation rates on POD 0, 1, and 2 improved from 36.4%, 47.3%, and 50.2% to 36.8%, 74.7%, and 82.6%, respectively (Table 3). The VTE rate decreased from 2.7% to 0.4% (P = 0.02), with 1 DVT and 0 PEs. It should be noted that the only patient who developed a VTE postintervention did not ambulate on PODs 0, 1, or 2.

Discussion

Postoperative VTE is a severe complication for postoperative colorectal surgery patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that increasing ambulation is associated with a lower rate of overall complications, and, when incorporated into a bundle, is associated with decreased rates of VTE.^11,15 However, this is the first study to our knowledge demonstrating that creation of an ambulation protocol alone is associated with a decrease in VTE.

Analysis of pre-intervention data demonstrated a strong association between ambulation and an absence of VTE. No patient who ambulated on PODs 0, 1, and 2 developed a VTE. Based on those results, we moved forward with creating the ambulation protocol. While ambulation stayed stable on POD 0, there were 60% and 65% increases on PODs 1 and 2, respectively. Nurses cited late arrival to the floor for second and third start cases as the primary difficulty in getting patients to ambulate more on POD 0.

We believe the key to the success of the ambulation protocol was its multidisciplinary nature. Certainly, the easiest way to create an ambulation protocol is to change the postoperative orders to state patients must walk 4 times per day. However, if the nursing staff is unable or unwilling to carry out these orders, the orders serve little purpose. In order to make lasting changes, all stakeholders in the process must be identified. In our case, stakeholders included surgery and nursing leadership, surgeons, nurse practitioners, nurses, medical assistants, physical therapists, patient care technicians, and patients. This is where we utilized kaizen, a core principle of Lean methodology that empowers employees at the level of the work being carried out to propose ideas for improvement.¹⁶ From the beginning of the patient experience, the health care practitioners who were carrying out each step of the process were best able to identify the problems and create solutions. In addition, stakeholders were given regular updates regarding how their efforts were increasing ambulation rates and the results at the end of the study period.

This study also demonstrates that, in a health care system increasingly focused on both quality and cost, significant improvements in quality can be made without increasing cost or resource utilization. Early in the process, it was proposed that the only way to increase the ambulation rate would be to increase the number of physical therapists, nurses, and nursing assistants. However, after identifying the root causes of the problem, the solutions had more to do with improving workflow and fixing problem areas identified by the staff.

In addition to having a positive effect on the outcome studied, collaborative projects such as this between physicians and nurses may lead to increased nursing job satisfaction. A meta-analysis of 31 studies identified nurse-physician collaboration and autonomy as 2 factors that correlate most strongly with nursing satisfaction.¹⁷ A Cochrane review also suggests that practice-based interprofessional collaboration may lead to improved health care processes and outcomes.¹⁸

This study has several limitations. Pre-intervention ambulation rates were abstracted from institution-specific NSQIP data, and missing data were excluded from analysis. Also, due to the retrospective collection of the pre-intervention data, the distance of ambulation could not be quantified. The bar for ambulation is low, as patients were only required to get out of bed and walk 1 step. However, we feel that getting out of bed and taking even 1 step is substantially better than complete bedrest. It is likely that once patients cross the threshold of taking 1 step, they are more likely to ambulate. An area of future study may be to more precisely define the relationship between the quantity of ambulation in steps and its effect on VTE. Finally, we acknowledge that while there is no direct increase in costs, implementing an ambulation protocol does take time from all who participate in the project.

Conclusion

Creation of an ambulation protocol is associated with a decrease in postoperative VTE rates in colorectal surgery patients. A multidisciplinary approach is critical to identify the underlying problems and propose effective solutions. Further studies are required to better correlate the distance of ambulation and its effect on VTE. However, this study shows that even a minimum of 1 step is associated with decreased VTE rates.

Corresponding author: Aneel Damle, MD, MBA, Colon & Rectal Surgery Associates, 3433 Broadway St. NE, Suite 115, Minneapolis, MN 55413; adamle@CRSAL.org.

Financial disclosures: None.